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INTRODUCTION

Among the products of Texas' 68th Legislature was the first comprehensive revision since 1957 of those provisions of the state's
Mental Health Code dealing with involuntary treatment of the mentally ill.' The revision, Senate Bill 435, was authored by Senator
Ray Farabee. Bill 435 was based largelym-although not entirely1. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, §§ 1-104, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 505-26, revised
by Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 47, §§ 1.100, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 211, 211-68. For purposes of
this article, the Code prior to its 1983 revision will be cited as: Mental Health Code, ch. 243,
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upon recommendations of a citizen group, The Mental Health Code
Task Force. The Task Force was established by a resolution of the
Texas Board of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, but functioned independently of the agency.2
Revision of the Code was undertaken in part because the existing
statutes were regarded as failing to adequately accommodate the
need to provide compulsory mental health care on an outpatient
rather than institutional basis. In addition, the period between
1957 and 1983 saw a significant increase in sensitivity to the procedural and substantive interests of proposed and actual involuntary
patients. Efforts to protect these interests culminated in two major
federal lawsuits affecting the Texas mental health system: R.AJ v.
Kavanagh,4 alleging denial of patients' constitutional rights, and
Luna v. Van Zant,5 holding the Texas prehearing detention procedures to be in violation of due process.
This litigation concerning the Texas public mental health system,
as well as similar litigation in other jurisdictions, did not definitively
resolve the content of actual or proposed patients' federal constitutional rights. It did emphasize the need to carefully consider the
continued adequacy of the Code's provisions for protecting patients'
interests, both as a matter of federal constitutional mandate and,
within the bounds of the federal requirements, as matters of appropriate state policy.
In almost all ways, the revised Code continues the basic framework of its predecessor. State mental health facilities are authorized
to admit as patients only persons who come within one of the au-

§§ 1-104, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 505-26 (revised 1983); and the Code as revised in 1983

will be cited as: TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5547-1 to -100 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
2. No formal product was produced by the Task Force and no effort was made to gain
the formal consensus of the members on matters at issue. Rather, an informal reading was
taken of the members' views and this was communicated to Senator Farabee's staff for purposes of consideration in drafting the Senator's revision proposal.
3. Provision for court-ordered outpatient care had been made when, in 1975, the legislature created what became § 38(c) of the prior Code. See Mental Health Code, ch. 209,
§ 38(c), 1975 Tex. Gen. Laws 486, revised by Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 47, § 50(d)(2), 1983
Tex. Gen. Laws 211, 242. This simply authorized the court to order a proposed patient to
submit to treatment other than commitment to a mental hospital and, later, to commit the
patient if the patient failed to fulfill the terms of the order. See id
4. No. CA3-74-394-H (N.D. Tex. Settlement Agreement filed Mar. 2, 1981) (defendants

agreed to implement certain remedies in order to provide improved patient care).
5. 554 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (due process requires probable cause hearing).
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thorized categories of patients.6 A somewhat structured procedure
for admission of patients on a voluntary basis is continued.7 The
basic format for involuntary treatment continues to be a limited or
"temporary" period of 90 days duration.
The revised Code does not change the curious dual nature of proceedings to secure involuntary treatment. 9 Such proceedings are
usually begun by a private person who must take the initiative in
filing an application and paying the applicable fees; in this sense,
mental health proceedings resemble private litigation in which the
plaintiff has responsibility for beginning the action. When the litigation has commenced, however, a public officer often assumes responsibility for processing the case further; in this sense, mental
health proceedings resemble criminal actions in which a public
prosecutor rather than counsel retained by the victim processes the
case. The revised Code now specifically permits the application to
be filed by a county or district attorney, as well as by "any adult
person."'" But the legislature declined to require prosecutors or
some other public agency to assume responsibility for screening ap6. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-73(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984). As did its
predecessor, art. 5547-73(b) provides that "[n]othing in this Code prohibits the admission of
voluntary patients to private mental hospitals in any lawful manner." Id.art. 5547-73(b).
The meaning of this provision is unclear, primarily because of uncertainty as to the meaning
of "any lawful manner." If "any lawful manner" means simply in a manner authorized by
the Mental Health Code, it adds nothing to the provision, since persons can clearly be admitted to any mental hospital, public or private, in such ways. Perhaps the provision means
that noncoercive admissions to private--but not public-mental health facilities is permissible even if the procedural requirements for "voluntary" admissions set out by the Code are
not met. If this is the meaning, the provision may be of doubtful wisdom. Given the reduced visibility of the practices of private inpatient facilities and the practical impact of
wealth, there is reason to fear that informal coercion of an impaired person to become or
remain a patient might be more effective where exerted to encourage the person to enter or
remain in a private facility. In any case, however, there is no indication that the 1983 revision considered whether admissions to private facilities might, under this section, be subject
to more lenient standards, or whether any such increased leniency for private facilities
would be justified.
7. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-22 to -25 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
8. See id.at 5547-31(b).
9. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-31 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (application
may be filed by any adult person or by the state) with Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 31,
1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 511 (revised 1983) (application may be filed by "any adult person
or by the county judge").
10. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-32(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984). Under the
prior Code, an application could be filed by any adult person or the judge. See Mental
Health Code, ch. 243, §§ 31, 41, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 511-12 (revised 1983).
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plications and then fie those found to be meritorious. 1 On the
other hand, the revised Code, unlike its predecessors, requires
county or district attorneys to assume responsibility for the case "in
[the] hearings."' 2 Thus, the revision permits a system in which public officers assume responsibility for screening and filing applications, but does not require this. Counties remain free to demand
that relatives or friends seeking involuntary treatment for another
file the initial pleading and assume financial responsibility for the
fees involved. The revision, however, seeks to assure that once a
case is begun, responsibility for "lawyering" it through the hearing
is a public, rather than private, responsibility.
The process for obtaining temporary involuntary treatment for an
impaired person is begun by filing an application for court-ordered
mental health services.' 3 Prior to a hearing on this application, the
proposed patient must have been examined by two physicians, and
the certificates of those physicians must have been filed with the
court.' 4 A hearing is held at which the judge or jury determines
whether the proposed patient meets the standard for involuntary
care.' 5 If it is determined that the proposed patient does meet the
standard, such care is ordered. 6
The revised Code continues the assumption that, as a general
rule, involuntary treatment will occur only after the proposed patient has been accorded a judicial hearing and a determination by a

11. An argument can be made that sound policy and perhaps procedural due process
entitle a proposed patient to be free of the task of having to defend against a mental health
proceeding unless and until a law-training representative of the public-like a prosecutorscreens the case and determines that it has merit. But see In re Kossow, 393 A.2d 97, 106-07
(D.C. 1978) (rejecting the argument).
12. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-13 (Vernon Supp. 1984). Under the prior
Code, the county or district attorney was to represent the state if requested to do so by the
judge. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 13, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 508 (revised 1983).
The reference in art. 5547-13 of the revised Code to "the state" is an implicit acknowledgement that at the time of the hearing, the proceeding has become one in which the public,
rather than any private applicant, has become the party adverse to the proposed patient.
Formally, the applicant's role seems to end with the filing of the application. See, e.g., TEX.
REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-36 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (motion for an Order of Protective
Custody to be made by court itself or county or district attorney); id art. 5547-38 ("the state"
is a party in the "probable cause" hearing); id art. 5547-43 (county or district attorney is to
provide notice).
13. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-32(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
14. See id art. 5547-46(a).
15. See id art. 5547-50(a).
16. See id art. 5547-50(d).
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judge or jury that he or she meets the criteria for involuntary treatment.t" On the other hand, provision continues to be made for prehearing detention in what are assumed to be exceptional
situations. 8 The revised Code, like its predecessor, does contemplate that compelled treatment can occur on an outpatient basis; it,
however, provides a more elaborate framework for compelled
noninstitutional treatment.' 9
As was the case prior to the revision, the Code continues to provide for longer-term compelled treatment for, what are again
viewed as, exceptional situations.20 Unlike the prior Code, however,
there is no authorization in the revised statutes for indefinite orders
compelling treatment or hospitalization.21 Orders for "extended"
treatment of twelve months duration may be entered under certain
circumstances 22 and renewed for additional periods of equal
length.23
Despite the similarities in structure, there are substantial differences between the revised Code and its 1957 predecessor. Some are
primarily differences of terminology. In recognition of the revision's
effort to encourage use of community based treatment programs, the
24
basic procedure-previously called "temporary hospitalization"
was relabeled "temporary mental health services. ' 25 Longer term
-

17. Compare id art. 5547-31(b) (order for health services must comply with § 50 which
requires a hearing) with Mental Health Code, ch. 243, §§ 33, 35-39, 43-44, 1957 Tex. Gen.
Laws 505, 511-13 (revised 1983) (hearing required for temporary care and indefinite
commitment).
18. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5547-26 to -30 (Vernon Supp. 1984)
(emergency detention) with Mental Health Code, ch. 243, §§ 27-30, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws
505, 510-11 (revised 1983) (emergency admission procedure).
19. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5547-50(d)(2), -52, -53 (Vernon Supp.
1984) (judge may order outpatient care) with Carter v. State, 611 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1981, writ refd n.r.e.) (interpreted former art. 5547-38 as permitting an alternative form of treatment in lieu of commitment).
20. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-51 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (extension
of mental health services) with Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 52(b), 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws
505, 515 (revised 1983) (commitment for an indefinite period).
21. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-31(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (order
extending treatment may not exceed twelve months) and id art. 5547-50(0 (temporary order
not to exceed 90 days) with Mental Health Code, ch. 243, §§ 40-51, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws
505, 512-15 (revised 1983) (procedures for indefinite commitment) and id § 52, 1957 Tex.
Gen. Laws at 515 (indefinite commitment for individual found mentally ill).
22. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-51 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
23. Id. art. 5547-55.
24. Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 31, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 511 (revised 1983).
25. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-31(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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treatment-previously called "indefinite commitment" 26 -was relabeled "extended mental health services. 27 For reasons that are
less clear, the references to "proposed patients" in the 1957 Code
28
were often, but not always, changed to refer simply to "persons.
Other changes, however, were more substantive than these modifications of the rhetoric used.
Despite the comprehensiveness of the revision, there are significant problems remaining under the Code. This article is designed to
develop the major changes in Texas mental health law that will result from the revision of the Code and the major issues that either
remain despite that revision, or that have been created by the
changes.
II.

THE CRITERIA FOR INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT

29

Under the 1957 Code, involuntary treatment was authorized upon
a determination that an impaired person was "mentally ill and require[d] observation and/or treatment in a mental hospital for his
own welfare and protection or the protection of others."3 There
was widespread agreement that this was insufficiently precise. Further, insofar as its content could be ascertained, there was substantial belief that the criterion was too broad, that is, that it permitted
involuntary treatment under circumstances in which the impaired
person's interest in freedom of choice was not counterbalanced by
sufficiently important state interests. These concerns raised questions of federal constitutional
dimensions as well as analogous ques31
tions of state policy.
26. Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 40, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 512 (revised 1983).
27. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-31(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
28. Compare TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-26(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (emergency detention of "person" by peace officer) with id art. 5547-32(c)(1) (application is to
state name and address of "proposed patient").
29. See generally Dix, Major Current Issues Concerning Civil Commitment Criteria,45
LAw & CONTEMP. PaOBS. 137 (1982).

30. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 38(b), 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 512 (revised
1983).
31. See Exparte Webb, 625 S.W.2d 372, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1981, writ
dism'd). In Webb, the court read the language of the 1957 Code as incorporating a "dangerousness" standard that was sufficiently precise and narrow to survive attack. See id at 374.
The content of the supposedly incorporated dangerousness standard was not developed.
The cases relied upon appear to have involved uncritical and offhand comments rather than
serious considerations of the meaning of the statutory language. See id at 374. Specifically,
the court in Webb relied upon the offhand comment by the Texas Supreme Court in State v.
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The revised Code provides three alternative criteria under which
an impaired person might be subject to involuntary treatment.3 2
Such treatment may be ordered only upon determination that:
(1) the person is mentally ill; and
(2) as a result of that mental illness the person:
(i) is likely to cause serious harm to himself; or
(ii) is likely to cause serious harm to others; or
(iii) will, if not treated, continue to suffer severe and abnormal
mental, emotional, or physical distress and will continue to experience
deterioration of his ability to function independently and is unable to
make a rational and informed decision as to whether or not to submit
to treatment.33
All three alternatives or "prongs" require proof of a mental illness.
They differ significantly, however, in what must be anticipated will
occur as a result of that mental illness if involuntary treatment is not
provided.
The new criteria meet some of the objections that were raised to
the prior Code's standards; but some problems remain, and some
new ones have been raised by the revision. The following section
addresses the federal constitutional concerns and the variety of issues presented by the revised Code's substitute for the "welfare" and
"protection" criteria of the prior Code. 4
A. FederalConstitutional Considerations
In terms of federal constitutional concerns, there was reason to
Turner that patients not presenting "a danger" to themselves or others should be released.
CompareState v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563, 566 (Tex. 1977) (patient is entitled to be released
when he "no longer presents danger to himself or others") with Carter v. State, 611 S.W.2d
165, 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, writ refd n.r.e) (sufficiency of evidence measured on
basis that failure to hospitalize would expose patient to a "substantial risk of serious hurt,
injury, exploitation or loss").
32. CompareTEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-50(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (temporary mental health services) with id art. 5547-51(b) (extended mental health services). For
extended services, several additional showings are required. First, it must be shown that the
proposed patient's condition is expected to continue for more than 90 days. See id. art. 554751(b)(3). Second, the proposed patient must have received involuntary inpatient mental
health services for at least 60 consecutive days within the preceding 12 months. See id art.
5547-5 1(b)(4)(i). Clearly, the intention is to limit use of extended term orders to situations in
which shorter term orders have been tried and have proven insufficient to meet the impaired
person's needs.
33. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-50(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
34. Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 31, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 511 (revised 1983).
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fear that the 1957 criterion might run afoul of the due process bar
against vagueness. Traditionally, the prohibition against vagueness,
or the affirmative requirement of precision, has been explained in
terms of the need for notice." Unless legal standards are precise,
those persons desiring to determine if their contemplated actions
will create legal liability are denied that opportunity. This type of
notice, as a practical concern (e.g., notice of potential criminal liability), does not deserve significant consideration here. There is little risk that persons will seek to determine whether their conduct
will subject them to involuntary treatment before engaging in that
conduct.
But the requirement of precision also serves the different and
equally important purpose of safeguarding against arbitrary application of legal liability.36 Unless the standards for determining
whether legal liability exists are reasonably precise, those charged
with enforcement of that liability-judges, jurors, perhaps police officers-must substitute their own criteria. Inconsistency, and therefore arbitrariness, is consequently inevitable. This is a major
problem in regard to involuntary treatment. Determining whether
impaired persons are impaired in the manner and to the degree necessary to deprive them of the legal capacity to choose whether or not
to submit to treatment is a complex and difficult task. This difficulty
creates a substantial risk of reliance upon subjective criteria and,
therefore, increases the need for a clear and practical legal standard
by which proposed patients can demand to be judged.
The United States Supreme Court's decisions leave no doubt as to
the continued existence and vitality of the due process requirement
of precision.37 But the Court has never addressed its application to
state statutory criteria for involuntary treatment of the impaired.
Almost certainly, the Court will require some specificity in such cri35. See United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954) (no one can be "criminally
responsible for conduct which [cannot] reasonably be understood to be proscribed").
36. See Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Giaccio v. Pennsylvania, 382
U.S. 399 (1966). Papachristouand Giaccio are the leading cases in the criminal context relying on this aspect of the precision requirement. In addition to these functions, the require-

ment of precision also serves other interests. By focusing the issues in any litigation
applying the statute, for example, it makes rational application of the statute more likely.
By permitting parties to anticipate the issues that may arise in such litigation, it also facilitates the process of preparation of defenses to efforts to enforce the statute.
37. See, e.g., Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 112-13 (1979); Colautti v. Franklin,
439 U.S. 379, 390 (1979); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
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teria under the due process clause. The degree of specificity that
will be demanded, however, remains uncertain.
Insofar as the content of the 1957 standard could be ascertained,
it may also have suffered from the constitutional defect of "overbreadth." "Overbreadth" is the characteristic of permitting the involuntary treatment of persons in violation of federal constitutional
considerations. The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the issue as to what criterion is to be used to determine
whether a state involuntary treatment statute validly permits or invites the commitment of such persons.
The Court has, however, made clear that under some circumstances involuntary treatment of an impaired person violates that
person's federal constitutional right to liberty. In O'Conner v. Donaldson,8 the Court held that Donaldson's retention in the Florida
mental health system violated his federal constitutional right to liberty, given the absence of any indication that he posed risks of harm
to himself or others, or that he was being provided with meaningful
treatment.3 9 Presumably, his initial commitment, under those circumstances, would have similarly violated his federal constitutional
rights. The Court's discussion provides little guidance in determining the scope of the restrictions which the right to liberty imposes
upon a state mental health system. The Court carefully declined to
address the sort of "dangerousness" to self or others that would permit restrictions upon an impaired person's liberty. It also found no
occasion to consider the sort of treatment which, if provided, would
permit the retention of nondangerous impaired persons. Donaldson
confirms the existence of federal constitutional limits upon the
states' right to commit, but carefully avoids addressing the content
of those limits.
B.

The Requirement of Mental Illness

All three alternative grounds for involuntary treatment under the
revised Texas Code require proof of mental illness. 40 This is defined
as: "an illness, disease or condition which either: (A) substantially
impairs the person's thought, perception or reality, emotional process, or judgment; or (B) grossly impairs behavior as manifested by
38. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
39. See id at 575-76.
40. SeeTEX. REv. CiV. STAT. ANN.arts. 5547-50(b)(1), - 51(b)(1) (vernon Supp. 1984).
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recent disturbed behavior."41 It is extremely doubtful whether this
definition is in any way meaningful. There is no reason to believe
that it is intended to limit involuntary treatment to persons who
come within any particular category used in current diagnostic or
therapeutic practice. Despite widespread assumption to the contrary, the language does not appear to require that the proposed patient's condition justify categorization as "psychosis" or a diagnosis
of one of the traditional psychotic disorders. 42 The provision in subsection (B), that impairment of behavior alone can constitute sufficient symptoms of mental illness, would seem to permit involuntary
treatment of persons properly diagnosed as suffering from personality disorders fthe person meets the requirements of one of the alternative criteria. 03
Whether a more meaningful definition of mental illness could
have been drafted is doubtful. Perhaps the most important point is
that this definition of mental illness will not significantly restrict the
criteria and, therefore, is unlikely to "cure" imprecision or overbreadth that may be found in the remainder of the criteria.
C.

Danger to Others

Alternative (ii),44 the second prong of the revised Code's criterion,
is designed to authorize involuntary treatment of those impaired
persons found to pose sufficient risk of harm to other persons in
41. See id art. 5547-4(8) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
42. Article 5547-5 of the revised Code provides that mental illness "does not include
epilepsy, senility, alcoholism, or mental deficiency." Id art. 5547-5. It continues, however,
that persons who are mentally ill may be compelled to submit to treatment under the Code
even if they also suffer from one of these conditions. Id art. 5547-5.
The apparent effort to exclude mental retardation from the definition of mental illness has
given rise to difficulties. Recent federal court litigation concerning the rights of hospitalized
patients, discussed in detail in the text at note 251, infra, recently resulted in a federal district
judge concluding that mentally retarded persons have been, and continue to be, improperly
committed by state judges to state mental hospitals under the Mental Health Code. See
R.A.J. v. Miller, No. CA3-74-0394-H, at 17 (N.D. Tex. Memorandum Opinion and Order
filed Apr. 2, 1984).
43. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-4(8) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (Mental
Health Code's definition of mental illness) with TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(b) (Vernon
1974) ("The term 'mental disease or defect' does not include an abnormality manifested only
by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct"). The Penal Code apparently makes
some conditions simply diagnosed as personality disorders insufficient bases for a defense of
insanity. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 8.01(b) (Vernon 1974).
44. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-50(b)(2)(ii) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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order to bring into play the state's unquestionable "police power"
right to protect its citizens from the dangerously impaired. 5 But
there is substantial reason to doubt that the language used is either
sufficiently precise or limited to survive critical scrutiny.
No effort is made in the Code to define the nature of the "harm"
at issue. In the Task Force discussion, a proposal to limit the harm
to physical harm was specifically rejected. 46 As a result, it is unclear
what impact upon others must be anticipated. Will, for example, a
risk of financial harm be sufficient impact upon "other persons"?
Will "emotional" or "psychological" harm? If either of the latter
two might suffice, what is meant? Is it sufficient, for example, that
there is a risk that the proposed patient may cause other members of
his family discomfort? Or might "emotional" harm demand something more, as, for example, some lasting impairment of the person's
ability to adjust to life or achieve self satisfaction?
The statutory language does require that the harm be "serious." 47
Perhaps this reduces the effect of the uncertainty. But insofar as the
criterion leaves unclear the sort of impact upon others which must
be anticipated if the proposed patient goes untreated, the uncertainty is not reduced by the requirement that the harm-whatever
its required nature-be "serious."
Further, the statute makes no effort to define how likely it must be
that the harm will occur. Perhaps the demand that the harm be
"likely" is intended to require a finding that it is more likely than
not that the required harm will occur if the proposed patient is not
treated. But if this was the intention, that meaning could easily
have been stated more clearly. Further, the implications of such a
construction suggest that this was not intended. Could the legisla45. See Powers v. State, 543 S.W.2d 194, 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976), af'd, 556
S.W.2d 567 (Tex. 1977) (the standard of commitment prescribed by § 51 of the prior Code
held constitutional); see also Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F. Supp. 424, 430-31
(D. Utah 1979) (state has legitimate interest to protect citizens from the mentally ill). A
patient's "obsession with death and violence, coupled with the threats and attempt to hit his
mother with the guitar, is sufficient evidence to show that he is a danger to others."
Seekins v. State, 626 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, no writ) (danger
to others is sufficient to support verdict for commitment).
46. No formal product was produced by the Task Force and no effort was made to gain
the formal consensus of the members on matters at issue. Rather, an informal reading was
taken of the members' views and this was communicated to Senator Farabee's staff for purposes of consideration in drafting the Senator's revision proposal.
47. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-50(b)(2)(ii) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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ture have intended to permit deprivation of liberty upon a finding
that there is only slightly more than a fifty-fifty chance that if not
treated the proposed patient will cause the anticipated harm?
Whether in such cases there would be an adequate showing of a
state interest to override the proposed patient's due process right to
liberty is at best problematic.
Finally, the statutory criterion fails to specify any time frame
within which to evaluate the risk. When the judge or jury attempts
to predict whether, without treatment, a proposed patient poses an
adequate risk of causing sufficient harm, how far in the future
should the inquiry proceed? Over a two week period? Two months?
Five years?
These aspects of imprecision in the standard are significant for
several different, although related, reasons. Both due process and
sound policy require that a statutory standard for making important
decisions provide sufficient guidance to the trier of fact to minimize
arbitrary decisionmaking. The new Code's "danger to other" terms
do not do this as applied to many situations that will often be
presented in mental health cases. Despite the infrequency of jury
trials, a convenient method of evaluating a standard's precision is
whether it can be translated into meaningful jury instructions. The
Code's provisions provide no basis for telling jurors what kind of
harm they must find may be inflicted on others, how likely it is that
this harm will be inflicted, or how far in the future they should attempt to look in deciding whether a proposed patient poses a sufficient risk.
A growing body of empirical studies raises significant concerns
regarding the accuracy of judicial and psychiatric predictions concerning "dangerous" conduct.48 Almost none of this deals with the
prediction of assaultive conduct by persons who are likely candidates for involuntary treatment. Nevertheless, this literature justifies concern that predictions based upon psychiatrists' clinical
judgment are not sufficiently reliable to assure that, in each case, a
sufficient social interest exists to justify intrusion upon the proposed
patient's liberty interests. There is reason to believe that such pre48. See generally Dix, Major Current Issues Concerning Civil Commitment Criteria,45
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 143-44 (1982) (there is no empirical evidence determining the

accuracy of professional predictions concerning the assaultive behavior of mentally ill
persons).
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dictions are significantly more accurate if they are limited to predicting conduct during a relatively short time in the future. It can
be persuasively argued that if a statutory standard limits inquiry to
short ilme periods, it will provide adequate assurance that the final
judgment will be soundly enough based to support a significant intrusion upon privacy. This seems to have been the largely unarticu49
lated basis for the Ninth Circuit's recent holding in Suzuki v. Yuen
that only a commitment standard requiring a showing of an "imminent" danger can survive scrutiny under federal constitutional
standards.5 °
The ambiguity of the new Code's "dangerous to others" criterion
cannot be defended on grounds of necessity. Absolute precision, of
course, is an illusory goal. But there was readily available terminology that would have significantly reduced the imprecision in the
statutory language. Use of the imprecise terms can only be explained in terms of either a lack of concern with the underlying risks
of arbitrary application, or an inability to make the hard decisions
necessary to determine what precise positions to adopt as matters of
legislative policy. Such explanations cannot justify imprecision that
endangers proposed patients' constitutionally protected interests.
D. Danger to Self
The same concerns discussed above obviously apply as well to
alternative (i), the first prong of the statutory criterion.5 ' Again, the
statute provides no guidance as to the probability of harm that must
be found, the nature of the harm, or the time frame within which
these questions should be considered. There is, however, one additional consideration.
Alternative (iii) permits involuntary treatment upon a showing of
a risk of deterioration when, in addition, there is proof that the proposed patient has been deprived of the ability to engage in acceptable decisionmaking5 2 It follows that the meaning of alternative (i)
should be construed in light of this. Thus, "serious harm to [the
proposed patient] himself" must require more than the risk of dete49. 617 F.2d 173 (9th Cir. 1980).
50. See idat 178 (statute not requiring imminent danger held unconstitutional).
51. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-50(b)(2)(i) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (threat of
serious harm to self).
52. See id.
art. 5547-50(b)(2)(iii) ("deterioration of ability to function independently").
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rioration that would suffice under (iii). Otherwise, (iii) would be
deprived of any meaning. "Serious harm" as used in (i) probably
must mean more than "mental, emotional, or physical distress," but
does it require a risk of death within a short period of time? Does it
require a risk of some physical injury or illness, even if not a lifethreatening injury or illness?" Neither the language nor the background of the revised Code provides an answer.
E. Deterioration,Distress, and Impairment of Decisionmaking
Capacity
The third prong of the revised Code's criterion is, in some senses,
the broadest of the three. 4 It is clearly designed to permit involuntary treatment of persons on the basis of a prediction that their illness will cause effects upon them which are of a less serious nature
than is required to invoke the "danger to self' criterion. Unlike the
"danger to self' and "danger to others" criteria, the third alternative
does not permit involuntary treatment solely upon findings that the
proposed patient is mentally ill and that the illness will result in a
certain impact upon the person or others. It additionally requires
that the illness has so affected the proposed patient's capacity to decide for himself whether to submit to treatment that the proposed
patient's decision is not entitled to respect.
Hospitalization under this prong represents the most direct exercise of the state's parens patriae responsibility for certain impaired
citizens. It requires a demonstration that the proposed patient has
been deprived of the ability to make an acceptable decision for himself as to whether or not to submit to treatment. 5 If this impairment
53. One possible source for help in defining the terms is the provisions of the Texas
Penal Code. Causing mere "bodily injury" to another is only a misdemeanor assault, while
causing "serious bodily injury" is an aggravated assault, a felony. Compare TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 22.01(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (Class A misdemeanor) with id § 22.02(a)(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1984) (third degree felony). Bodily injury is rendered "serious" if it "creates
a substantial risk of death" or if it in fact caused death, "serious permanent disfigurement or
protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." See id.
§ 1.07(a)(34) (Vernon 1974). There is no indication, however, that the Mental Health Code
was intended to incorporate this definition of "serious," even in regard to that aspect of
harm involving physical injury. The Penal Code definition, of course, is simply inapplicable
to other types of harm. It may, however, indicate the degree of difference that is generally
intended when the word "serious" is used.
54. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-50(b)(2)(iii) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
55. See id ("unable to make a rational ... decision").
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of decisionmaking capacity is shown, a less severe anticipated impact of the mental illness will suffice for involuntary treatment.
"Dangerousness," in other words, need not be shown. State intervention is justified, the statute assumes, upon a less dramatic showing of harm to self if, in addition, it is actually demonstrated that the
impaired person has also been deprived of the ability to choose
6
whether or not to seek help in avoiding that harm.1
In addition to mental illness, the third prong requires proof of
three elements: deterioration, distress, and impaired decisionmaking. As might be expected, the terms of these elements contain
considerable uncertainty.
Involuntary treatment is permissible under the third prong only
upon proof that the impaired person "will, if not treated, continue to
suffer severe and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress. 58 In addition, it must also be shown that the person "will
continue to experience deterioration of his ability to function
independently. ' 59 Several aspects of these requirements are
troublesome.
First, there might reasonably be doubt as to what is required by
the demand of a showing that the proposed patient will "continue to
'60
experience deterioration of his ability to function independently.
It seems clear that some deterioration must have already occurred;
involuntary treatment is not permitted simply upon a prediction that
deterioration will occur in the future. But it is also necessary to determine that deterioration will continue; some deterioration in the
past is not sufficient. Both the past and anticipated deterioration
must be of the proposed patient's ability to function independently.
Precisely what this ability must have been, and what past and anticipated loss of this ability is necessary to subject an impaired person
to involuntary treatment, is arguably unclear.
This language was formulated by the Task Force. Prominent in
the Task Force's development of the language was a preliminary
draft of what was later to become the Model State Law on Civil
Commitment of the Mentally Ill approved by the American Psychi56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See id
See id
Id.
Id.
Id
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atric Association.6 The Task Force based the third alternative
upon a somewhat similar proposal in the draft of the Model Law.6 2
The commentary to the Model Law makes clear that the Model
Law's provision was designed to permit involuntary treatment on
the basis of even a lesser showing than that the proposed patient
would be unable to provide for his own basic needs, such as those
for food, clothing, shelter, safety, and health.63 It further suggests
that the language refers to what is represented to be "a clearly defined" category of persons.64 While no clear definition is offered,
the commentary states that the requirement "suggests an acute episode or sudden collapse of mental state (decompensation)" and
"permits commitment of severely mentally ill individuals who are
moving towards sudden collapse. ' 6 - Even if this can be read into
the statutory language, it scarcely provides reasonable specificity.
There are several differences between the Model Law and the
Texas Code. The Model Law, unlike the Texas Code, requires that
the underlying impairment be a severe mental illness.66 But given
the difficulty of finding any meaningful substance in any definition
of mental illness, this difference is unlikely to be of significance.67
61. See Stromberg & Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 275 (1983).
62. See id at 330 (§ 6.C.(4)) (person unable to make "informed decision concerning
treatment").
63. See id at 330. The basic criteria for involuntary treatment in the Model Law are
contained in § 6.C. See id. at 330 ("Criteria for Thirty-Day Commitment"). Among the
elements are a showing that, as a result of severe mental disorder, the person is "likely to
cause harm to himself or to suffer substantial mental or physical disorder." See id at 330
(§ 6.C.(5)(a)). This, in turn, is defined as meaning a likelihood of self-inflicted serious physical injury, inability to provide for some of the basic needs ("such as food, clothing, shelter,
health, or safety"), or suffering or continuing to suffer abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress, if the distress "is associated with significant impairment of judgement, reason, or
behavior causing a substantial deterioration of" the person's "ability to function on his
own." See id at 302-03. But under the Model Law, the inability to provide for basic needs
is an alternative and, therefore, presumably different from what becomes alternative (iii)
under the Texas scheme.
64. See id at 304.
65. Id at 303-04.
66. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-50(b)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984) ("person is mentally ill") with Stromberg & Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment ofthe
Mentall, ll, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 275, 330 (1983) (§ 6.C. (1)) ("person is suffering from a
severe mental disorder").
67. See Stromberg & Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally
Ill, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275, 312 (1983). The Model Law's definition of "severe mental
disorder" is not significantly different from the definition of mental illness in the Texas
Code. Compare id at 312 (illness must "substantially impair") with TEX. REV. CiV. STAT.
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Perhaps more important, the Texas Code also requires proof that
the proposed patient will, if not treated, "continue to suffer severe
and abnormal mental, emotional, or physical distress. ' ' 68 Under the
Model Law, this is an alternative to deterioration. 69 The dual requirement of the Texas Code may reflect an intention to make the
criterion more restrictive than was intended in the Model Law. But
whether the means used to implement this intention have any significance is less clear.
The meaning of the distress which must have already been experienced by the proposed patient, and which must be shown sufficiently likely to continue, is not certain. Inclusion of "emotional"
and "mental" makes clear that distress other than physical discomfort was intended. The distress must be "severe" and "abnormal";
the commentary to the similar language in the Model Law makes
clear that "normal [distress]-as grief over the loss of a loved onewould not suffice,"' 70 but it provides little help as to what was intended as sufficient.
Perhaps the greatest uncertainty regarding the substance of the
third prong lies in the nature and degree of decisionmaking impairment that must be shown. The statute demands proof that the impaired person "is unable to make a rational and informed decision
as to whether or not to submit to treatment.'
It is clear that this
was intended to mean something more than a showing of mental
illness as defined in the Code; otherwise, the requirement in (iii), not
imposed by (i) or (ii), would be of no effect.
The final draft of the Model Law imposes a similar requirement
in different terminology. It would require that certain proposed patients be shown to lack "capacity to make an informed decision concerning treatment. ' 72 Given the availability of preliminary drafts of
the Model Law to the Task Force, it is likely that the Texas Code
ANN. art. 5547-4(8) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (illness that "substantially impairs" or "grossly

impairs"). Both the Model Code and the Texas Code require that the effect of the condition
be "substantial."
68. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-51(b)(2)(iii) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
69. See Stromberg & Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally
11, 20 HARV. J.ON LEGIs. 275, 330 (1983) (§ 6.C. is further discussed in note 63).

70. See id at 305. "Substantial impairment means more than transitory disorientation
or an isolated phobia or sensitivity." Id at 314.
71. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-50(b)(2)(iii) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
72. See Stromberg & Stone, .4Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally
11, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275, 330 (1983) (§ 6.3 (4)).
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was drafted with an intention of imposing a requirement of similar
substance.13 The Model Law, however, contains a definition of that
requirement:
[Tihe person, by reason of his mental disorder or condition, is unable,
despite conscientious efforts at explanation, to understand basically
the nature and effects of hospitalization or treatment or is unable to
engage in a rational decisionmaking process regarding such hospitalization or treatment, as evidenced by inability to weigh the possible
risks and benefits.7 4
No similar definition is contained in the revised Texas Code. The
Model Law's definition, however, might reasonably be used to give
content to the Texas Code's terminology.
Whether this definition will be of significant aid is unclear.
Under the Model Law's definition, the matter cannot be determined
by the end result. A determination that an impaired person continues to unwisely reject sound medical advice that treatment be accepted cannot suffice to show the required impaired
decisionmaking 7 5 Instead, attention must be focused upon the impaired person's process in arriving at the conclusion. That process
must be found severely impaired. If the person is unable to understand the basic factual information, the process of reasoning from
the facts to the result is obviously deficient. Thus, an impaired person who denies the existence of any illness or impairment arguably
cannot understand the effect of treatment, because understanding
73. Compare TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-50(b)(2)(iii) (Vernon Supp. 1984)

("unable to make rational and informed decision") with Stromberg & Stone, A Model State
Law on Civil Commitment ofthe Mentally 111, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275, 330 (1983) (§ 6.C
(4)) ("lacks capacity to make an informed decision").
74. Stromberg & Stone, A Model State Law on Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111, 20
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 275, 301 (1983) ("lacks capacity to make an informed decision concerning treatment").
75. See Colyar v. Third Judicial Dist. Court, 469 F. Supp. 424 (D. Utah 1979) (leading
case on requirements of impaired decisionmaking capacity). Colyar held constitutionally
invalid a provision that required that a proposed patient "lacks sufficient insight to make a
responsible decision as to the need for care and treatment as demonstrated by evidence of
unwillingness or inability to follow through with treatment." See id. at 432-33 (provision
held unconstitutional was UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36(6)(c) (1953)). The court held an impaired person's interest in liberty may be overridden only upon a showing that the person's
refusal to accept treatment was the result of an irrational thought process. See id at 434
("threshold requirement"). The provision at issue, the court concluded, created an unacceptable risk that treatment might be imposed only after a conclusion that the person's conclusion-that treatment should not be accepted-was inappropriate. See id at 432
("language equates inability to make 'responsible' decision with unwillingness to follow
through with treatment").
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the existence of an illness is a prerequisite to understanding treatment of that illness.
Delusional beliefs may also render an impaired person's decisionmaking process deficient. An impaired person who experiences the
delusional belief that treatment personnel intend to kill him, for example, similarly cannot understand "basically the nature and effects" of treatment. On the other hand, an impaired person who
gives greater significance to the restrictiveness of institutional life or
to the potential side effects of medication than to the potential benefits of institutionalization or medication may be wrong. But it cannot be said on this basis alone that the person is unable to
understand basically the nature or effect of treatment. Full agreement with the physician is not the test.
An impaired person may also be deprived of decisionmaking capacity by an inability to reason from factual information. Whether
this inability exists may pose a more difficult inquiry. An impaired
person may, of course, be so obsessed by some aspect of proposed
treatment that he is unable to give other aspects-which he intellectually understands-any significance in deciding whether to submit
to treatment. Such a person may well be unable to engage in a "rational decisionmaking process" despite his ability to understand the
situation. But again, an impaired person's failure to arrive at what
treating personnel regard as "the correct" position is clearly not
enough to show impaired decisionmaking capacity.
The third alternative under the revised standard expands coverage of involuntary treatment to certain persons who are not "dangerous to themselves," within the somewhat limited meaning of that
term, as embodied in alternative (i). An effort is made to counterbalance this by demanding proof, in each case, that the person's impairment has so deprived him of the ability to choose whether or not
to accept treatment that the state is justified in making that decision
for him in his own best interests. But in its effort to be both expansive and restrictive, the legislature may have failed. Arguably, the
broad definition of the required deterioration and distress are insufficiently precise to assure that the criterion will be applied evenhandedly and consistently.
The standard for determining the nature and extent of decisionmaking impairment necessary may, in the abstract, be as precise as
possible. There is, however, a very significant risk that in practice it
will be meaningless. There will be a strong tendency to avoid the
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difficult inquiries involved in attempting to apply the standard in a
meaningful manner. Instead, there will be a temptation to assume
that an impaired person's rejection of apparently "good" advice that
treatment should be accepted is sufficient to show decisionmaking
impairment. This is not only inconsistent with obvious legislative
intent, but also renders an important part of the criterion useless. If
there is inadequate assurance that the requirement of impaired decisionmaking ability will be carefully and accurately applied, alternative (iii) seems clearly to be overbroad in the sense that it permits
involuntary treatment of persons under circumstances where insufficient state interests exist to override the impaired person's continued
interest in, and right to, liberty.
F.

Least Restrictive Alternative

The increasing use of treatment programs that do not involve fulltime hospitalization, together with the increasing sensitivity to the
impaired person's interest in experiencing no more severe an intrusion upon liberty than is necessary, have created demands that compelled institutional treatment be required only if other forms of
treatment are unavailable.7 6 The 1957 Code did not address this.
Under the revised Code, a commitment to full-time institutional
care does not demand that the petitioner prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that no less intrusive or restrictive alternative
treatment programs are available; but, the Code does direct that
"[m]ental health services shall be ordered in the least restrictive appropriate setting available."' 77 "Least restrictive appropriate setting
for treatment," in turn, is defined as:
76. See Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657, 661 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (court has statutory duty
to explore available alternatives to institutional treatment). Some courts have found that
establishment of the lack of a less restrictive alternative is a federal constitutional prerequisite to involuntary institutionalization. See Lynch v. Baxley, 386 F. Supp. 378, 392-93 (M.D.

Ala. 1974); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1095-96 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated, 414
U.S. 473 (1974), on remand, 379 F. Supp. 1376 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated, 421 U.S. 957
(1975), on remand, 413 F. Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976). But there is an indication that the
Supreme Court regards the issue as presenting no "substantial federal question." See State
v. Sanchez, 457 P.2d 370 (N.M. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 276 (1970) (appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question). See generally Hoffman & Foust, Least
Restrictive Treatmentfor the Mentally 111. 4 Doctrine in Search ofits Senses, 14 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1100, 1101 (1977) (the least restrictive treatment "doctrine proposes that governmental action must not intrude upon constitutionally protected interests").
77. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-50(e) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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that available treatment setting which provides the patient with the
highest likelihood of improvement or cure and which is no more restrictive of the patient's physical or social liberties than is necessary
for the most effective treatment of the patient and for adequate protection against any dangers which the patient poses to himself or
others. 8

The Code does provide a basis for a patient to challenge commitment to an institutional program of care on the basis that full-time
institutionalization is not the "least restrictive appropriate setting for
treatment. 79
The definition of "least restrictive appropriate setting" minimizes
the value of this requirement in several ways. First, institutionalization is inappropriate only if an outpatient program is not only appropriate and sufficient, but available. The statute therefore imposes
no bar upon commitment on the ground that the state or locality has
declined to develop programs for noninstitutional care.80 Institutionalization is appropriate if it provides the highest likelihood of
improvement; apparently, there is no need to balance the restriction
upon the patient's liberty against the incremental increase in effectiveness of institutional versus outpatient programs. If institutional
treatment is "most effective," it appears of no significance that a
slightly less effective outpatient program might be utilized which
would constitute an immensely reduced intrusion upon the patient's
liberty.
Finally, the definition arguably gives overriding and primary significance to almost any perceived need for confinement based upon
protective purposes. If institutionalization is "necessary" for "adequate protection" of others or the patient himself, it may be irrelevant that other programs might be as effective in improving the
patient and less intrusive upon his liberty. On the other hand, there
may be more flexibility in considering this factor. The definition
78. Id art. 5547-4(16).
79. Compare id art. 5547-50(e) ("trial court shall order least restrictive setting") with
Carter v. State, 611 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1981, writ refd n.r.e.) ("trial
court may order alternatives to confinement").
80. If patients have an enforceable right to treatment, this might create a duty on the
part of the state to develop noninstitutional treatment programs for at least certain patients.
See Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974 (D.D.C. 1975) (statutory right to treatment requires that alternative facilities be made available for involuntary patients who do not require full-time hospitalization); see also text accompanying note 297 infra.
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requires only adequate protection instead of the "most effective"
protection or the "highest" protection. 8 ' Perhaps in deciding
whether commitment to an institution is appropriate, a court might
properly regard a minimal increase in risk of harm to others involved in an outpatient program as overridden by the reduced intrusiveness of such a program. This is permissible only if the court
determines that the outpatient program provides "adequate," although perhaps not necessarily maximum, protection for the public.
G. Requirement of an "Overt Act"
A number of jurisdictions have imposed a requirement that the
proof establishing an impaired person's commitability include conduct by the patient tending to prove that the lack of treatment would
in fact result in the harm required by the statutory criterion.82 This
constitutes a rejection of the position that predictions of harm can
always be acceptably established on the basis of purely clinical
evidence.
To some extent, such a requirement might save a statutory criterion from what might otherwise be constitutional deficiency. It can
be argued that predictions of assaultive conduct are so frequently
erroneous that a criterion permitting commitment on the basis of
such predictions fails to adequately assure that a sufficient state interest will exist to support particular commitments. If, however,
predictions must be supported by evidence that the proposed patient
actually acted in a manner confirming the danger, the predictions
may be sufficiently reliable to render the criterion acceptable.
The 1957 Code contained no requirement that the proof include
such conduct. The revised Code, however, provides: "The. . .evidence must include . . . evidence of either a recent overt act or a

continuing pattern of behavior in either case tending to confirm the
likelihood of serious harm to the person or others or the person's
distress and deterioration of ability to function. 83 It is clear that
this provision is not intended to reduce the need for expert testi81. TEX.REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-4(16) (Vernon Supp. 1984). The least restrictive setting must provide for adequate protection against any dangers posed by the patient to
himself or others. See id.
82. See generally Dix, Major Current Issues Concerning Civil Commitment Criteria, 45
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 137, 144-47 (1982) ("some jurisdictions require commitment to be

based upon recent overt conduct of proposed patient").
83. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-50(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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mony based upon clinical evaluation of the proposed patient. It
does, however, demand that evidence be introduced that the expert's
clinical prediction is supported by the actual behavior of the proposed patient. A number of questions may arise in the implementation of the requirement.
First, there may be some question as to what constitutes an "overt
act." If an impaired person thought likely to assault others is shown
to have physically struck another, this would certainly constitute an
"act." But in order to meet the requirement that the overt act tend
to confirm a likelihood of serious harm to others, is it necessary that
the prior assault be shown to have caused serious harm? If not, is it
necessary that it have caused a risk-perhaps a high risk-of serious
harm? Or perhaps confirmation that the proposed patient is willing
to act in such a manner as to cause any harm is all that is necessary
if there is, in addition, expert testimony that the proposed patient is
likely to cause serious harm in the future.
An attempt to cause harm would seem to meet requirements of an
overt act. But what about a verbal threat? Is a threat sufficient in the
absence of proof that the proposed patient meant it seriously or was
otherwise predisposed to act on it? If a "verbal act" will suffice, suppose a proposed patient acknowledges to an examining psychiatrist
that he intends to cause harm to others. Is a verbal acknowledgment
an "overt act"? It may, of course, be far more reliable than ambiguous physical conduct in the past. But if it can be sufficient, how
specific must the acknowledgment be? Is it sufficient if the proposed
patient expressed hostility towards others but failed to expressly
state, in the presence of the examiner, that he intended to do harm
to those under discussion? Perhaps, in order to avoid insurmountable ambiguity, "overt act" should be defined as a physical rather
than a "verbal" act.
When does an act confirm the risk? Suppose a paranoid patient,
thought to pose a risk of attacking those he delusionally believes are
against him, is shown to have carried a firearm. Without more, does
this confirm the risk? Or must it be shown that he carried the firearm for a purpose related to those delusional beliefs that form the
basis for the perceived risk? If carrying a firearm is sufficient confirmation, is purchasing or possessing a firearm? Is ascertaining where
and how one can be purchased, borrowed, or perhaps stolen?
The overt act must be "recent." What does this mean? The apparent intent is to demand that the conduct be shown to have been
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engaged in a sufficiently short period of time before the hearing (or
perhaps before the application) so that it constitutes reasonably reliable confirmation that the required risk exists at the time of the
hearing. Quantification is obviously difficult. It seems unlikely that
conduct more than two or three weeks prior to the application or
hearing could be "recent" within the meaning of the revised Code.
On the other hand, hostility to this effort to prohibit reliance upon
mental health professionals' clinical judgment alone may stimulate
efforts to minimize the overt act requirement by a broad definition
of "recent." The Nebraska Supreme Court, for example, so construed a similar provision in that state's commitment scheme to permit reliance upon conduct engaged in nine months before the
hearing. 4 This seems entirely inappropriate and inconsistent with
the apparent legislative intent in imposing the requirement of recent
conduct.
The new Code provides that in the absence of an overt act, a
"continuing pattern of behavior" might suffice to meet the requirement. 85 "Behavior," of course, consists of overt acts. This provision
must mean, then, that particular overt acts, insufficient in themselves to constitute the confirming evidence, may suffice if several
are shown, so that they constitute a "pattern of behavior." Obviously, there are potential problems in deciding when acts are sufficiently related to constitute a "pattern." But more importantly, it is
unclear whether, or to what extent, this might "dilute" the requirement of overt conduct. Suppose, for example, a paranoid person is
believed to pose a risk of assaulting his perceived enemies. Suppose
further that he has never assaulted, attempted to assault, or expressly threatened others. But the evidence might show a number of
incidents in which he engaged in angry exchanges with persons he
delusionally perceived were "against him." If none of these exchanges were sufficient overt acts, is it possible that several of them
84. See Hill v. County Bd. of Mental Health, 279 N.W.2d 838, 841 (Neb. 1979). The
court construed the requirement as demanding only that commitment proceedings be begun
and carried out with reasonable diligence following the conduct. See id at 841. On the facts
before it, the court found such diligence despite the time gap. See id at 841. This approach,
of course, de-emphasizes the evidentiary significance of the conduct and instead focuses
upon "fault" in delaying efforts to secure treatment. No justification for such a focus appears in the context of the Texas Code.
85. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-50(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (evidence demonstrating behavior that tends to confirm likelihood of harm).
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together constitute the sort of pattern that might substitute for an
overt act? How is a trial judge or jury to determine when an offered
pattern of incidents is equivalent to an overt act?
Perhaps a pattern of behavior should be regarded as sufficient
only in regard to alternative (iii). Deterioration of functioning and
distress are arguably more likely to be meaningfully demonstrated
or confirmed by a pattern of conduct than one specific act. In regard to these requirements, a pattern of behavior might reasonably
be regarded as a meaningful, and perhaps necessary, substitute for
an overt act as a measure of corroboratory conduct. Such a construction of the statute would avoid the difficult problem of deciding
when, in regard to the other prongs, a pattern of insufficient actions
can provide necessary corroboration of an anticipated risk. But
there is little in the phraseology of the Code itself that justifies giving the provision relating to patterns of behavior this limited effect.
H.

Conclusion

Probably the major conceptual change made by the 1983 revision
in the Mental Health Code was the revision of the criteria for involuntary care. The revised criteria contain clearly separate alternative
theories on which involuntary care might be sought. Despite the
increased specificity, however, each of the three contains troublesome ambiguities that raise viable issues of constitutional validity.
These are most apparent in regard to alternative (iii), which was
apparently intended to continue the Code's coverage of certain
"nondangerous" impaired persons, but only upon a specific demonstration that those persons are also suffering from a rather specific
impairment of their decisionmaking capacities.
Whether the revised criteria will have a significant impact is uncertain. Minimally adequate practice, however, requires that the
three prongs of the statutory standard be applied separately and the
content of each prong addressed independently. Such careful analysis is a prerequisite to the development of content for the new
Code's provisions.
Unfortunately, a separate analysis of each prong may not occur
and, in fact, is to some extent being discouraged. The form for court
ordered involuntary treatment developed and distributed by the
Mental Health Code Committee for use under the revised Code
does not require--or even permit-the judge to indicate which of
the statutory alternatives has been found applicable to the patient.
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Instead, the only finding made is that the evidence shows that the
proposed patient meets one of the alternatives without further specification. Use of such forms will encourage practice such as that
which was often seen under the prior Code. This practice did not
involve careful separation of the statutory requirements, but rather
an amorphous inquiry into whether a proposed patient somehow
came within some provision of the statute. The 1983 revision of the
Code reflects a legislative effort to increase the structure and substantive limits which the Code places on the determination of compelled treatment. Unless proceedings distinguish among, and
address specifically, the alternative grounds for such treatment
under the revised Code, the elaborate legislative reform is unlikely
to have much impact on practice.
III.

PREHEARING DETENTION

The 1983 revision adheres to the assumption of the 1957 Code
that most impaired persons whose involuntary treatment is sought
will remain at liberty in the community pending a hearing on the
application for their involuntary treatment. 86 As was the case with
the 1957 Code, the revised Code contains two categories of provisions authorizing prehearing detention. One consists of provisions
for so-called "emergency detention" before any application is
filed.87 The other is for detention following the filing of an application; such detention is to be authorized by an Order of Protective
Custody. 88 Significant changes have been made in regard to both
types of prehearing detention. Perhaps the most serious deficiency
of the 1983 Code, however, is its continued adherence to the assumption that prehearing detention is to be used only in exceptional
cases.8 9 By failing to recognize that prehearing detention is, and will
86. See id art. 5547-35. Article 5547-35 states: "Pending the hearing on an Application
for Court-Ordered Mental Health Services, the person shall remain at liberty unless he is
legally detained under an appropriate provision of this code." Id. art. 5547-35. The revised
Code and the prior Code provisions are substantially similar. Compareid art. 5547-35 ("unless legally detained under this . . . code") with Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 35, 1957
Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 511 (revised 1983) ("unless already a patient").
87. Compare TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-26 to -30 (Vernon Supp. 1984) with
Mental Health Code, ch. 243, §§ 27-30, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 510-11 (revised 1983).
88. Compare TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-36 to -39 (Vernon Supp. 1984) with
Mental Health Code, ch. 243, §§ 66-67, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 517-18 (revised 1983).
89. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-35 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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continue to be, the normal practice, the Code may have sacrificed its
ability to impose meaningful limits upon that detention.
A.

Emergency Detention

Before the 1983 revision the Texas Code provided no legal authority for a peace officer or anyone else to detain, without a court
order, a person reasonably believed to be mentally ill and imminently dangerous to himself or others. Such authority had been
originally enacted in 1957.90 In 1961, however, this provision was
amended so as to remove the authorization for warrantless detention. 91 Following that revision, emergency detention was permissible only with a court order authorizing twenty-four hours of
detention of such an impaired person. The 1983 revision restored
the peace officers' authority to make emergency detentions. 92
The shift was apparently based upon a conclusion that the prior
requirement of a magistrate's order, while well-intentioned, was
poorly designed to accomplish its purpose. Given the flexibility of
many criminal laws and local ordinances, peace officers confronted
with impaired persons could, and often did, avoid the bar on detentions by making a criminal arrest and securing the person's evaluation during the subsequent period of incarceration. There was also
some perception that magistrates' orders may be so readily issued
that they seldom served the intended function of assuring that requested detentions were, in fact, based on merit. As an end result,
in any case, actual or suspected impaired persons were seldom protected from detention by the requirement of an order. Instead, however, they were often subjected to the trauma and stigma of a
criminal arrest and booking, with an attendant delay in the provision of mental health care.
Under the revised Code, an orderless detention of a person by a
peace officer may occur if three requirements are met. First, the
officer must reasonably believe that the person is mentally ill. 93 Second, the officer must reasonably believe that, because of his mental
90. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 27, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 510 (revised
1983).

91. See Mental Health Code, ch. 454, § 27, 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws 1029, 1030, amended
by Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 47, § 26, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 211, 221-23.
92. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-26 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
93. Id art. 5547-26(b)(1).
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illness, the person "represents a substantial risk of serious harm to
himself or others unless immediately restrained. 94 The provision
for the officer's subsequent application for the person's admission
requires that the application contain the information "that the officer's beliefs are based on specific recent behavior, overt acts, attempts or threats, observed by or reliably reported to the officer." 95
The behavior or acts are to be described in detail. 96 This appears to
constitute an implied-although an unfortunately indirect-requirement that the detention itself be based upon recent behavior, acts,
attempts, or threats.
Third, the officer must believe that "there is not sufficient time to
obtain a warrant," the magistrate's order for emergency detention.97
No requirement is imposed that the officer's belief be reasonable. It
is difficult to imagine why the legislature might intend that other
aspects of the officer's belief be reasonable but not to impose such a
requirement here. The language used, however, almost conclusively
indicates this.
If the statutory requirements are met, the officer may detain the
person, present the person to an appropriate facility, and make application for the person's admission.9 8 The facility "shall temporarily accept" the person upon presentation of an application by the
officer. 99 An examination of the person is to be conducted by a physician, and the person is not to be "admitted" to the facility unless
this examination is conducted and the physician concludes that the
person evidences a substantial risk of imminent serious harm unless
restrained. °°

There are several potential problems under the new detention authority. Again, as was the case with the basic involuntary treatment
criteria, it is unclear what, if any, limits are intended upon the kind
of "serious harm" that can justify emergency detention. The overall
pattern of the Code suggests that a higher showing is required for
94. Id art. 5547-26(b)(2) (risk of harm must be specifically described).
95. Id art. 5547-26(b)(4).
96. See id art. 5547-26(b)(4).
97. Id art. 5547-26(a). Upon restraint, the proposed patient must be taken to a mental
health facility and may not be detained "in a jail or similar facility" unless an emergency
exists. Id art. 5547-26(a).
98. See id art. 5547-26(a).
99. See id art. 5547-26(c).
100. See id art. 5547-27 (physician's statement must be in writing).
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emergency detention than is necessary for involuntary treatment.
Yet the emergency detention authority is conferred in words in no
way limiting the "serious harm" to harm more "serious" than is required for temporary involuntary treatment. No requirement that
the harm be physical, for example, can reasonably be read into the
language.
This ambiguity might well have serious consequences. Given the
language of the revised Code, a magistrate might conclude that
emergency detention is authorized if that detention is necessary to
assure rapid treatment and thus prevent "serious harm" to the person's mental health that would result from delaying treatment. It
seems virtually certain that this was not intended. Yet the language
used fails to unambiguously preclude emergency detention on this
ground.
Unlike the basic involuntary treatment criteria, this provision
does impose some sort of time frame by the requirement that the
risk be one of harm "unless [the person is] immediately restrained."' ° But whether this is specific enough to be meaningful is
problematic. Functionally, perhaps it should be regarded as referring to the time period necessary to secure detention and care on
some other legal basis, such as pursuant to an Order of Protective
Custody or an order for temporary treatment. Only if there is a
sufficient risk that the person will cause the harm during that limited
period is emergency detention permissible.
For emergency detention, the risk perceived of the harm occurring must be "substantial." This was probably intended to require a
higher risk than is imposed by the basic involuntary treatment criteria's demand that the harm be "likely." Whether this ambiguous
indication of an intent to require a higher risk renders the emergency detention criterion sufficiently precise is uncertain.
The Code's continued embracement of court ordered detention is
evident in the inclusion of the need for a belief that "there is not
sufficient time to obtain a warrant."'' 0 2 There are ambiguities in this
requirement beyond the uncertainty as to whether the belief must be
reasonable. Must the officer believe that the harm will, in fact, occur if detention is delayed until a court order is obtained, or is it
sufficient that the officer believes that the risk of the harm will be
101. Id. arts. 5547-26(b)(3), -27(a)(3).
102. Id. art. 5547-26(a).
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greatly increased by such delay? Or that the risk will be somewhat
increased?
B.

Order of Protective Custody. The FederalJudicialMandatefor
Revision

The 1957 Code provided for the issuance of an Order of Protective Custody once a petition for commitment had been filed. 0 3 The
order could only have been issued by the court in which the petition
was pending and had to be supported by the certificate of a physician; the certificate set out that the physician had examined the proposed patient and on the basis of that examination concluded that
the proposed patient met the standard for prehearing detention'1°4
The 1983 revision continues this basic approach, but makes a
number of significant changes, in part at least in response to a federal judicial indication that the previous scheme suffered from federal constitutional deficiencies.10 5
The federal judicial mandate for revision of the protective custody process was set out in Luna v. Van Zant.106 The Luna court
held that the existing provisions for detention under orders of protective custody violated the federal due process rights of the detainees, because the detainees were given no assurance of a hearing
before the expiration of fourteen days after issuance of the order. 07
The court then proceeded to speculate upon what hypothetical provisions might satisfy due process. 0 8 Specifically, the opinion indicated that due process requires that within seventy-two hours of
detention, impaired persons must be afforded a state-initiated hearing at which the state is required to show "probable cause for believing the assertion that the patient is too dangerous to be at liberty
pending the final hearing."' 10 9 At this hearing, the patient must be
accorded the right to representation by counsel." 0
There is substantial reason to believe that both the holding and
103. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 66, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 517-18 (revised
1983).
104. See id § 66, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws at 517.
105. Luna v. Van Zant, 554 F. Supp. 68 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
106. Id
107. See id at 76.

108. See id at 76.
109. See id at 76.
110. See id at 76 (referring to service of notice on the patient "and his attorney").
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dictum in Luna overstated the substance of the federal due process
requirements. As the Luna court acknowledged, summary action by
the Supreme Court appears to have found no due process violation
in detention lasting as long as forty-five days.' " These "holdings"
were distinguished in Luna, however, as involving detentions during
which general mental health treatment was provided the patient. I I2
The summary judgment affidavits submitted in Luna indicated an
administrative policy in Texas of providing patients detained under
Orders of Protective Custody only that treatment necessary to prevent physical injury to the patient or others.' 3 Where prehearing
detention is not used to provide more general treatment, the Luna
court reasoned that the state's interest in prolonged summary detention is less and cannot
support such detention for a period as long as
4
fourteen days."1
It is not at all clear that the Supreme Court's summary action
rested upon the issue of a general treatment program for patients
detained prior to a hearing. Nor is it clear that the treatment available to detained patients in Texas was as limited as the Luna court
assumed. It may well have been, for example, that general treatment was available to those detained persons who expressed a desire
for it, or a willingness to submit to it. Moreover, a detained patient
could, under the prior Code's procedure, obtain a hearing by affirmatively invoking his right to habeas corpus.'
The Luna court held
116
best.
at
unclear
is
rationale
its
but
insufficient,
this
II. See Logan v. Arafeh, 346 F. Supp. 1265, 1268-69 (D. Conn. 1972), af d, 411 U.S.
911 (1973) (45 days of confinement without hearing); French v. Blackburn, 428 F. Supp.
1351, 1355 (M.D.N.C. 1971) (10 day detention), af'd, 443 U.S. 901 (1979). On the signifi-

cance of such summary affirmances, compare Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975)
(lower courts are bound by summary disposition of an appeal) with Mandel v. Bradley, 432
U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (summary affirmances are not to "be understood as breaking new
ground").
112. See Luna v. Van Zant, 554 F. Supp. 68, 73 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
113. See id at 73.
114. See id at 73-75. The Luna court specifically rejected the state's argument that the
need for a period of prehearing evaluation justified the "hearingless" delay. See id.at 73-75.
115. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 24(b), 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 509 (revised

1983).
116. See Luna v. Van Zant, 554 F. Supp. 68, 75 n.8 (S.D. Tex. 1982). Reliance was
placed on Doe v. Gallinot in which a similar argument made in defense of a California
procedure was rejected. See idat 73-75 (citing Doe v. Gallinot, 657 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir.
1981)). The Gallinot court rejected the patient-initiated procedure on the ground that the
initial detention decisions were "highly error-prone, especially where review of the decisions
depended on the initiative and competence of the persons committed." See Doe v. Gallinot,
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Apparently because a stay of Luna's injunctive relief was denied,
the state responded not by seeking appellate review of the holding,
but .rather by securing revision of the statutory procedure before the
legislative consideration of the Code revision. The resulting
changes were enacted for immediate effectiveness" 7 and then incorporated into the revised Code.'" 8 An obvious effort was made to
comply with both the Luna holding and the dictum in the court's
opinion.
C. PrehearingDetention: The Texas Revision
Under the 1957 Code, an Order of Protective Custody required a
conclusion that the proposed patient was mentally ill and "because
of his mental illness injury is likely to be caused either to himself or
others if he is not immediately restrained."" 9 The provision that an
order "may" issue upon such a conclusion, however, suggested that
further discretion existed. No criterion for the exercise of that discretion was suggested.
The 1983 revision retains the requirement of mental illness. It
modifies the second requirement, however, by demanding a conclusion that "the person presents a substantial risk of serious harm to
himself or others if not immediately restrained pending the hearing. ' "2 This appears to somewhat tighten the standard, although
how and to what extent is not clear. Whether "harm" requires a
more substantial impact than "injury" is uncertain. But the
"harm"-whatever it is-must be "serious," although the injury required previously did not have to be. The risk that must exist was
changed from a likelihood to "a substantial risk." Again, the flavor
657 F.2d 1017, 1023 (9th Cir. 1981). Whether any determination made in the issuance of
Orders of Protective Custody was highly error-prone, under the prior Code, is problematic.
Apparently the Ninth Circuit's second consideration was that the practical difficulties of
implementing a theoretical right to a patient-initiated hearing made such hearings an ineffective method of reviewing the initial decision. Again, whether the availability of habeas
corpus was, or could be made into, a meaningful practical method of reviewing the decision
to detain under the prior Texas Code was not explored.
117. See Mental Illness-Certificate of Medical Examination, Notice, and Protective
Custody Probable Cause Hearing, ch. 2, §§ 8, 66, 67, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 2, 2-7, revised by
Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 47, §§ 36-39, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 211, 230-35.
118. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-36 to -39 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
119. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 66, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 517-18 (revised

1983).
120. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-36 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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of the revision is one of increased restrictiveness. But both the new
and old terms are so ambiguous that any judgment as to the significance of the change is difficult to formulate.
Prior law simply authorized the issuance of an order of protective
custody if the required certificate of a physician was filed.' 2' The
new provision requires that a motion for the order be filed, but authorizes such a motion either by the lawyer representing the petitioner or by the court itself.' 22 The apparent intent was to
discourage issuance of such orders as a matter of course by requiring that someone take the initiative to secure one. But the authorization for the making of the required motion by the court itself may
have rendered this effort of no effect.
Under the 1957 Code, it was unclear whether issuance of an order
required that the judge make any specific findings or exercise any
discretion. The statute was capable of being read as permitting such
orders to be routinely issued ministerially if the application and certificate of the physician was filed. Under the revised Code, however,
the judge is required to make two specific determinations. In regard
to the existence of mental illness, the judge is not required to make
any absolute determination as to whether mental illness is present.
He is, however, required to ensure that a physician's opinion that
the proposed patient is mentally ill has a "detailed basis."' 23 Additionally, the judge is required to determine specifically that the person presents the required risk of the required harm. 24 Apparently
the existence of the risk was regarded as a more appropriate matter
for independent judicial scrutiny than was the existence of mental
illness.
The revised Code permits the findings to be made on the basis of
the application for treatment and the physician's certificate. 25 If it
is made on such a basis, however, the judge is directed to determine
121. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 66, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 517-18 (revised

1983).
122. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-36 (Vernon Supp. 1984).

123. See id art. 5547-36(b)(1).
124. See id art. 5547-36(b)(2).
125. See id art. 5547-36(b)(2). Apparently under the revised Code the certificate must
be sworn to by the examining physician. See id.
art. 5547-33(a) (describing the certificate as
"sworn" but not specifically requiring that it be sworn to as well as signed and dated). A
sworn certificate was not required by the prior Code. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 8,
1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 507 (revised 1983).
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that the information presented supports the finding.1 26 It seems
clear that this demands more than a physician's conclusory assertion
that a person is sufficiently dangerous. Most likely, any conduct on
the part of the person, or any clinical observations regarded as supporting or establishing the required risk, must be specifically set out
in the certificate. This tends to be confirmed by the provision in the
revised Code addressing the requirements of a physician's certificate. The 1957 Code required only that the certificate state the opinion of the examining physician concerning matters such as the
proposed patient's likelihood of causing injury if not immediately
restrained.' 27 The revised Code, on the other hand, demands both
the opinion of the physician "and the detailed basis for that
opinion.

' ' 28
5

The revised Code authorizes the judge to conclude that a "fair
determination" on whether the proposed patient is to be detained29
cannot be made on the basis of the formal documents submitted.
In such a case, the judge may take further evidence. 30 Presumably,
a hearing may be held at which witnesses-as, for example, the certifying physician-will testify in person in support of the application. It seems highly doubtful, however, that issuing judges will
ever demand information beyond the barebones documents.
In obvious response to the Luna holding, the Code now provides
for a hearing to be held within seventy-two hours of the beginning
of detention under an Order of Protective Custody. 13 1 The hearing
may be before a magistrate or, at the discretion of the presiding
judge, an appointed master. 32 The master need not meet any particular qualifications, nor be legally trained or have experience in
either legal or mental health matters.
The procedure provided is quite flexible. The proposed patient
and counsel are entitled to written notice including the reasons why
the Order of Protective Custody was issued. 33 "Evidence" that may
126.
127.
1983).
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-36(b)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 8(0, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 507 (revised
See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-33(a)(7) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
See id.
art. 5547-36(b)(2).
See id art. 5547-36(b)(2).
See id art. 5547-38(a).
See id art. 5547-38(a).
See id art. 5547-37(b).
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not be admissible or sufficient at the ultimate hearing on the application may be considered at the "probable cause" hearing; "letters"
34
and "affidavits" are specifically mentioned as types of evidence.
Further, it is provided that "the state may prove its case on the physician's certificate filed in support of the initial detention.' 35 The
patient and his attorney are afforded "an opportunity to appear and
present evidence ... 36
The language of the statute is unfortunately ambiguous in directing what determination the magistrate or master should make.
The magistrate or master is directed to order the continued detention of the patient if he determines that "an adequate factual basis
exists for probable cause to believe that the proposed patient
presents a substantial risk of serious harm to himself or others, such
' 37
that he cannot be at liberty pending the commitment hearing."'
Perhaps this means only that the magistrate should inquire as to
whether information exists which would give a reasonable person
probable cause to believe that the proposed patient is dangerous.
Under this approach, the magistrate should not proceed further to
determine whether on this information he himself believes that
probable cause exists. Instead, this construction would make the
"probable cause" hearing essentially an inquiry into the existence of
a reasonable basis for the decision made prior to the issuance of the
Order of Protective Custody. The question for the "probable cause"
hearing magistrate, then, would not be whether probable cause exists. Rather, it would be whether the evidence as to dangerousness
is so deficient that the prior determination that probable cause existed lacks a "factual basis."
On the other hand, there is also language in the statute that suggests the magistrate's inquiry should be a more substantive one. 138
Under this approach, the probable cause hearing is a de novo inquiry into whether probable cause exists. Thus, the magistrate's
134. See id art. 5547-38(a).

135. Id art. 5547-38(a).
136. See id art. 5547-38(a).

137. See id.
art. 5547-38(b).
138. See id.art. 5547-38(a). Under art. 5547-38(a), the magistrate or master is directed
to release the patient if he "determines that no probable cause exists." The form contained
in that article for embodying the results of the probable cause hearing provides for a finding
of "probable cause to believe" that the proposed patient is dangerous. See id art. 554738(b).
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function is to consider the information and to determine, apparently
without regard to any decision made earlier on the issuance of the
order, whether, on that information, he believes that probable cause
exists to believe the proposed patient dangerous.
The second construction of the magistrate's role at the probable
cause hearing obviously provides for the magistrate to perform what
is conceptually a more significant function. It seems likely that this
is what was legislatively intended. This may, however, be too ambitious a formulation of the magistrate's role, given what magistrates
will be willing to do. A review to assure the previous decision had
some adequate basis may be as much as the hearings can be hoped
to accomplish. The issue may, in any case, be a purely academic
one. In practice, the entire proceeding may be so informal that such
fine distinctions between various standards for the inquiry will be
entirely meaningless.
Where the burden of proof falls at these probable cause hearings
is not specifically addressed by the revised Code. The specification
that the proposed patient is to have an opportunity to "challenge the
allegation" that he is dangerous is awkward, 39 but suggests that the
patient bears the burden of showing the absence of probable cause.
The statute, on the other hand, is capable of being construed as requiring an affirmative finding of probable cause as a prerequisite to
continued detention under the previously entered order. This suggests that the state, seeking continued retention, bears the burden of
coming forward with sufficient evidence to persuade the magistrate
or master that probable cause exists. Such a construction is further
indicated by the provision that the state may "prove its case" on the
certificate of the physician; 14° the "case" referred to apparently
means the case for the existence of probable cause, thus putting the
burden on the state.

139. It is not clear what "allegation" this refers to. There was, of course, an allegation
of immediate dangerousness in the motion for an Order of Protective Custody and perhaps
this is the referent. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-36(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984). In
addition, there has been a finding by the issuing court that the proposed patient is dangerous
in this sense, and conceptually it would seem most likely that the opportunity to which the
proposed patient is entitled is to attack this finding. See id art. 5547-36(b). Most likely,
however, this reflects uncritical incorporation into the statute of some of the dicta in Luna
See Luna v. Van Zant, 554 F. Supp. 68, 76 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (patient must "be given an
opportunity to challenge the allegation that he is dangerous").
140. See TEX. REV. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-38(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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If the probable cause hearing results in the release of the proposed
patient, this does not require, or even permit, dismissal of the pending application. It means only that the proposed patient may not be
detained pending the disposition of that application.
There is some reason to believe that the provisions for the hearing
are so flexible that the hearing may be meaningless. The patient
may be effectively powerless to sway a magistrate or master who is
inclined to uncritically accept the certifying physician's conclusions.
While the patient has the right to be present and "present" evidence,
it is unclear whether the patient has the subpoena power, or any
other right, to compel evidence. For example, if the state chooses to
rest on the certificate without calling the physician, may the patient
subpoena or otherwise compel the appearance of the physician? Perhaps the right to appear and present evidence would be illusory
without attendant rights to compel production of evidence and witnesses. The right to "present" evidence may necessarily include the
right to develop that evidence by compelling witnesses to appear.
The absence of any grant of the subpoena power,41 on the other hand,
may indicate an intent to make it unavailable.
It is unclear whether the probable cause hearing can be waived.
The revised Code provides that a probable cause hearing "shall be
held." 142 While provisions are made for waivers of other rights, such
as jury trial and the right to be present at the application hearing, no
such waiver provisions appear in the probable cause sections. Perhaps the legislative intent was to assure that a proposed patient
would not be subject to a prolonged deprivation of liberty without a
mandatory appearance before someone from outside the mental
health system; this would provide minimal assurance against overt
abuse of the prehearing detention process. 43 The legislature may
141. The provisions for the hearing on the application make no specific provision for
the subpoena power. See id art. 5547-48. It is simply incomprehensible that the legislature
intended to deny proposed patients the right to compulsory process at this point.
142. See id art. 5547-38(a). The intent of the revision seems to have been to incorporate at least all of the requirements that the Luna dictum suggested were demanded by due
process. But this is of little assistance. The Luna dictum included the suggestion that the
probable cause hearing must be initiated by the state. See Luna v. Van Zant, 554 F. Supp.
68, 75 (S.D. Tex. 1982). But neither this nor any other part of Luna addresses waivability.
Perhaps the state-initiation requirement suggests nonwaivability. On the other hand, the
Luna court might have been of the view that a hearing could not be conditioned upon the
patient's initiative, but could be dispensed with if the patient affirmatively waived it.
143. If the probable cause hearing cannot be waived, any meaningful procedural as-
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also have feared that if waivers were authorized, they might be so
readily accepted as to render the right to the probable cause hearing
of no practical effect.
Under the 1957 Code, it was unclear whether detention under an
order of protective custody could exceed fourteen days where there
were repeated Orders of Protective Custody or continuances granted
as to the hearing on the petition. The revised Code requires the
patient's discharge after the expiration of fourteen days of detention
if no final order on the application has been entered.'44 If continuances have been granted, this may be expanded to twenty-one
days. 145 But in light of this and the absence of any provision for
consecutive orders, it appears that under no circumstances can a detention pending action on an application last longer than twentyone days.
The revised Code, to some extent, addresses another related problem under the protective custody provisions. Under the 1957 Code,
facilities to which a person was admitted under an order of protective custody regarded themselves as having no authority to discharge the patient until the order was dissolved. Even if a decision
was made not to pursue the temporary hospitalization petition,
sometimes no efforts were made to have the order dissolved, and the
patient was retained until the order was rendered ineffective by the
expiration of fourteen days. This meant that the facility had, as a
practical matter, a two week period during which the patient could
be treated without regard to whether or not the patient met the criteria for involuntary treatment. 146
pects it may contain are probably subject to waiver. Since the state is specifically authorized
to "prove" its case on the physician's certificate on which the Order of Protective Custody
rested, the proposed patient can apparently waive his rights to appear and to present evidence and any other such similar rights as he may have. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANNi. art.
5547-38(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984). If the hearing is nonwaivable, it may apparently consist of
an exparteor in camera consideration by the magistrate or master of the certificate followed
by the making of the required findings.
144. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-39(d)(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
145. See id
146. The Department's administrative rules provide that a hospital should request the
issuing judge to "rescind" orders of protective custody when (and if) patients are found not
to meet "admissions criteria." See Tex. Dep't. of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 25
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 405.485 (Shepard's May 1, 1982). But "admissions criteria" refers to
the Department's own internal requirements, rather than the statutory requirements for deprivation of liberty. See id §§ 405.444-.480. An impaired person might well meet the Department's admission criteria but not the prior Code's standard for prehearing detention.
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In at least some localities, the result was the development of a
procedure for short term involuntary treatment almost entirely divorced from legal regulation. Applications would be filed for temporary hospitalization, supporting certificates would be filed
uncritically, or perhaps fraudulently, asserting that the patient met
the standard, and orders of protective custody would be routinely
issued. The patient would be retained and treated for the fourteen
day period, despite recognition from the beginning, or at least from
an early point in the process, that the patient could not be shown to
meet the legal standard for temporary hospitalization. Since no
hearing would be held, this was regarded as of no significance.
While only two weeks of treatment were available under this procedure, such a period was often sufficient to provide much, or perhaps
all, of the treatment regarded as needed.
The 1983 revision inserted a mandatory directive that a patient
detained under an Order of Protective Custody be discharged if and
when the head of the facility in which the patient is detained, or his
designee, determines that the person no longer meets the standard
for protective custody. 147 Presumably-although this is not made
clear-the patient must also be discharged if it is determined that
the patient never met the standard in the first place. Upon either
determination, the facility is not only authorized but is directed to
discharge the patient without regard to whether the Order of Protective Custody has been modified or dissolved by the issuing court. In
many situations, it now appears, retention of patients under the sort
of informal two week programs that developed under prior law
would be in direct violation of the Code's mandate.
On the other hand, this may not necessarily be so. The literal
mandate of the Code is limited to situations in which a determination has actually been made that the patient does not meet the criteria for protective custody. 148 Can the mandate be circumvented by
simply failing to make such a determination? Perhaps unfortunately, the revised Code imposes no specific duty upon a facility to
make, with some dispatch, a determination as to whether or not a
patient admitted under an Order of Protective Custody meets the

147. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANNq. art. 5547-39(d)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (release
from protective custody).
148. See id
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criteria. 49 It is difficult to imagine how a facility, consistent with
acceptable mental health practices, could fail to make a relatively
rapid assessment of an admitted patient. Perhaps, however, a treatment-oriented assessment would not necessarily involve inquiry into
whether the patient meets a legal standard; the staff members might
regard this as arbitrarily restrictive of their ability to treat those who
"need" treatment. The Code's provision would be a far more effective vehicle for dealing with the problem of the informal programs
of detention if it expressly imposed a duty upon facilities to evaluate
admitted patients and then to discharge them if it was determined
that they failed to meet the criteria for protective custody.
D. Effect of Improper PrehearingDetention

Even under the 1957 Code, provisions for prehearing detention
were relatively narrow. Generally speaking, the 1983 revisions
made such detention even less available. Perhaps the most significant question is whether there is any meaningful remedy available
to a patient who is improperly detained pending a hearing on an
application for court-ordered services. 150 The possibility exists that
the court can either dismiss the commitment proceedings or can exclude the evidence obtained during the improper custody. Conceptually, dismissal of the proceedings would be most appropriate if the
improper detention might reasonably be said to affect the jurisdiction of the trial court.
There is little basis in the Code, or elsewhere, for regarding such
149. The revised Code, in contrast, does require rapid assessment of a patient admitted
under the emergency detention provisions and an internal decision that the patient meets the
legal standards. See id. arts. 5547-27, -28(0.
150. The Code does provide-albeit indirectly-for civil liability of those acting in bad
faith, or even negligently, in the performance of their actions under the Code. See id art.
5547-18. "Knowing" violation of any provision of the Code is a criminal offense. See id
art. 5547-20 ("fine not exceeing $5,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both").
The willful causing of an unwarranted "commitment" is a more serious offense. See id. art.
5547-19 ("fine not exceeding $5,000, or imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both").
But it is unlikely that either of these remedies is of much value in any but the most aggravated situations. An admittedly impaired person claiming relief on the ground that he was
improperly compelled to submit to treatment which he apparently "needed" is unlikely to
make an attractive civil plaintiff or a sympathetic criminal complainant. But the legislature
has directed that the attorney general and district and county attorneys "shall" prosecute
violations of the Code. See id. art. 5547-21. Perhaps this is a legislative directive that persons invoking the criminal remedies are not to be deprived of those remedies by the exercise
of prosecutorial discretion.
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improper detention as affecting the subject matter or personal jurisdiction of the court. Even in criminal litigation, the fact that an
accused has been unconstitutionally detained and consequently
made available for trial does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial
court. 5 ' The Code itself cannot be read as conditioning jurisdiction
upon the patient's proper prehearing processing. Perhaps the prehearing requirement that certificates of two physicians be filed with
the court is rendered "jurisdictional" by the Code's directive that an
application for court-ordered treatment be dismissed if the certificates have not been filed at the time set for the hearing on the application. 152 But, the absence of any similar provision for dismissal
upon a showing of improper prehearing detention confirms the legislative intention to provide no such remedy.
There is widespread agreement, however, that in civil litigation,
when jurisdiction over one party was obtained by wrongfully luring
that party into the jurisdiction for purposes of service, the trial court
has discretion to decline to exercise its jurisdiction.'53 A Texas trial
court might, upon a showing of improper prehearing detention of a
proposed patient, properly rely on this authority and use its discretion to decline to exercise its jurisdiction.
These "wrongful presence in the jurisdiction" cases are arguably
inapplicable for several reasons. First, it will be unlikely in the
mental health context that the wrongfulness of the prehearing detention can be regarded as factually related to the trial court's jurisdiction over the proposed patient. Presumably, jurisdiction exists
because of the proposed patient's presence. In few, if any, mental
health cases, however, will the facts show that any wrongful detention was the cause of the proposed patient's presence in the jurisdiction. If jurisdiction over ' the proposed patient rests upon his
presence, it may well be that any wrongful detention was not caus151. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952); Stigger v. State, 506 S.W.2d 609,
611 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (unreasonable arrest of defendant does not per se vitiate a
conviction).
152. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-46(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (immediate
release required absent certificates).
153. See Cornell v. Cornell, 402 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1966) (apparently acknowledging rule but declining to apply it because record failed to contain finding that party was wrongfully indicted to enter Texas for purposes of being served with
process), rev'd on other grounds, 413 S.W.2d 385 (Tex. 1967); see also Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d
551, 612-13 (1964).
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ally related to the basis for jurisdiction, and, thus, the rule described
above ought not to apply.
In addition, the rule has a strong discretionary flavor. Perhaps
the mental health context suggests that this discretion could seldom,
or never, be properly exercised by declining to exercise jurisdiction
on the basis of improper prehearing detention. The rule is designed,
in part, to prevent a party from benefiting by his own wrongful action. But in mental health cases, it is arguable that no one-least of
all those who wrongfully detained the patient-is seeking a personal
advantage as is the plaintiff in other civil litigation. Moreover, a
refusal to exercise jurisdiction may deny to the proposed patient
useful treatment the patient needs. Application of the rule to the
mental health context, then, would not serve to deny a wrongdoing
party the fruits of his misdeeds, but might deny an impaired person
treatment to which he is entitled. Moreover, mental health litigation
serves important social interests, such as protection of society from
dangerously impaired persons. Where declining to exercise jurisdiction would result in their interests being disserved, perhaps almost
any decision to pursue other interests by declining to exercise jurisdiction would be an abuse of discretion.
There is virtually no basis, therefore, for regarding improper prehearing detention as affecting the jurisdiction of the court. Nor does
there appear to be any other basis in the Code authorizing dismissal
of the proceeding for improper detention. An argument might be
made that trial judges can exercise their apparent discretion to refuse to exercise jurisdiction that has been obtained by wrongful action directed against one of the parties. But the rule permitting trial
courts to decline to exercise their jurisdiction probably has little application to the mental health context.
Widespread acceptance of exclusionary rules in criminal litigation
suggests a more limited remedy for improper prehearing detention." 4 Evidence obtained during, or as a result of, an improper
prehearing detention might be excluded at the hearing on the application. Thus, detention might not automatically deprive the peti-

154. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961) (evidence obtained in violation of
criminal defendant's fourth amendment rights cannot be used to provide defendant's guilt in
state criminal prosecution); see also TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 38.23 (Vernon 1979)
(evidence obtained in violation of laws or Texas Constitution cannot be used "against the

accused on the trial of any criminal case").
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tioner or the state of its ability to secure involuntary treatment. The
petitioner or the state, however, would not be permitted to benefit
directly from those preliminary proceedings that were conducted in
violation of the proposed patient's rights under the Code. There is
no basis in the Code, and almost none elsewhere, for the proposition
that evidence offered at the hearing should be excluded because of
its relationship to an improper preliminary detention. The exclusionary rules continue to be limited to criminal litigation. 5 '
Perhaps a case can be made that Texas courts have an inherent
power to develop exclusionary rules applicable in non-criminal litigation, at least where an especially important need for such a rule
exists. 56 Only such a remedy, the argument must run, would provide sufficient incentive for careful administration of the statutory
limits on prehearing detention. Generally, other remedies are so
unlikely to be significant that petitioners, mental health professionals, and others can proceed in virtual disregard of the limits on prehearing detention, since no ramifications flow from violation of
those limits. It is far from clear, however, that the state tribunals
have authority to develop such remedies.
If authority exists to develop an exclusionary remedy, there are
significant, and perhaps controlling, considerations suggesting that
this authority not be exercised. There is no reason to believe that
155. See Allison v. American Surety Co., 248 S.W. 829, 832 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1923, no writ) ("evidence which is otherwise admissible may not be excluded because it
has been illegally and wrongfully obtained"). The Texas courts appear to have accepted the
general rule that the manner in which evidence was obtained does not affect its admissibility
in civil litigation. See id at 832.
156. See Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Strickland, 483 S.W.2d 541, 547 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1972, writ ref d n.r.e.). The court in Strickland found testimony by a witness
inadmissible because the testimony was based upon observations made by the witness during an unlawful entry onto the appellee's property. See id at 547. The appellate court
stressed that application could have been made under rule 167 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for an order authorizing such entry. See id at 547. Noting that the purpose of rule 167
is to protect parties from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or expense, the courtwithout discussion or authority--concluded that its violation carried a sanction rendering
evidence thus obtained inadmissible. See id at 547. Strickland provides some authority for
the proposition that at least certain legal requirements related to the manner in which evidence is obtained may be construed as carrying an implicit directive that evidence obtained
by a violation of the requirements be inadmissible in civil litigation when offered by the
violating party. Perhaps the requirements of the Mental Health Code relating to the prehearing manner of processing potential patients, like the requirements in rule 167 for entry
onto the premises of an adverse party, may and should be read as embodying an exclusionary sanction.
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evidence obtained during improper detention of a proposed patient
would be in any way unreliable. Both society and proposed patients
have important interests in having a mental health proceeding result
in an accurate decision as to whether the proposed patient is, in fact,
subject to involuntary treatment. Evidence obtained during a proposed patient's prehearing detention in a mental health facilityperhaps for the express purpose of evaluation-might be especially
reliable evidence bearing upon the propriety of compulsory treatment. Thus, the need for all reliable evidence, including that obtained during an improper prehearing detention, may outweigh
whatever value an exclusionary rule might serve in encouraging
compliance with the Code's prehearing detention requirements.
E. PrehearingDetention: A GeneralEvaluation
Despite the complex and elaborate provisions in the revised Code
for limitations on, and challenges to, detention under protective custody, a proposed patient remains without any opportunity for a full
and adversarial determination as to whether or not he is sufficiently
dangerous to warrant prehearing detention. The judge issuing an
Order of Protective Custody, of course, makes such a determination.
But this is in an exparte proceeding, which realistically will almost
always be decided on the basis of the certificate of the physician. It
is unlikely that this is a meaningful screening device.
Nor does the probable cause hearing require any decision on the
merits of the issue. The Code provides that the patient is to have an
opportunity to challenge the "allegation" that he presents the required risk of harm. But at most, the hearing provides an opportunity to address the existence of probable cause to believe that the
risk exists. This opportunity may be without much, if any, practical
value. By the time of the hearing on the application, of course, the
existence of justification for prehearing detention has become moot.
At no point is a proposed patient entitled to a full adversary inquiry
into the justification for prehearing detention.
There is reason to believe that this state of affairs is insufficient to
protect against abuse of the prehearing detention process. It may
well provide only a facade of an opportunity to challenge the application of a procedure that presents a high risk of abuse. A full inquiry into the merits of prehearing detention might, of course, be
burdensome, especially if it was to take place within a short time
after initial detention. But on balance, the extraordinary nature of
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the prehearing detention power and the high risk of abuse it poses
seem to argue strongly in favor of a more substantive opportunity to
challenge prehearing detention than, is provided by the revised
Code's "probable cause" hearing.
A more realistic procedure would recognize that hearings need
not be conducted in all cases on the propriety of a prehearing detention. But, a detained patient should have the right, upon request, to
a rapid andfull hearing on the justification for continued prehearing
detention. The hearing should be before the judge of the court in
which the application has been filed. The patient should have the
right to compel the attendance of witnesses. The state should have
the burden of establishing, by admissible evidence, that the proposed patient is mentally ill and immediately dangerous within the
meaing of the statute. Since such hearings would be held only
upon request, they would be relatively infrequent. But when held,
they would hold more hope of providing a remedy for wrongfully
detained persons than the revised Code's "probable cause" hearing
procedure.
It may well be, however, that any effort to meaningfully limit prehearing detention is doomed to fail. The assumption that the legal
framework can, in fact, assure that most, or even many, proposed
patients remain at liberty pending the hearing may be simply
inaccurate.
Probably the major defect in the Code as revised, as well as
before the 1983 revision, is its continued effort to base provisions for
prehearing detention on a misperception of reality. The assumption
of the separation of prehearing detention from the general involuntary treatment process is that probably most cases in which involuntary treatment is sought are ones in which prehearing detention is
unnecessary and therefore can be avoided. But reality is completely
the opposite. In almost no cases is involuntary treatment sought
15
without prehearing detention also being sought and granted. 7
Judges presiding over mental health cases generally assume that if a
person is not sufficiently "sick" to "require" immediate detention,
the person is not sufficiently sick to justify involuntary treatment
157. See Jones, Emergency Restraint Under the Texas Mental Health Code, 33 TEX. B.J.
31, 32 (1970) (seldom is a person served with paper alleging that he is mentally ill and then
allowed to remain at liberty; "[u]sually the conduct attributed to the [proposed] patient indicates a need for immediate restraint").
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proceedings of any sort. Conversely, a person sufficiently sick to
require involuntary treatment is too sick to remain at liberty pending a full hearing.
This is reflected by practice under the revised Code. There are
reports that in those infrequent cases in which the probable cause
hearing results in a finding of no probable cause, the underlying
application is not in fact pursued. Instead, by general consensus, the
probable cause hearing is regarded as having terminated the entire
proceeding on the basis that insufficient grounds existed to pursue it.
In theory, of course, this is completely incorrect. That a patient is
not properly detained prior to the hearing says little as to whether
that hearing should or will result in involuntary treatment being ordered. If, however, there is no practical difference between the criteria for prehearing detention and that for involuntary treatment in
general, a preliminary finding that probable cause is lacking might
be regarded as a signal that the entire proceeding should be aborted.
The reason that no distinction between the two issues-prehearing detention and involuntary treatment in general-is recognized is
not entirely clear. Perhaps it rests upon an assumption that all seriously mentally ill persons are so likely to be "dangerous" that it is
artificial to separate the issues. Or perhaps it rests upon the conclusion that the limited criteria for prehearing detention ignore important considerations that must, as a practical matter, be respected.
Once a decision has been made to seek involuntary treatment for a
family member, for example, and especially when that is made clear
to the proposed patient, it may be totally unrealistic to expect the
proposed patient and the family members seeking treatment to live
together as a family unit. If a proposed patient is not a member of a
local family, it may be unrealistic to expect that he or she will remain available in the community to await the results of a mental
health proceeding. Thus, detention may be sought to assure the person's availability for treatment.
Most likely, a decision to seek treatment reflects the culmination
of a developing crisis in either a family or some segment of the community. When the crisis erupts, the tolerance of the family or the
community may have been so strained that the proposed patient's
continued presence is simply unthinkable. If an uncritical determination of dangerousness is necessary to implement this, there will be
tremendous pressure to make such a determination.
If this is correct, the appropriate response of the law is, at best,

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

47

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 1, Art. 2

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:41

unclear. Unfortunately, the revision of the Code never addressed
the issue. In total disregard of the overwhelming evidence to the
contrary, the revision continued to assume that a system of involuntary care could entertain and act on applications for involuntary
treatment without also immediately removing the proposed patient
from the community. As a result, there will continue to be tremendous pressure to bend the provisions for emergency care to accommodate the perceived "need" for routine immediate detention of
those whose involuntary treatment is sought. Authorizing judges to
consider more evidence before issuing an Order of Protective Custody, mandating probable cause hearings on "dangerousness," and
other similar procedural measures purportedly enacted to enforce a
limitation of prehearing detention to the "immediately dangerous"
mentally ill are likely to miss the mark by far. It is unfortunate that
the revision of the Code could not directly face the pervasive problem of the community demand for routine and immediate detention
of those whose involuntary treatment is sought.
IV.

RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION

The right of a proposed patient to representation by counsel, almost certainly of federal constitutional dimensions, was recognized
in the 1957 Code. 58 This recognition, of course, is continued in the
1983 revision.' 59 Under the revised Code, however, the right of representation is more specifically and broadly defined than it was
under the prior statutory scheme.
A.

Right to 'Adversary" Representation

Despite the tradition of affording proposed patients the right of
representation in mental health proceedings, the prior Texas Mental
Health Code made no effort to define the role of defense counsel. In
part as a result of this failure, lawyers representing proposed patients in mental health proceedings are often uncertain as to how
158. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 33, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 511 (revised
1983) (attorney to be appointed when petition is filed); see also TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15
(statutes providing for commitment of persons of unsound mind "may" provide for "attorney ad litem" appointed by court).
159. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-44(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (within 24
hours of filing application for court-ordered treatment, judge is to appoint attorney if proposed patient does not already have one).
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their role should be defined. 60 There is a widespread perception
that the impaired condition of many of the clients in mental health
cases gives defense attorneys greater ethical and legal authority to
ignore or override the clients' desires than is the case in other situations, such as criminal prosecutions. In at least some cases-and
perhaps in many--counsel representing proposed patients have
failed to vigorously resist involuntary treatment on the assumption
that the lawyer is entitled to determine what course of action is in
the "best interests" of the client and to pursue this course whether or
not the client agrees. 16 There is significant reason to believe that
representation by an attorney who defines his or her role in such a
manner does not meet the apparent federal constitutional require62
ment of representation. 1
The 1983 revision largely resolves the dilemma of lawyers representing proposed patients by defining the role of defense counsel:
Whether or not to resist [efforts to provide involuntary mental health
services] is a decision to be made by the person. If the person ex160. See Dix, The Role of the Lawyer in Proceedings Under the Texas Mental Health
Code, 39 TEX. B.J. 982, 983 (1976) (lawyers must define their role in mental health proceedings).
161. See Cohen, The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill,
44 TEXAS L. REV. 425, 447-50 (1966) (drawing in part upon observations in Travis County,
Texas). For the Texas standards for counseling the disabled, see STATE BAR OF TEXAS,
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-12 (1972)
which provides:
If a client under disability has no legal representative, his lawyer may be compelled
in court proceedings to make decisions on behalf of the client. If the client is capable of
understanding the matter in question or of contributing to the advancement of his interests, regardless of whether he is legally disqualified from performing certain acts, the
lawyer should obtain from him all possible aid. If the disability of a client and the lack
of a legal representative compel the lawyer to make decisions for his client, the lawyer
should consider all circumstances then prevailing and act with care to safeguard and
advance the interests of his client. But obviously a lawyer cannot perform any act or
make any decision which the law requires his client to perform or make, either acting
for himself if competent, or by a duly constituted representative if legally incompetent.
Id.
162. See, e.g., Exparte Ullmann, 616 S.W.2d 278, 283-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1981, writ dism'd) (attorney appointed to represent 23 persons on same date, under
system in which counsel's main job was to assure that proper papers were filed, did not
provide effective assistance of counsel); Moss v. State, 539 S.W.2d 936, 942 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1976, no writ) (Mental Health Code may be deficient for failure to require
adversary representation, but, on facts of case before court, effective and adversary representation was provided); State ex rel. Memmel v. Mundy, 249 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Wis. 1977)
(attorney must represent client competently and zealously within the law).
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presses a desire to avoid court-ordered mental health services, the attorney has the duty to use all reasonable efforts within the bounds of
law to advocate the person's right to avoid court-ordered mental
63
health services, without regard to the attorney's personal views.'
This was not intended to give the client control over those decisions generally regarded as within the attorney's prerogative to
make. The attorney in a mental health proceeding is ethically required, under the Code, to elicit and follow the client's decision as
to whether or not to resist treatment. 64 Probably, although this is
less clear, the attorney must also permit the client to decide whether
or not to invoke the right to a jury trial and the right to testify at the
hearing. But nothing in the new Code suggests that decisions such
as which witnesses (other than the client) to call and what matters to
inquire into on cross examination are taken from the sole province
of the attorney.
Counsel is not prohibited from advising and attempting to persuade the client concerning the appropriate decision to make in regard to those matters on which the client has the right of
65
decisionmaking. This is specifically recognized in the new Code.
It seems clear, however, that the attorney has an ethical responsibility to assure that any advice or efforts to persuade are reasonably
based. Uncritical acceptance of the proposition that the client
should submit to institutional treatment would be inappropriate.
Also, the attorney's efforts to persuade the client must accommodate
the reality that the client is likely to be impaired and quite susceptible to overreaching. The attorney clearly has a continuing duty,
while providing advice, to assure that the client remains as independent an agent as is possible under the circumstances.
The revised Code's definition of the role of counsel does not address the problem presented when a proposed patient either declines
completely to express a view on whether to resist involuntary treat163. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-45(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
164. See id

165. See id ("The attorney may advise the person concerning the wisdom of agreeing
to or resisting efforts to provide mental health services."). In the Task Force, suggestions
that providing such advice be required of attorneys was countered with the argument that
lawyers are often insufficiently equipped to provide such advice. The final legislation quite
clearly creates no duty to advise on such matters. It may not, however, be unrealistic to
expect lawyers to become equipped to provide these clients with such advice, as lawyers
often "counsel" other clients concerning the wisdom of exercising various legal options.
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ment or vacillates between accepting and rejecting treatment.
Under a rigorous "advocate" view of counsel's role, the attorney's
duty in such a case would be to resist involuntary treatment. But
the revised Code speaks in terms of the proposed patient's expressed
desires. 66 It may well have been legislative intent to authorize
counsel in cases where no expression of view can be obtained from
the client in order to make the decision on behalf of the client. Perhaps in such cases efforts to resist would frequently be so futile that
the need to avoid expensive and potentially traumatic litigation
overrides other considerations.
A somewhat similar problem may be presented if the proposed
patient's expressed desire to resist involuntary treatment is obviously related to manifestations of the proposed patient's illness.
May defense counsel ignore the client's expressed desires where this
is the case? Unlike the situation presented by the silent client, no
reasonable reading of the statutory language would authorize overriding the client's expressed desires in this situation. To authorize
defense counsel to pass judgment on whether a client's desire to resist treatment is sufficiently independent of the client's impairment
may be to impose upon counsel a sometimes impossible task. On
balance, it seems clear that the revised Code intends to require that
counsel respect and implement a proposed patient's desire to avoid
involuntary treatment, whether or not that desire appears to counsel
to be related to an impaired mental condition experienced by the
client.
B.

Representation at Probable Cause Hearings

The 1983 Code clearly contemplates that counsel is to play a role
in the process of evaluating the propriety of detaining a proposed
patient pending a hearing. 6 ' Counsel is to be appointed at the time
an Order of Protective Custody is to be issued 68 and is entitled to be
present at the probable cause hearing.' 69 This was included in response to dicta in the Luna decision, indicating the court's view that
due process required the right to counsel at the proceeding for chal-

166.
167.
168.
169.

See id
See id.
art. 5547-37(b).
See id. art. 5547-37(a).
See id art. 5547-37(a).
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lenging prehearing detention. 70 It is clear that counsel's role includes active implementation of a proposed patient's right to remain
at liberty pending the hearing, unless the provisions for prehearing
detention are properly invoked. Given the unrealistic nature of the
provisions for prehearing detention, however, the value of this may
reasonably be questioned.
C. Preparation
In an apparent effort to make clear that adequate representation
cannot be provided simply by counsel's physical presence and participation in the hearing itself, the revised Code establishes certain
minimum requirements for the sort of prehearing preparation that
adequate representation demands. Thus, the attorney is specifically
directed to review both the documents filed in the case and the client's medical records, to interview witnesses, and to explore the possibility of alternatives to inpatient treatment.' 7 ' The latter is clearly
intended to provide proposed patients with the assistance of counsel
in exploring outpatient treatment programs or other alternatives to
institutional care and in presenting these to the court if the hearing
results in a conclusion that involuntary treatment of some sort
should be ordered.
D. Continuing Responsibility
The revised Code also makes clear that defense counsel's role
goes beyond preparation for and participation in the hearing itself.
If the court orders involuntary treatment, defense counsel is directed
to discuss with the patient the patient's legal status. 72 This expressly includes the right to appeal, circumstances in which release
is available, and provisions for discharge. 173 Unless another attorney assumes further responsibility, counsel is required to "maintain
until appeal has
responsibility" for the representation of a patient
74
been taken or the time for appeal has expired.
The Code, unfortunately, does not address the situation in which
counsel participates in a "settlement" of the case, which involves the
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

See Luna v. Van Zant, 554 F. Supp. 68, 75 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-45(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
See id art. 5547-45(a).
See id art. 5547-45(d).
See id. art. 5547-45(e).
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1

patient agreeing to voluntary admission. As a voluntary patient, the
client has the theoretical right to a release upon the expiration of
ninety-six hours after written request for release.1 75 While an application for court-ordered treatment may be filed, the Code's provision is designed to give a voluntary patient the right either to be
released, or to require proof that the criteria for involuntary treatment are met. 7 6 Yet, there is reason to fear that informal discouragement may greatly reduce the realistic availability of this
opportunity for at least some voluntary patients.
Perhaps defense attorneys who participate in placing a client in
institutional care as a voluntary patient have a continuing responsibility to assure that the client retains access to those rights possessed
by a voluntary patient. This might mean, for example, that a lawyer
should have an obligation to be available for consultation on matters such as the method or wisdom of invoking the right to release.
Despite the revised Code's emphasis on the lawyer's continuing responsibility when the case goes to hearing, however, it fails to address any similar responsibility when the case is resolved by the
Mental Health Code's equivalent to a plea of guilty.
E.

Conclusion

A major theme of the 1983 revision was the encouragement of
more extensive and active involvement of lawyers performing an
adversary role. Whether or to what extent this will actually materialize, however, is somewhat problematic and depends upon several
factors. Clearly, trial judges have substantial practical control over
this. Adversarial activities can be effectively discouraged by means
as blatant as selection of lawyers for appointment who have demonstrated their willingness to avoid rigorous representation. If a judge
disfavors such activity by counsel representing a proposed patient,
counsel may be required to compromise his views as to his orientation simply to provide his client with as effective representation as is
possible before the trial judge.
It may well be that despite the statutory framework, a number of
trial judges will continue to view defense counsel as quasi-guardians, whose role is to see that the court can pursue a proposed pa175. See id art. 5547-25.
176. See id art. 5547-25.
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tient's "best interests" with a minimum of procedural interference.
To the extent that this is the case, the legislative mandate in the
revised Code that proposed patients be provided with rigorous adversarial representation may be long in materializing.
V.

HEARING ON APPLICATION FOR COURT
ORDERED TREATMENT

Under the prior Code, the hearing on an application or petition
was to be "conducted in as informal a manner as is consistent with
orderly procedure."' 77 The revision of the Code was stimulated, in
significant part, by increasing sensitivity to the value of greater procedural structure in the hearing itself.178 The extent, however, to
which such procedural structure is required by federal constitutional
concerns is uncertain. The United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue only in the context of the required burden of proof.
In Addington v. Texas,'79 the Court confirmed that a hearing to
determine whether a proposed patient would be committed to a psychiatric facility requires due process of law.' 80 The Court made
clear that the process that is required is affected by the specific characteristics of such proceedings.' 81 Among these characteristics are
the difficult and often "clinical" nature of the matters at issue and
the resulting necessity of deference to professional expertise. In
light of these considerations, the Court concluded, federal due process does not require that mental health proceedings apply all of the
procedural niceties of the criminal trial, or even those constitutionally mandated in proceedings to declare a child a delinquent. 8 2
Specifically, the Court held that while due process does not permit
commitment of a proposed patient on the basis of a mere preponderance of the evidence, it does not require proof beyond a reason177. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 36(d), 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 512 (revised
1983).
178. Cf Comment, Civil Commitment in Texas--An Illusion of Due Process, 8 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 486, 487-89 (1976) (due process is necessary to accurately and impartially determine individual's best interest).
179. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
180. See id at 425.
181. See id at 425.
182. See id at 428-29. Evidence of the Court's willingness to find flexibility in the due
process requirements for mental health proceedings can also be found in Parham v. J.R., 442
U.S. 582, 606-08 (1979) (hospitalization of children does not require judicial proceeding, but
only structured "administrative" process).
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able doubt. Proof by "clear and convincing evidence" meets federal
constitutional demands.' 83
Following Addington, the Texas Supreme Court abandoned its
earlier adherence to the preponderance of the evidence standard
and directed the application of the "clear and convincing evidence"
test for indefinite involuntary treatment proceedings. 84 This was
incorporated into the revised Code and made applicable to proceedings for both temporary and extended treatment. 8 5 In addition,
however, the revised Code has, in several areas, significantly increased the structure of hearings and the procedural protections
available to proposed patients.' 86 Given the flavor of Addington,
these changes must be regarded primarily as ones dictated by sound
state policy rather than as required by federal constitutional
mandate.
AdversarialNature of Hearing
Providing a proposed patient with representation, of course, cannot assure an adversarial proceeding. Insofar as lawyers representing proposed patients have failed to function vigorously, this has
sometimes been justified on the ground that such action seemed inappropriate where no vigorous advocate for the other side was present. Under the previous Code, the court was authorized, but not
required, to direct the county attorney or district attorney to represent the state. 87 This discretion is removed by the 1983 revision by
requiring the county attorney (or the district attorney in counties
having no county attorney) to represent the state. 8 8 This was part
of the overall effort to assure that proceedings are truly adversarial.

A.

B.

Notice and Discovery

Unlike the former Code, the revised Code contains formal provisions for the sort of detailed notice essential to prehearing preparation. Counsel representing the State is to provide the defense with
183. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33 (1979) ("middle level of burden of
proof strikes fair balance").
184. See State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979)(per curiam).
185.
186.
187.
1983).
188.

See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-48(e) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
See id art. 5547-48.
See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 13, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 508 (revised
See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-13 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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several items of information: a written statement that includes a
specification of which of the alternative prongs of the criteria for
involuntary care the state will rely upon," 9 a description of the
state's theory ("a brief description of the reasons" why treatment is
required), 90 and "the names, addresses and telephone numbers of
the witnesses who may testify (presumably in support of the application) at the hearing."' 9' In addition, the statement is to include "a
list of any acts of the person which the [state will] attempt to prove
at the hearing. ' 92 This would seem to include any overt act relied
upon, or the acts constituting the behavior pattern that will be
shown. If other conduct by the proposed patient will be addressed
by the testimony of any state witnesses, then this apparently must
1 93
also be anticipated and set out in the notice.
The written notice and discovery statement described above need
be provided only if requested by defense counsel prior to forty-eight
hours before the hearing 94 and if the information was unobtainable
otherwise. Thus, the procedure for enforcing the right to notice is
left unfortunately unclear. Apparently, a request for notice must be
filed with the prosecutor. While there appears to be no requirement
that it be in writing, or that a copy be filed with the court, both
would seem to be dictated by sound practice. Whether the request
must contain an assertion of inability to obtain some or all of the
information by other methods is again uncertain, but discretion
strongly suggests such a claim be made in the request.
Perhaps the relatively broad discovery and notice provisions are
partly offset by the limited remedy that the revised Code makes
available for a violation of the provisions. The Code provides that
evidence and testimony related to matters that should have been
disclosed in the written statement may be admitted if the judge determines that admission would not deprive the proposed patient of a
fair opportunity to contest the evidence or testimony.1 95 This obviously contemplates that in those cases where such a determination
cannot be made, the notice and discovery provisions are to be en189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See id art. 5547-43(b)(1).
See id. art. 5547-43(b)(3).
Id art. 5547-43(b)(2) (parenthetical statement added).
Id art. 5547-43(b)(4).
See id art. 5547-43.
See id art. 5547-43(b).
See id art. 5547-43(c).
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forced by excluding evidence and testimony concerning matters not
disclosed. The issue will apparently be whether disclosure would
have permitted the sort of investigation and preparation necessary
to subject the state's evidence to reasonable scrutiny and rebuttal.
If the state offers testimony concerning matters it has not provided in the required notice, and the judge determines that the absence of such notice will prevent the defense from fairly contesting
the credibility of the evidence, may the judge-instead of excluding
the evidence and progressing with the hearing--order a continuance
with the view towards admitting the evidence after the defense has
had opportunity to prepare? The Code does not address this. A
reasonable reading of the scheme as a whole suggests not. A proposed patient is entitled to a hearing conducted with dispatch. To
delay a hearing because of the state's failure to comply with the notice provisions is arguably to respect a proposed patient's right to
notice at the cost of ignoring the proposed patient's right to speedy
resolution of the application. The best reading of the provision is
that excluding the evidence and progressing immediately with the
hearing is the only legislatively contemplated course.
C.

The Requirement of Two Certficates

As was previously the case, the revised Code demands that the
state must have filed the certificates of two physicians before the
hearing begins. 96 Like the prior Code, the revision requires that
one of the two certifying physicians be a psychiatrist if one is "available in the county."' 97 The meaning of "available" may cause some
196. See id art. 5547-46(a).
197. See id art. 5547-46(a). This requirement may be of special procedural importance
because of the remedy provided by the Code. Under art. 5547-46(c), the judge is directed to
dismiss the application and release the proposed patient if the two certificates are not on file
at the time set for the hearing on the application. See id art. 5547-46(c) (two certificates
based on examinations conducted within the preceding 30 days). It is unclear, however,
whether this requires dismissal if two certificates have been filed but neither is that of a
psychiatrist. Perhaps the dramatic remedy of dismissal was intended to apply only where
there was a total failure to comply with the requirements, i.e., where at least one of the two
certificates was totally lacking. If dismissal is required for failure of the certificates to meet
the "one psychiatrist" requirement, it is unclear whether the certificates must on their face
show the defect. If a proposed patient moves to dismiss and alleges that neither of the
certifying physicians is a psychiatrist, although a psychiatrist was "available," must a factual
hearing be held and that issue resolved before the hearing can progress to the merits of the
application? If an application is dismissed on this basis, may another application be filed?
If so, may it be based upon essentially the same allegations, that is, upon the same claims
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difficulty. It is uncertain if the legislature intended to require the
certificate of a psychiatrist if at least one such physician is currently
practicing in the county. But such an interpretation may be the only
way of giving the provision reasonably precise meaning. Unless so
construed, it may mean only that a certificate of a psychiatrist is
necessary if one is practicing or otherwise accessible to persons in
the county, if that psychiatrist is willing to conduct examinations, if
the court finds it convenient to arrange for an evaluation of the proposed patient by that psychiatrist, or some combination of these
considerations. On the other hand, the requirement may, as a realistic matter, have been intended only as an admonition and not as
an enforceable requirement, making its meaning of little real
significance.
D. Formality and Procedure
In contrast with the general directive of informality in the prior
Code, the revised Code specifically adopts the application of the
Rules of Evidence applicable in civil litigation except where inconsistent with the Mental Health Code.'98 The hearing is to be "on the
record"; 199 this apparently requires that, even in the absence of a
request, a court reporter is to be present and preserve the proceedings. Under the prior Code, the court was given general authority to
exclude all persons not having a "legitimate interest in the proceedings. ' ' 200 Under the revision, the hearing is to be "public,"' 2° ' which
supported by the same evidence? To the extent that a new application can be filed, is there
any limit upon the proposed patient's detention pending the hearing on that new application? The apparently simple remedy provided may be far from simple in application.
198. See id art. 5547-48(d) (rules govern all civil proceedings). The Texas Rules of
Evidence were promulgated by the Texas Supreme Court "on November 23, 1982, to become effective on September 1, 1983." See Caperton & McGee, Background, Scope and
Applicability of the Texas Rules of Evidence, 20 Hous. L. REv. 49, 57 (1983) (1983 Texas
Rules of Evidence Handbook).
199. See TEX. REV. CwV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-48(e) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
200. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 36(c), 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 512 (revised

1983).
201. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-48(c) (Vernon Supp. 1984). The right to

a public trial has generally been limited to criminal cases. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale,
433 U.S. 368, 379 (1979) (right to a public trial in criminal cases is guaranteed under sixth
amendment). This right could become important because of the extension of certain rights
held by the criminally accused to proposed patients in civil commitment proceedings. Cf
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1979) (recognizes right of accused to "conduct his
own defense"); Luna v. Van Zant, 554 F. Supp. 68, 74 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (recognizing patient's right to liberty). The criminal's right to a public trial, however, "does not guarantee
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presumably means open within the limits imposed by the environment in which it is held. The revised Code continues the prior directive to hold the hearing in a "setting not likely to have a harmful
effect on the person";2"2 this presumably includes locations in a hospital. But at the request of the proposed patient or his attorney, the
hearing must be held in the county courthouse.20 3 Under the revised
Code, the hearing may be closed by the judge.20 4 But this may be
done only if the proposed patient or counsel so demands and, in
addition, the court determines that good cause exists.20 5
The proposed patient has the right to be present.20 6 This may be
"waived," however, by either the proposed patient or the attorney.20 7 It is uncertain whether this authorizes an attorney to
"waive" the proposed patient's presence over the objections of the
proposed patient. The overall thrust of the revision, however, is that
such rights, as that of presence at the hearing, are personal to the
proposed patient and may be waived only by the patient himself.
Arguably, this provision means only that an attorney is authorized
to convey to the court the proposed patient's expressed desire to
avoid attending the hearing. It does not, under this construction,
authorize the attorney to independently make a waiver for the proposed patient.
Whether or not the proposed patient may be called as a witness
by the state is left unresolved; although, the case law from the Texas
appellate courts makes clear that this is an important issue.20 8 Perhaps the "presence" provision suggests that whether to be present,
for testimony or other purposes, is to be at the option of the prothe right to compel a private trial." See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 382
(1979).
202. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-48(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).

203. See id
204. See id art. 5547-48(c).
205. See id art. 5547-48(c).
206. See id art. 5547-48(b).
207. See id art. 5547-48(b). Under the prior Code, the proposed patient was "not required to be present at the hearing," but was "not to be denied the right to be present." See
Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 36(b), 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 512 (revised 1983).
208. See Greene v. State, 537 S.W.2d 100, 102-03 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1976, no writ) (proposed patient has self-incrimination right not to disclose information that
might lead to criminal prosecution and conviction, but no right to avoid disclosures that
would only tend to reveal mental illness); see also State for Interest and Protection of Ellenwood, 567 S.W.2d at 251, 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1978, no writ) (fifth amendment
not applicable to every aspect of a civil commitment proceeding).
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posed patient. But whether to require the proposed patient to testify
in support of the application seems a separate and important issue.
It is unlikely that the legislature intended to resolve it as merely a
subaspect of the need to have the patient attend the entire hearing.
E. Jury Trial and Disposition
A jury trial remains available in all cases. In applications for extended treatment, a jury trial must be held unless it is waived.2 °9 In
proceedings on applications for temporary treatment, a jury trial is
to be held only if requested. 210 The revised Code carefully defines
the role of judge and jury in those cases in which a jury trial is held.
The jury is to determine whether the proposed patient meets the
criteria for involuntary treatment. t ' If this determination is made,
then what treatment to utilize is made an issue for the judge.21 2
Whether or not treatment inan institution is treatment in the "least
restrictive appropriate setting available" is an issue for the court,
21 3
rather than the jury.
F. Treatment Order
The Code authorizes the entry of an order directing treatment for
a period not to exceed ninety days or, in the case of extended treatment, not to exceed twelve months.21 4 It further directs that the order "shall not specify any shorter period of time. 121 5 This bars the
entry of orders authorizing institutional treatment for a period not
to exceed a lesser number of days, as had sometimes been ordered in
the past. The legislative judgment appears to have been that once
involuntary treatment was found to be appropriate, the difficulty of
predicting in advance the appropriate length of that treatment was
such that the court ought not to undertake the task. Within the
209. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-49(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984). Waiver of
jury trial must be "in writing, under oath, signed and sworn to by both the patient and his
attorney, and filed 48 hours prior to the hearing." See id art. 5547-49(c).
210. See id art. 5547-49(a).
211. See id art. 5547-49.
212. See id arts. 5547-50(d), -51(d) (upon determination of mental illness, "judge shall
dismiss the jury").
213. See id art. 5547-50(e).
214. See id arts. 5547-50, -51.
215. See id art. 5547-50(0. Prior to Code revision, one court held invalid a commitment order not limited to a 90 day period. See C.V.v. State, 616 S.W.2d 441, 443 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
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ninety day or twelve month time frames, the duration of treatment
is to be-in the first instance at least-a matter determined by treating personnel rather than the court.
VI.

"WAIVER" OF HEARINGS

Among the most perplexing tasks is providing for those cases in
which no active contest to the proceedings is to occur. This is the
mental health equivalent to the guilty or "no contest" plea in criminal procedure. In both situations, there is some reason to fear that
to permit judgment to be entered simply upon the person's expressed willingness to submit to the judgment creates a risk of informally compelled submission and, therefore, in the mental health
context, of ultimately unjustified involuntary treatment.2" 6
In the criminal context, this concern is addressed by rather elaborate provisions requiring, as a prerequisite to the taking of a guilty
plea, that the judge address the defendant in open court and elicit
information indicating that the defendant understands the significance of the plea and is making it voluntarily.2 7 Further, no conviction may be had upon the defendant's plea alone. Evidence must
be introduced supporting the defendant's guilt.21 8 There is some in216. See Greene v. State, 537 S.W.2d 100, 102 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1976, no writ) (commitment based upon proposed patient's out-of-court waiver of right to be
present and certificates filed by examining physicians). Justice Evans, dissenting from the
majority's affirmance of the order of commitment, stressed the absence of any determination
by the trial court as to the proposed patient's capability of attending the hearing. See id. at
103 (Evans, J., dissenting). The record, he urged, created a serious issue as to whether the
proposed patient made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to remain silent. See id
at 103 (Evans, J., dissenting). Moreover, in light of the conclusory statements in the physicians' certificates, there was a serious question as to whether the proposed patient was afforded due process overall. See id at 104 (Evans, J., dissenting). The majority, however,
summarily affirmed on the basis that the appellant had made no showing that acceptance of
the waiver violated due process. See id. at 102. But see Munoz v. State, 569 S.W.2d 642, 644
(Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1978, no writ) (lower court erred by committing appellant
only upon basis of certificates). In Munoz, the findings of fact by the trial judge included the
determination that the proposed patient "objected to the failure of the State of Texas to
introduce evidence at the hearing." See id at 644. In light of this, the court of civil appeals
held the trial court erred in making findings on the basis of the physicians' certificates without hearing testimony. See id at 644-45.
217. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (plea shall not
be accepted unless free and voluntary).
218. See id. art. 1.15 (Vernon 1977). "Regardless of the depth of one's desire to enter a
plea of guilty an accused does not have a constitutional right to have it accepted by the trial
court." Thornton v. State, 601 S.w.2d 340, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
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dication that a version of the latter requirement may, in regard to
mental health proceedings, have been constitutionalized. A person
is, under article 1, section 15-a of the Texas Constitution, to be
"committed as a person of unsound mind [only] on competent medical or psychiatric testimony."2 9 No provision is made for waiver of
this requirement, although the same section authorizes, in some detail, waiver of the right to trial by jury.22°
Perhaps the requirement of competent testimony is a non-waivable prerequisite to orders committing impaired persons to institutional or involuntary treatment. To the extent that this is the case, it
becomes important to determine what is meant by "competent medical or psychiatric testimony."22 ' In ordinary "legalese," competent
would mean admissible, which in turn would mean that it must consist of actual "live" testimony by a physician who is then available
222
for cross examination.
The 1957 Code apparently assumed that competent testimony
had this meaning. It further took the position that "temporary hospitalization" for no more than ninety days was not "commitment"
as of "unsound mind" and, thus, was not subject to the requirement.
Therefore, where no one opposed temporary hospitalization, this
Code authorized the required findings to be made on the basis of the
physicians' certificates on file with the court. 223 "Indefinite commitment," on the other hand, was apparently regarded as within the
constitutional mandate. In regard to proceedings of this sort, the
Code restated the constitutional requirement of "competent medical
or psychiatric testimony, ' 224 provided that two physicians "shall"
testify, 225 and made no provision for waiver or findings on the certificates of the physicians. Whatever the correctness of the result, the
Code's position that only indefinite institutionalization constituted
"commitment" within the meaning of the constitutional requirement was disingenuous at best.
It would be possible to require that admissible testimony be intro219. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15-a.
220. See id
221. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-47 (Vernon Supp. 1984).

222. See 23 TEX. JUR. 2d Evidence § 120 (1961).
223. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 37, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 512 (revised
1983).

224. See id.
§ 50, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws at 515.
225. See id § 49(d), 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws at 515.
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duced in all cases, even if the proposed patient expressed a willingness to forego challenge. But this would be cumbersome and costly.
Moreover, it is doubtful whether such testimony would prevent any
unjustified commitments if it were introduced merely to comply
with the formal requirement, with no one present with an interest in
exposing any weaknesses in it. The revised Code, however, continues to require medical or psychiatric testimony with regard to extended treatment.226 The findings required for extended treatment
may not be made on the basis of the physicians' certificates, despite
the proposed patient's willingness to forego challenge. A factual
hearing must be held and supporting testimony-including "competent medical or psychiatric testimony"-must be taken.227
In regard to temporary involuntary treatment, the revised Code
continues the prior Code's policy of authorizing a court order without live testimony of physicians. 228 A waiver of the right to cross

examine witnesses may be executed by both the proposed patient
and counsel.229 If this is filed, the court is authorized to admit into
evidence the certificates of the physicians and to make its findings
on those certificates. 230 In an admirable burst of candor, the Code
simply asserts that the certificates, if admitted pursuant to such a
waiver, "shall constitute competent medical or psychiatric testimony."' 23' While the revised Code abandons the prior Code's artificial effort to give "commitment" a limited meaning, it reaches the
same result by a somewhat similar effort to define "competent"
testimony.
The constitutional provision may be intended to impose a requirement of "admissible" evidence in all cases.232 The risk of
abuse or misuse of an opportunity to waive the right may have been
seen as sufficiently great to require at least a "minihearing" in all
cases. By requiring that the state introduce at least some admissible
evidence that the proposed patient meets the legal standard, the provision may well be intended to minimally protect proposed patients
226. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-47(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984).

227. See id
228. Compare id art. 5547-47(a) with Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 37, 1957 Tex.

Gen. Laws 505, 512 (revised 1983).
229. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-47(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 15-a.
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from at least blatant miscarriages of justice arising from ineffective
assistance of counsel, uninformed waivers of the right to a hearing,
and similar defects that may still constitute serious problems. If this
is the intent of the constitutional provision, the revised Code's procedure must fall and cannot be saved by the arbitrary
definition of
233
the certificates as "competent . . .testimony.
VII.

OUTPATIENT TREATMENT

A major thrust of the 1983 revision was to create a framework
that would facilitate the provision of involuntary treatment in a context other than full-time institutionalization. Under prior law, as a
result of a 1975 amendment to the Code, 3 a court was authorized
to order a patient to submit to treatment, observation, or care in a
place other than in a mental hospital. 235 But there was widespread
perception that uncertainty as to the manner in which this might be
implemented discouraged its application in practice.
In the Task Force, consideration was given to the possibility of
authorizing some person to exercise direct authority to compel an
impaired person to submit to noninstitutional treatment. Thus, the
head of an outpatient treatment program might be given authority
somewhat analogous to that of the head of an inpatient facility, who
presumably has the right to use reasonable force to compel a patient
to remain in, or return to, an institution to which the patient was
233. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-47(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984). There is
case law support for the proposition that "competent" testimony means testimony admissible under the applicable rules of evidence. See Chacko v. State, 630 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1982, no writ) (testimony of a physician admitted in violation
of the proposed patient's privilege for communications to a physician was not "competent"
within the meaning of art. i, § 15-a). If an objection to evidence is one that is forfeited if not
asserted, or is one that can be waived, a failure to raise the objection or a waiver of it will
generally render the evidence "competent" within the meaning usually given that term. See
TEX. R. EvID. 103(a)(1) (objection required to preserve evidentiary error). Does this mean
that a proposed patient's failure to object to the judge's consideration of written communications from examining, but nontestifying, physicians will render a resulting order supported

by "competent medical or psychiatric testimony" within the meaning of art. 1, § 15-a? Probably not. Despite its use of the term "competent," the constitutional nature of the requirement in § 15-a suggests that it was intended to do more than simply restate the general
requirement that a litigant make a contemporaneous and specific objection to evidence offered by the other party. See TEX. CoNsr. art. I, § 15-a.
234. See Mental Health Code-Temporary Commitment Hearing, ch. 209, § 38(c), 1975
Tex. Gen. Laws 486, revisedby Act of Sept. 1, 1983, ch. 47, § 31, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 211,
227.
235. See id
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committed.236 But it was believed that delegation of such authority
over a person generally at liberty in the community presented serious risks of abuse.
Instead, the Task Force recommended, and the revision incorporated, a more detailed version of the approach utilized by the 1975
legislation.23' The court is authorized only to enter an order directed to the patient requiring him or her to participate in mental
health services other than inpatient programs.238 No person may be
authorized to exercise direct control over the patient; thus, treatment
personnel in a program in which a patient is ordered to participate
may not be authorized to forcibly compel a patient to appear for
sessions the patient has declined to attend. 239 The incentive for the
patient's compliance with the terms of the order is the court's ability,
upon a determination of noncompliance, to order inpatient care.240
In addition, the Code mandates that an order requiring a patient
to submit to outpatient services identify a person "to be responsible
for those services. "241 This person is directed to develop a "general
program" for the treatment, which is to be submitted to the court
within two weeks to be incorporated into the order.242 More importantly, the "individual responsible" is charged with the duty of informing the court of the patient's failure to comply with the terms of
the order.243 In effect, the "individual responsible" is to function
somewhat as does a probation officer in the criminal context.
If the court's attention is called to the alleged noncompliance by
the patient with the terms of the order or simply on its own motion,
the court may consider whether to modify the order. If the court is
to consider ordering inpatient care, or other "substantial deviations"
236. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-70 (Vernon Supp. 1984) (head of facility
may certify that an absent patient is to be returned, and peace or health officer is then
authorized to return patient).
237. See id arts. 5547-52, -53.
238. See id art. 5547-50(d)(2).
239. See id art. 5547-51(d)(2).
240. See id art. 5547-53(0(3). The modified order committing the patient may not extend the "time period of the original order." See id art. 5547-53(g).
241. See id art. 5547-52(a). The named individual must be either "the head of a
mental health facility or an individual" who has consented and is "involved in providing the
services" needed by the patient. See id art. 5547-52(a).
242. See id art. 5547-52(b).
243. See id art. 5547-52(c).
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from the original order, a hearing must be scheduled. 244 At the
hearing, the patient is entitled to representation by counsel.245 The
hearing is to be held in a manner meeting the requirements for an
original hearing, except that there is no right to a jury trial.246 Modifications may be ordered only if the court specifically finds either
that the patient has not complied with the terms of the order, or that
the patient's condition has so deteriorated that outpatient services
are no longer appropriate.247
The overall intent of these provisions was to create an incentive
for persons to participate in treatment programs that provide less
intrusive conditions than are involved in full-time institutionalization. But at the same time, an effort was made to provide for the
community interest in safety and protection. The latter objective
was pursued by provision for imposing upon a specific person responsibility for calling the court's attention to the failure of an outpatient treatment program. Additionally, a procedure was given for
modification of the treatment order that accommodated both the patient's continued interest in remaining noninstitutionalized and society's interest in a flexible procedure. This sufficiently assures
community protection when outpatient programs are no longer
appropriate.
Whether the framework provided in the revised Code will in fact
result in greater use of alternatives to institutional programs remains
open. Despite the rather elaborate framework--or perhaps because
of it-the vehicle may not be appropriate. The expectation that
treatment personnel may be willing to assume responsibility for reporting noncompliance to the courts may not be fulfilled. Judges
may entertain doubts as to the effectiveness of the oversight that will
be provided by "individual[s] responsible." These doubts may discourage them from taking the risks involved in ordering treatment
other than in the institutional context. Thus, the complexity of the
legal framework may be so great that judges and treating professionals may be disinclined to attempt to utilize it.
Perhaps the most serious potential barrier will be the unavailabil244. See id art. 5547-53(a) (applicable only to proposed changes which substantially
deviate from original program).
245. See id. art. 5547-53(d).
246. See id art. 5547-53(d) (hearing must meet requirements of art. 5547-48 of the revised Code).
247. See id art. 5547-53(e).
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ity of outpatient programs that meet the needs presented by persons
found properly subjected to involuntary treatment. Despite widespread agreement that well-constructed outpatient programs can, in
theory, provide as effective treatment as institutional programs, outpatient programs of this sort may simply be unavailable. 248 To the
extent that this is the case, the provision of a legal framework for
outpatient treatment cannot be expected to magically reduce reliance upon full-time institutionalization as a means of providing involuntary mental health services.
VIII.

PATIENTS' RIGHTS

The most disappointing aspect of the 1983 revision of the Code is
the failure of the revised Code to creatively or comprehensively address the legal status or rights of persons compelled to submit to
treatment. While this is true in regard to patients' rights generally,
the issues presented by such persons' potential rights to treatment,
and to avoid certain specific treatment techniques, require special
consideration.
In addressing the area of patients' rights, it is important to note
that the Mental Health Code itself is not the only legitimate source
of applicable state "law." Under the prior Code, as well as the revised Code, the Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation has the authority to promulgate rules and regulations
"necessary for proper and efficient treatment of the mentally ill."249
Given the judicial nature of the task of determining which persons
may be subjected to involuntary treatment, such administrative
rules can play little role in the involuntary admission process. But
the processing of persons properly admitted is a different matter and
is unquestionably largely administrative in nature. Some aspects of
248. See Shuman & Hawkins, The Use of Alternatives to Institutionalizationof the Mentally Ill, 33 Sw. L.J. 1181, 1209 (1980) (observations of mental health proceedings in three
Texas counties showed patients often sent to state hospital because local alternatives did not
exist); Note, The Due Process of Community Treatment of the Mentally Ill, 59 TEXAS L. REV.
1481, 1501-05 (1981) (discussion of "unavailability of alternatives" to full-time
institutionalization).
249. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 9, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 507 (revised
1983); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-8 (Vernon Supp. 1984). Additionally, art. 55478 authorizes the Department to "prescribe the form of applications, certificates, records, and
reports provided for under the code." See id The state, to an extent, controls the content of
the evidence submitted at the hearings by virtue of controlling the type of information contained in these forms.
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this area might well be treated only generally, if at all, as legislative
ones and left for detailed treatment by administrative rules. The
Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation has,
in fact, promulgated such rules on a variety of matters, and those
rules are codified in the Texas Administrative Code. 25° Legislative
consideration of so-called "patients' rights" must involve a determination as to which matters are best defined as ones of legislative
concern and which are best left for administrative development, perhaps under very general legislative guidance. In addition, state law
matters of either sort cannot be considered without regard to the
federal constitutional framework within which state law must exist.
In regard to Texas patients' rights, the contours of this framework
were-and still are--exceptionally difficult to discern.
A. Federal ConstitutionalConsiderations
Two developments concerning the federal constitutional limits
upon state flexibility in dealing with involuntarily treated mentally
ill persons are of special importance to the revised Code. These developments were the decisions and actions in R.A.J v. Kavanagh25
and Youngberg v. Romeo.252
In 1974, R.A.J v. Kavanagh, a class action lawsuit, was filed, alleging a variety of violations of the federal constitutional rights of
patients in Texas state hospitals.253 In 1979, the case was transferred
to the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, Dallas Division;254 all further proceedings took place in that
court. On March 2, 1981, the plaintiffs, the Texas Attorney General
for the defendants, and the Civil Rights Division of the United
States Department of Justice, as amicus curiae, entered into a settlement agreement.255 Without admitting violations of any legal requirements, the defendants agreed to implement a variety of
"patients' rights," including rights to adequate staff, individualized
250. See Tex. Dep't. of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 25 TEx. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 401.1-407.102 (Shepard's May 1, 1982).
251. No. CA3-74-394-H (N.D. Tex. Settlement Agreement fied Mar. 2, 1981).
252. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
253. See R.A.J. v. Kavanagh, No. CA3-74-394-H (N.D. Tex. Amended Complaint filed
June 6, 1980).
254. See id.
255. See R.A.J. v. Kavanagh, No. CA3-74-394-H, 2 (N.D. Tex. Settlement Agreement
filed Mar. 2, 1981).
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treatment planning, treatment for mental disorders and physical ailments, and, in regard to younger patients, education.2"6 Specific
plans were to be developed by the defendants to implement patients'
rights to safety, for protection from improper, excessive, or inappropriate use of psychotropic drugs, and, for mentally retarded patients,
to provide for special program needs for retardation.2 "'
The settlement agreement also provided for the creation of a
three-person Review Panel to monitor the defendants' compliance
with the agreement over a three year period.258 The panel was authorized, among other things, to develop recommendations for compliance with the terms of the settlement agreement.25 9 If informal
agreement on implementation matters could not be reached among
the parties, the United States, and the panel, the issue was then to be
brought before the district court for resolution. 260 Semi-annual reports were to be prepared by the panel, indicating areas in which
compliance with the terms of the agreement had been achieved and
those areas in which "deficiencies remain[ed]. 26 l
The settlement agreement was reviewed by the court and, on
April 3, 198 1, was entered as an enforceable order of the court.262 A
"charter" setting out the Review Panel's structure and function in
more detail was approved by the court a year later.263 Soon after its
first six month term ended in November, 1982, the panel issued its
first report. 2
Despite the activitism of the lower federal courts in cases such as
R.A.J., the United States Supreme Court had largely avoided addressing the existence or substance of federal constitutional rights of
the involuntarily treated or institutionalized impaired. But in June
256. See id at 2.
257. See id at 16-18.
258. See idat 6-8.
259. See id at 6.
260. See id at 6.
261. See id at 8.
262. See R.A.J. v. Kavanagh, No. CA3-74-394-H (N.D. Tex. Order, Apr. 3, 1981).
263. See R.A.J. v. Miller, No. CA3-74-394-H (N.D. Tex. Charter Establishing Review
Panel, Apr. 22, 1982). The term of the Review Panel was subsequently extended to April 15,
1986. See R.A.J. v. Miller, No. CA3-74-394-H (N.D. Tex. Stipulated Recommendations of
Remedies, undated); R.A.J. v. Miller, No. CA3-74-394-H (N.D. Tex. Order, June 5, 1984)
(approving stipulation and providing that stipulation is to have effect of court order).
264. See R.A.J. v. Miller, No. CA-3-74-394-H (N.D. Tex. Report to the Court, Apr.
1982-Nov. 1982).
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of 1982, in Youngberg v. Romeo, the Court considered several constitutional arguments raised by retarded persons institutionalized in
Pennsylvania. 26 5 Despite the fact of appropriate institutionalization,
the Court concluded, respondent Romeo, and others like him, retained a federal constitutionally protected interest in liberty. 266 This
interest entitled them, as matters of federal constitutional law, to
reasonable safety and freedom from restraint during institutionalization.267 These rights, in turn, also entitled them to "training"the equivalent to "treatment" for mentally ill persons-which was
sufficient to protect those interests.268
Turning to whether these rights had been so violated as to entitle
Romeo to recover damages from institutional officials, the Court
adopted an extremely restrictive standard. A decision by a state
mental health professional that denies a retarded institutional resident physical safety, freedom from restraint, or related training is
constitutionally impermissible. 269 This gives rise to a right to recover damages "only when the decision by the professional is such a
substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice
or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually
did not base the decision on such a judgment. 27 ° If no professional
judgment is exercised under this standard, but such a judgment was
precluded because of budgetary constraints, the Court continued,
good faith immunity would bar liability. 7 '
The long term significance of the Romeo holding is uncertain.
Only several quite limited rights of retarded institutional residents,
and the content of those rights, were expressly addressed by the
Court.272 On the other hand, there is reason to believe that Romeo
may reflect the attitude which the Court is likely to take to claims of
broader rights of the retarded and to claims of similar rights in the
institutionalized mentally ill.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
by either
n.30.
271.
272.

See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309 (1982).
See idat 315-16.
See id at 316.
See id at 318-19.
See id at 324.
See id at 323. A professional was defined by the Court as any "person competent
education, training or experience to make the decision at issue." See id at 323
See id at 323.
See id at 324.
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The Supreme Court in Romeo made clear that its formulation of
the contents of those rights before was based, in part, upon its perceptions that professional judgment as to the needs of treated persons is entitled to judicial deference,2" 3 and that federalism
considerations demand minimization of federal judicial interference
with the internal operations of state institutions.27 4 Whether the
same restrictive standard would be applied when institutionalized
persons sought compliance with what they argued were federal constitutional requirements, rather than damages, is uncertain. Similarly, it is not clear whether the same restrictive standard would be
applied to claims that other federally protected interests had been,
or were being, infringed. Yet, the majority's emphasis on avoiding
interference with the administration of state institutions and with
professional decisionmaking suggests that the Court will be sympathetic to arguments that the same approach should be taken in other
contexts.
If the R.A.CJ issues were addressed with the flavor of Romeo, it is
quite likely-although far from certain-that the resolutions would
be found to be more general in content than was provided for in the
R.A.J settlement. The increased accuracy of hindsight suggests that
federal constitutional demands upon state mental health systems
may be significantly less stringent than the terms of the R.A..J
agreement.
What legislative flexibility remained after the R.A.J settlement
agreement is not entirely certain. But it seems reasonably clear that
the Attorney General's submission to the agreement in no way precluded the legislature from undertaking to develop new approaches
to those areas in which the settlement agreement indicated deficiencies of federal constitutional dimensions. It seems likely, moreover,
that in those areas where specific action had not yet been taken, the
need for such action under the agreement might be reduced and
perhaps eliminated by curative action taken at legislative insistence.
The legislature was asked to consider a comprehensive revision of
the Mental Health Code at a time when the Attorney General had
functionally admitted that practice under the prior Code had re273. See id. at 322.
274. See id. at 322. The federal courts must not unduly burden the states' efforts to deal
with the difficult social problems involved in the involuntary commitment process. See
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 608 n.16 (1979).
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suited in extensive violations of patients' federal constitutional
rights. Further, the Attorney General had agreed not only to remedy the conditions giving rise to the violations, but also to an enforcement mechanism that was for all practical purposes an agency
of the federal district court. This invited complacency to some extent. With the concurrence of the Attorney General, the federal
court had-temporarily at least-assumed responsibility for defining patients' basic federal constitutional rights, as well as for establishing and administering a mechanism to provide some assurance
that they would be respected.
This state of affairs should have alerted the legislature to the need
for legislative leadership in the area of patients' rights. The settlement agreement was an unmistakable indication that serious
problems existed in this area. It did not necessarily establish that
the appropriate solution was legislative modification of the statutory
framework. To some extent, the state of affairs giving rise to the
settlement might have reasonably been regarded as the result of administrative misimplementation or insufficient legislative funding of
a legislative Mental Health Code and program sufficient on its face.
But at a minimum, the settlement should have indicated the need
for legislative scrutiny to assure that the statutory framework contained the most appropriate provisions for an area in which serious
problems unquestionably existed, and in which a federal district
court had indicated a willingness to undertake the initiative in defining and implementing at least minimal interests of the patient
population.
B.

Patients' Rights in General

The revised Code contains a general broad introductory statement that mentally ill persons-presumably including those undergoing involuntary treatment-have the rights and privileges, as well
as the responsibilities, "guaranteed" by the constitutions and laws of
the United States and Texas.275 Under the prior Code, the admission or the commitment of a person to a mental hospital did not,
275. See TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-80(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984). The provision continues that, absent specific provision to the contrary, this includes the rights to vote,
to acquire, use, and dispose of property, to exercise contractual rights, to sue and be sued, to
licenses, permits, privileges, and benefits "under law," to religious freedom, and "concerning
domestic relations." See id
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generally speaking, affect the person's competency. 6 This policy is
continued under the revised Code. 7 Under the prior Code, the
courts in proceedings for indefinite commitment were specifically
required, upon determining that a proposed patient was to be indefinitely committed, to proceed to determine whether "he is mentally
competent. 2 78 A determination that the patient was not competent
was of uncertain effect. 9 In any case, the revised Code imposes no
such requirement for proceedings for court-ordered extended treatment and specifically provides that competency is presumed in the
absence of a determination of incompetency made under the Texas
Probate Code.28°
"Physical restraint" is permitted, as under the prior Code, only if
prescribed by a physician and then is to be removed "as soon as
possible." A patient's clinical record is to contain a notation as to
every use of physical restraint and the reasons for this as well as the
signature of the "prescribing" physician.2 81 If, as the language suggests, this is intended to mean that no physical limitation can be put
upon a patient in the absence of specific advance authorization by a
physician, then it is clearly unrealistic. Restraint by ward staff is
sometimes immediately necessary to protect patients themselves as
well as staff members, and exigencies in the circumstances often do
not permit delay until a physician's approval can be obtained. Perhaps the reenactment of this provision was intended to implicitly
approve the procedure authorized by the Commissioner's rules.282
Under this procedure, a verbal or telephone authorization can be
obtained from a physician and an immediate note made in the pa-

276. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 83(b), 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 521 (revised

1983).
277. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-83 (Vernon Supp. 1984).

278. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 51(a)(3), 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 515 (revised 1983).
279. Since no provision was made for appointment of a guardian, it is doubtful whether
the committing court had authority to make such an appointment. This left the hospitalized
patient without the legal capacity to engage in at least some activity of legal significance
without anyone legally empowered to act in his behalf.
280. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-83 (Vernon Supp. 1984); TEX. PROB.
CODE ANN. §§ 415-426 (Vernon 1980) ("Chapter IX: Specific Provisions Relating to Persons of Unsound Mind and Habitual Drunkards").
281. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-86 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
282. See Texas Dep't. of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 405.126(g) (Shepard's May 1, 1982).
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tient's record. 283 Thus, the physician need not be present and need
only personally sign the written order for the restraint within eight
hours.284
The revised Code also provides that all persons receiving inpatient mental health services have the right to receive visitors, to communicate with persons outside the facility, and to communicate by
uncensored and sealed mail with legal counsel, the Department, the
courts, and the attorney general. 285 But this is preceded by the
broad qualification that the rights are "subject to the general rules
and regulations" of the facility.286 Is this intended as a blanket authorization to limit exercise of these rights as long as this is done by
"rules and regulations"? In addition, the head of a facility is authorized to impose restrictions upon the exercise of the rights-apparently beyond those imposed by the "rules and regulations of the
facility"-if "necessary for the welfare of the patient." 287 Any such
restriction, and the reasons for it, however, must be made a part of
288
the patient's clinical record.
In more general language, article 5547-80 of the revised Code also
provides that all patients receiving mental health services under the
Code have the rights:
(1) to appropriate treatment for their mental illness in the least restrictive appropriate setting available consistent with the protection of
the patients and the community;
(2) to be free from unnecessary or excessive medication;
(3) to refuse to participate in research programs;
(4) to individualized treatment plans and to participate in such
planning; and
(5) [to] a humane treatment environment that affords reasonable
protection from harm and appropriate privacy to such persons with
283. See id§ 405.126(g)(4).
284. See id § 405.126(g)(5).
285. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-81(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984). No restriction is permitted on communications between a patient and an attorney "where the attorneyclient relationship is established." See id.art. 5547-81(b). Apparently, restrictions can be
imposed upon a patient's efforts to communicate with a lawyer in hopes of establishing the
attorney-client relationship. See id art. 5547-81(b). Whether this adequately protects an
institutionalized person's interest in being able to effectively seek legal advice is open to
question.
286. See i.art. 5547-81(a).
287. See id art. 5547-81(a).
288. See id art. 5547-81(b).
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regard to personal needs.28 9

Unfortunately, no effort is made to indicate how, or whether, the
legislature intended these rights to be enforceable.
To some extent, other portions of the revised Code may impose
almost perverse limits upon remedies. The right of an institutionalized patient to treatment in the least restrictive appropriate setting,
for example, might be implemented by authorization for the patient
to move the committing court to modify the order to provide for
outpatient treatment. The revised Code does provide for consideration by the court of possible modification of an order along these
lines, 290 but only the head of the facility to which the patient was
committed is specifically authorized to request such modification. 29 1
Does this mean that a patient is denied access to what appears to be
the most logical mechanism for implementing his right to placement
in a less restrictive treatment setting? Most likely, there is no barrier
to the court in modifying the order on its own initiative stimulated
by a patient's request. The failure of the Code to provide for this
confirms the total lack of legislative concern for practical implementation of those rights addressed generally in such ringing language.
It is arguable that these "patient rights" provisions of the Code
assume the desirability of remedies; they reflect a legislative decision
to delegate to the judiciary the matter of developing remedial procedures. Whether any such legislative disinclination to address the
remedies matter reflects an abdication of responsibility is problematic. There is some basis for fear, however, that this-if it was the
legislative approach-will be unsuccessful. The provisions of the
revised Code may be construed as merely ringing statements intended to create no enforceable rights and, therefore, as giving rise
to no need for judicial development of remedies. This was made
2 9 2 which
clear by Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,
placed in issue that portion of the federal Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act 293 that provides that persons with
developmental disabilities "have a right to appropriate treatment,

289. Id art. 5547-80(b).

290. See id art. 5547-54 ("If no hearing demanded," basis of court's decision may be
the request and supporting certificate).
291. See id art. 5547-54.

292. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
293. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1982).
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services, and habilitation for such disabilities. ' 294 The statute specifies that the services "should be provided in the setting that is the
least restrictive of the person's personal liberty. ' 295 Construing the
language as merely hortatory, the Supreme Court concluded in Pennhurst that it created no rights enforceable by litigation.296 There is
a significant risk that language such as that in article 5547-80 of the
revised Code-given the complete failure to address the question of
remedy-will similarly be construed as creating no enforceable right
on behalf of impaired citizens.
Perhaps no remedy should be provided by the Mental Health
Code. It may be that this is an area in which the legislative role is
best defined as one of general goal-setting. Implementation might
reasonably be left to administration, perhaps by means of development in administrative regulations. On the other hand, the R.A.J
litigation and the settlement agreement strongly suggested that this
approach had not worked in the past. It also made clear that the
federal district court would, at least in the absence of a newly-developed and adequate state alternative, continue to actively develop the
substance of patients' rights and procedures for their enforcement.
Continuation of the previous approach, under which no statutory
enforcement mechanism was provided and no administrative mechanism was mandated, was appropriate only after careful consideration of the alternatives, including continued federal judicial
supervision. It seems certain that no such consideration was given
to the matter. The revised Code reflects little more than total abdication of legislative leadership.
C.

The Right to Treatment

The problems presented by the revised Code's approach to patients' rights are presented even more graphically by the retention in
the revised Code of language from the 1957 legislation that might be
construed as addressing the right to treatment. Article 5547-82 of
the revised Code provides, in part: "The head of an inpatient
mental health facility shall provide adequate medical and ps'ychiatric care and treatment for every patient in accordance with the high294. See id. § 6010(1).
295. See id § 6010(2).
296. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1981).
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est standards accepted in medical practice . . 297 Whether this
provision creates an enforceable right to treatment is, at best,
problematic.
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed institutionalized persons' federal constitutional right to treatment in any general
sense. O'Connor v. Donaldson2 98 had been litigated in the lower federal courts as a right to treatment case. 299 But on review, the
Supreme Court upheld the finding of liability on the basis of the
respondent's federal constitutional right to liberty and did not reach
the right to treatment issue.
Chief Justice Burger's concurring
opinion stands as a vigorous argument against recognition of any
such federal constitutional right.3° ' In Romeo, the Court found that
the case did not present any claim of a general right to habilitation
or treatment and addressed only a right to such habilitation as was
necessary to implement retarded residents' right to safety and freedom from restraint.3 °2 No denial of even this limited right to habilitation occurs, the Court reasoned, if the decision as to what
habilitation to provide was a "professional judgment. 3 °3
R.AJ., however, is best read as primarily a right to treatment lawsuit. Many, perhaps most, of the plaintiffs' claims were based upon
what would best be categorized as inadequate treatment efforts and
programs. In the settlement agreement, the defendants agreed to
provide individualized treatment planning for all patients. In addition, they agreed to provide "meaningful, professionally recognized,
psychological and recreational programming. ' ' 301 In another portion of the agreement, the defendants obligated themselves to provide adequate staff support "to make available to all patients an
average of thirty (30) hours per week of appropriate planned or
scheduled activities related to the patient's Treatment Plan and the
297. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-82 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
298. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).

299. See Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 1974) (three district
courts, within the preceding three years, have decided that civilly committed patients do
have a right to treatment), vacated and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
300. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).

301. See id.
at 580-89 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
302. See Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309-14 (1982).

303. See id.
at 322-23 (1982).
304. See R.A.J. v. Kavanagh, No. CA3-74-394-H, 24 (N.D. Tex. Settlement Agreement
filed Mar. 2, 1981).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

77

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 1, Art. 2

ST MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:41

Unit Treatment Program. 30 5
Recent litigation, other than R.A.J, suggests that the potential
right to treatment raises one fundamental initial issue that relates
both to its substantive content and to the remedies that are, or
might, be available for its breach. 6 Is the right to treatment, if it
exists, limited to a right to be treated in an institution (or state system) that meets general prerequisites for providing effective treatment? Or, in addition, is it necessary that patients have an
opportunity for review of the sufficiency of the treatment actually
provided them within a system that, in general, meets reasonable
requirements? If the right to treatment does encompass a right to
such individualized review, must-or should-that be judicial review? Or is internal-and perhaps somewhat structured-review by
treatment personnel sufficient?
The R.A.J settlement agreement defines the right to treatment in
terms of the characteristics of the treatment system in general. 30 7 As
to a particular patient's right to treatment, the agreement emphasized internal review. The requirement of "individualized treatment
planning" by the treatment staff, and the absence of any provision
for judicial considerations of claims of deficiencies in such programs, obviously focused upon nonjudicial procedures for implementing the protection of the rights of particular patients within an
overall acceptable system. On the other hand, the Review Panel
was empowered to review patient complaints, which might well include complaints concerning the substance of individual treatment
plans.30 8 At least in the short run, the agreement apparently contemplated the possibility of some outside, although nonjudicial,
case-by-case review of the propriety of particular treatment plans.
Whether the R.A.J agreement's implicit definition of the requirements of a federal right to treatment accurately reflected the content
the Supreme Court would give to that right is, given the analysis in
305. Seeid at 10-11.
306. Compare Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373, 376 (M.D. Ala. 1972) (system-wide
enforcement of right to treatment), af'dsub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir.
1974) with Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 527 (5th Cir. 1974) (affirming an award of
damages for denying specific patient his right to treatment during hospitalization), vacated
and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
307. See R.A.J. v. Kavanagh, No. CA3-74-394-H (N.D. Tex. Settlement Agreement
filed Mar. 2, 1981).
308. See id. at 7.
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Romeo, problematic at best. On a system-wide level, the agreement
may have overestimated what the Court would require for compliance. If the Romeo "professional judgment" standard is to be applied, it is quite unlikely that the constitutional mandate is so rigid
as to permit a requirement of thirty hours of program per week to be
read into it. In regard to a right to individual review, however, it is
possible that the Court might construe the right as giving individual
patients more extensive access to review of their own particular
treatment plans than was provided for by the agreement. Whatever
the correct answers to these concerns, the task of revising the Mental
Health Code clearly confronted the legislature with the need to consider whether to respond to the Attorney General's willingness to
concede substantial content to the federal constitutional right to
treatment, and whether to submit the Texas public mental health
system to a federal judicial mechanism for implementing the right
as so defined.
The choices available to the legislature were at least three in
number. First, it could disclaim any responsibility for the meaningful definition of the right to treatment, perhaps on the rationale that
this would be done in R.A.J and similar litigation. Second, it could
attempt to preempt the area by defining a state right to treatment in
even broader terms than the federal right had been defined in
R.AJ., thereby providing a basis for moving enforcement procedures into state judicial and perhaps administrative forums. Third,
it could define the right to treatment as a matter of state law in a
more restrictive way than the federal right had been defined in
R.A.J., thus resisting the federal implementation efforts with a new,
and more defensible, state statutory framework and perhaps administrative policy.
The approach taken in the revised Code is difficult to discern.
This is largely because of the significant doubt that article 5547-82
creates, as a matter of state law, an enforceable right to treatment.3 °9
The argument that the section was not intended to create an enforceable right rests largely on the proposition that neither the section itself nor any other body of law addresses important issues that
would be raised if article 5547-82 establishes such a right. Since the
legislature is unlikely to have intended these issues to be raised but

309. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-82 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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not addressed, it is likely that the body's intention was not to have
the section create the sort of enforceable right that raises the issues.
Several different catagories of issues would be raised if an enforceable right were found.
First, the section fails to specify whether the right addresses the
general characteristics of the institution or system in which the patients are treated, the treatment provided specific patients, or both.
Yet which definition is given to the right would make a tremendous
difference in the administrative costs and the potential for judicial
intrusion into the adequacy of legislative appropriations for the
mental health system.
Second, and related, is the failure of the Code to address the remedies available for enforcement of the right. If individual patients
are entitled to scrutiny of the adequacy of the care provided, then
there must be a specific person and procedure to determine this adequacy of care; no effort was made, however, to specify either the
person or the procedure in the revised Code. This is in significant
contrast to those portions of the revised Code that make elaborate
provision for issuance and modification of judicial orders for compelled treatment. Perhaps this indicates that the section was not intended to create an enforceable right to review of individualized
treatment; or it might indicate the absence of any legislative contemplation that the right could be enforced at all.
Finally, the section does not establish a standard for determining
the adequacy of treatment-either on an individual or system-wide
basis-if that adequacy is meaningfully put into issue. In fact, the
language of the section contains inconsistent suggestions. At one
point, the facility is directed to provide "adequate" care. 3 10 Yet, a
few words later, the care is directed to be "in accordance with the
highest standards accepted in medical practice."' 31 ' Does "adequate" mean what a judge would regard as well suited to the patient's needs? Or to what mental health professionals would regard
as similar to "average" quality of care provided to private patients
in the jurisdiction? Or does it mean simply care sufficient enough to
avoid condemnation as malpractice? Any one of these possible
meanings is inconsistent with the further suggestion that the care
must be in accordance with the highest medical standards. Does this
310. See id
311. See id
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mean that the legislature contemplated the best care available given
the state of the art? Given the cost that would be involved in providing care of this quality to state hospital patients, it seems unlikely
that the legislature intended to give such patients an enforceable
right to care of this quality. Yet, can this language be ignored and
only the remainder used as a legislative basis for an enforceable
right?
The most likely explanation is that the language of the section
was never considered in terms of enforcement problems because
there was never any contemplation that it would provide the basis
for enforcement efforts. The terminology used is unsatisfactory as a
foundation for a major enforceable right. It is reasonably adequate
as an oratorical exhortation.
The legislative session left no doubt that the legislature failed to
concur in the Attorney General's view as to the federal constitutional demands upon the Texas mental health system. Although
the Department requested $18.5 million for the new staff positions
required to comply with the settlement agreement, it received only
$4.6 million in the 1984-85 appropriations bill. The Third Report of
the Review Panel concluded that the Department had not received
the funding necessary for compliance with staffing requirements in
the agreement. 312 The panel asked the district court to find the defendants in noncompliance with the agreement in this as well as

312. See R.A.J. v. Miller, No. CA3-74-394-H, at 36 (N.D. Tex. Third Report to Court,
May 1, 1983-Nov. i, 1983). In September, 1981, the Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives formed the Special Committee to Study the Texas Department of Mental Health
and Mental Retardation. This committee (often called the "Grubbs" committee because its
chair was House member Walter B. Grubbs) was charged to investigate and "monitor" the
Department's activities, including the care of clients. On October 1, 1982, the committee
issued an interim report. See SPECIAL

COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF

68th Leg. (Oct. 1, 1982).
Most of the report, however, concerned the organization and administration of the Departsettlement, the report indicated that the
ment. In a single paragraph reference to the RA..
settlement "does not appear to have legislative implications but does have substantial budgetary implications." See id at 8. It further commented that "much of what will be required"
will consist of single time expenditures to bring buildings and facilities into compliance. In
addition, however, the report summarily noted that "there are also programatic requirements which will call for additional funding on an ongoing basis." Id. at 8. There is no
indication that the committee addressed the propriety of the terms of the settlement as matters of state mental health policy, or that it considered the settlement or the information
responsible for it as creating a need for legislative action concerning matters such as patients'
ability to decline certain treatment techniques, or their right to challenge the adequacy of the
treatment provided them.
MENTAL HEALTH AND MENTAL RETARDATION, INTERIM REPORT,

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

81

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 1, Art. 2

ST MARY'S L,4W JOURNAL

other areas. 3

[Vol. 16:41

13

The development of the R.A.J legislation must have sensitized
the legislature to the problems of remedies. The failure of section 82
to address what remedies would be available under what circumstances to enforce the right to treatment, in light of this background,
suggests that the legislature could not have intended the right mentioned in the section to be an enforceable one.
As a result, the revision of the Code provided no basis for the
state to reassert primary responsibility for assuring adequate care
for the mentally ill at a cost that does no violence to other state
obligations. To the contrary, the revised Code merely makes a symbolic nod to the right to treatment. No other creative effort to address the problems giving rise to the R.A.J settlement was made
during the legislative session. 4 This virtually assured a showdown
between the state and the R.A.J court. On March 30, 1984, the
R.A.J court found that the defendants were in noncompliance with
their duties under the agreement to plan and document individualized treatment, to provide sufficient staff to ensure minimally adequate care, and to protect patients from physical harm." 5 The order
invited recommendations as to what action the court should make to
assure compliance. 16
In one very specific way, this order demonstrated the questionable
wisdom of setting state right-to-treatment policy by stipulation during federal litigation. In defense to claims that state hospitals were
313. See R.A.J. v. Miller, No. CA3-74-394-H, at 35-36 (N.D. Tex. Third Report to
Court, May 1, 1983-Nov. 1, 1983). It has been reported that the Department has determined
to respond to the staffing problem by reducing the length of patient stay. This, in turn, was
reported to be sought by a change in medication practice, which would involve providing
patients with high initial dosages of medication and then an effort to stabilize the patients on
a lower dosage. See Austin American-Statesman, May 24, 1984, at Al, col. 4-5.
314. See R.A.J. v. Miller, No. CA3-74-394-H (N.D. Texas Stipulated Recommendation
of Remedies, undated). The parties agreed on a series of stages of progressively more
favorable client: staff ratios leading to compliance with the requirements of the Settlement
Agreement by August 31, 1985. See id This was approved by the court and given the force
of an order. See R.A.J. v. Miller, No. CA3-74-394-H (N.D. Tex. Order, June 5, 1984). The
legislature has approved the use of $6.9 million of agency funds appropriated for other purposes to move towards compliance with this order, but additional appropriations may be
necessary. See Austin American-Statesman, July 4, 1984, at B2, col. 1; Austin AmericanStatesman, July 2, 1984, at B2, col. I.
315. See R.A.J. v. Miller, No. 3-74-394-H (N.D. Tex. Memorandum Opinion and Order, Mar. 30, 1984).
316. See id at 19.
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providing insufficient individualized planning, the R.A.J defendants offered testimony that, for many patients, the only meaningful
treatment was medication.3" 7 Therefore, it argued, any deficiencies
in other program planning for these patients was of no major importance.3 18 As the district court recognized, this was an effort by the
defendants to challenge the scientific basis for the claim that programming was meaningfully related to treatment. 1 9 Without reaching the merits of the issue, the district court held that the defendants
had agreed in the settlement agreement that individualized programming was constitutionally necessary. 320 They could not take
issue with this proposition in the enforcement stage of the
litigation.3 2'
Whether, or to what extent, patients who might reasonably be expected to respond to medication are entitled to carefully developed
plans for other programs of treatment is an important issue of treatment policy. Whether such patients are entitled to judicial or other
review of the sufficiency of efforts to provide them with such plans is
an important issue of legal policy. As a result of the Attorney General's concession in R.AJ and the legislature's failure to creatively
address the right to treatment in the Code's revision, these issues
will apparently be resolved in federal court entirely as matters of
federal constitutional law. How they might best be resolved as matters of Texas mental health and legal policy has never been adequately addressed.
D.

The Right to Proper Treatment by Medication

Claims of abuse relating to medications used to treat mental illness present, in a conceptual sense, merely one specific aspect of the
patients' right to proper treatment. Because of the extent to which
medications are used and the vigor with which claims of abuse are
made, however, this is often treated as a separate issue. Certainly it
constituted an independently significant aspect of the R.A.J
litigation.
Misuse of medication was a major thrust of the R.A.J litigation
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

See id at 6.
See id at 6.
Seeid at 6.
See id. at 7.
See id. at 7.
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and has continued as a principal concern of the Review Panel. The
settlement agreement provided that the defendants were to prepare
and submit a specific plan for addresssing the use of medication in
their facilities.3"' Such a plan was developed and was filed by
agreement in February of 1983.323
The plan contains schedules of ranges for a large number of
medications and requires that treatment with dosages in excess of
these ranges "be justified in the patient's medical record. ' 324 Review every ninety days to determine whether dosages should be adjusted is also required.325 Simultaneous treatment of a patient with
more than one drug of the same chemical class is, prohibited, unless
approved in advance by the institution's clinical director or director
of psychiatric services.326 Special procedures, including trial withdrawal, are required when manifestations of tardive dyskinesnia are
noted.3 27 In addition, periodic reports are required by each state
hospital in order to provide a means by which the Review Panel can
evaluate compliance.328
The Review Panel's third report made clear that the panel was in
fact examining the reports with care. The panel suggested greater
uniformity in the periodic reports and requested more detail on each
deviation from the approved dosage range.329 Concern was expressed regarding continued use of one medication to calm agitation
of a patient on a regular regime of another psychotropic medication,
especially where the medical director's review of this took place
only after the fact.33°
Among the rights which article 5547-80 of the revised Code provides is the right "to be free from unnecessary or excessive medication."33 ' Whether this creates an enforceable right is, of course, open
322. See R.A.J. v. Kavanagh, No. CA3-74-394-H, 16-17 (N.D. Tex. Settlement Agreement filed Mar. 2, 1981).
323. See R.A.J. v. Miller, No. CA3-74-394-H (N.D. Tex. Supplemental Agreement and
Order filed Feb. 14, 1983).
324. See id. at 2-3.

325. See id at 3.
326. See id at 8.
327. See id at 9-13.

328. See id at 15.
329. See id at 3.
330. See R.A.J. v. Miller, No. CA3-74-394-H, 6 (N.D. Tex. Third Report to the Court,
May 1, 1983-Nov. 1, 1983).
331. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-80 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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and may depend upon the same considerations as bear upon
whether article 5547-82 creates an enforceable right to treatment
generally. Article 5547-82 contains no effort to define or provide for
development of a definition of "unnecessary" or "excessive." Nor is
any provision made for enforcement, either on an individual or system (or institution) wide basis.
The R.AJ. experience must have alerted the legislature to the definitional and remedy issues that any enforceable right would create.
Article 5547-80's failure to address these issues may again mean that
no enforceable right to proper treatment by medication was intended or created. If so, this is unfortunate. The revision so construed reflects, at best, passive acquiescence in the federal district
court's willingness to recognize, define, and enforce such a right as a
matter of federal constitutional mandate. There is no foundation
laid for efforts to restore primary responsibility in these areas to
state officials or agencies.
E. The Right to Avoid Certain Treatment Techniques
No other issue related to patients' rights has received as much
recent attention as the existence of a potential right, under at least
some circumstances, to avoid certain treatment techniques. While
some concern has developed in regard to such techniques as psychosurgery and electroconvulsive therapy, most of the dispute has been
with regard to medication. Virtually no serious argument has been
made that all patients have, or should have, the right, under all circumstances, to refuse treatment by medication. Instead, the dual
issues have been (a) the standard to be used to determine whether a
patient's objections to treatment by medication may be overridden,
and (b) the procedure that must or should be used to determine
whether a patient's situation meets that standard.332 Unfortunately,
and in spite of R.A.J 's cry for legislative leadership in this area, the
1983 revision of the Texas Mental Health Code appears to have ignored the issue completely.
1. Treatment Refusal Under the Prior Code
While there is some uncertainty, it appears that the prior Code
332. See Dix, Realism and Drug Refusal A Reply to Appelbaum and Gutheil, 9 BULL.
AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 180, 188-97 (1981) (issues separated and discussed in light of

available empirical information).
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simply did not address patients' right, if any, to refuse certain treatment techniques. Article 5547-70 provided, in part: "The head of a
mental hospital may give the patient accepted psychiatric treatment
and therapy.

'3 33

This might have been read as authorizing "ac-

cepted" treatment techniques to be utilized for all or some patients
without regard to consent or objections. No definition of "accepted"
treatment was provided. No distinction was drawn between voluntary and involuntary patients. No hint was given that, in regard to
"accepted" treatments, the expressed desires of any patients were
entitled to any significance at all. Nor did the article contain or
refer to any procedure by which other non-"accepted" treatment
techniques might be utilized through overriding patients' objections.
On balance and given these characteristics of the statute, it is quite
unlikely that article 5547-70 was intended to resolve, or even address, the complex question of treatment refusal.
Article 3174b-2 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes might have
addressed the issue.334 Under this article, the Department "shall
provide or perform recognized medical treatment or services to persons admitted or committed to its care.

' 335

The performance or pro-

vision of such care is authorized, under some circumstances, if the
"advice and consent" of three physicians is obtained.336 In 1967, the
attorney general suggested that when the approval of the three physicians was obtained, treatment could be provided "without obtaining anyone else's consent.

'337

This, of course, raised the

possibility that in some situations the three-physician consent might
be sufficient despite the absence of consent from the patient or even
in the face of active objection from the patient. In a later opinion,
however, the office retreated from this position and offered that the
three-physician consent authorized by the statute would be sufficient
only in those situations specifically described in the statute.338 Both
333. Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 70, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 518 (revised 1983).
334. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3174b-2 (Vernon Supp. 1984) ("medical treatment and services, power to provide without consent of relatives, etc.").
335. See id.
336. See id
337. See Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. M-152 (1967).
338. See id No. H-646 (1975). The opinion concerned the need for parental consent
for treatment of a minor resident in a situation in which, as a general rule, it was apparently
agreed that parental consent was both necessary and sufficient. See id No. H-646 (1975).
Thus, no construction of the statute concerning an adult patient was asked of the office. See

id. No. H-646 (1975).
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of these situations are ones in which "the consent of any person or
guardian is considered necessary. 33 p One consists of instances in
which the consent "is requested, and such person or guardian shall
fail to immediately reply. ' 340 The other covers situations in which

"there is no guardian or responsible relative to whom request can be
made." 34 '
Under this second construction, the statute does not address
whether (or whose) consent is necessary in what circumstances. It
simply provides for substitute consent in those limited situations in
which consent of some person other than the patient is necessary
under some other legal requirement and either that person is unavailable or fails to respond to a request for consent. This is the
most appropriate reading. But even if Article 3147b-2 is read as
providing for substitute consent in some situations, it appears to be
limited to treatment for physicial ailments or ills. 342 So construed, it

simply does not address the need for, or adequate substitutes for,
consent to mental health treatment.
In apparent recognition of the absence of legislative guidance in
this area, the Department promulgated regulations dealing with
treatment refusal in several areas. Electroconvulsive therapy, under
these regulations, requires the consent of adult patients or, if the
patient has been declared incompetent, a duly appointed guardian.343 But no such consent is necessary in the event of a "psychiat339.
340.
341.
342.

See id No. H-646 (1975).
See id No. H-646 (1975).
See id No. H-646 (1975).
See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 3174b-2 (Vernon Supp. 1984). The preamble

to the original legislation creating art. 3147b-2 suggests, although not without ambiguity,
that the legislative concern was with treatment of physical ailments. See State Hospitals and
Special Schools-Medical Treatment-Consent of Guardian or Other Person, ch. 54, preamble,
1955 Tex. Gen. Laws 86, amended by Act of May 29, 1981, ch. 257, §§ 1-2, 1981 Tex. Gen.

Laws 665, 665-66. The statute provides that its provisions "shall not allow the performance
of any operation involving sexual sterilization or frontal lobotomies." TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. art. 3174b-2, § I (Vernon Supp. 1984). This may be read as emphasizing an intention
not to have the statute apply to mental health treatment procedures, such as lobotomies, but
to emphasize dramatically that the extraordinarily intrusive procedure of lobotomy was
under no circumstances to be approved under the procedure. On the other hand, the legislative provision that this one treatment procedure for patients' mental conditions was not to be
covered may suggest an intention to have the statute cover other treatment procedures for
mental conditions.
343. See Tex. Dep't. of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 405.101-.1 14 (Shepard's May I, 1982) (Departmental Procedures for Therapeutic Utilization of Electroconvulsive Therapy).
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ric emergency." This, in turn, is defined as "an emergency disorder
of such severity as to constitute an immediate threat to life or health
of the patient and where [electroconvulsive therapy] is the treatment
of choice." 3"
Programs involving aversive conditioning are authorized for committed patients-apparently without regard to the patients' objections-if four requirements are met. First, the program must have
been approved by the Departmental Committee on Behavior Therapy.345 Second, a psychiatrist or psychologist who is not an employee of the facility must have confirmed in writing the "need and
probable desirable consequences" of the program.34 6 Third, the Facility Committee on Behavior Therapy must have confirmed the
need and probable desirable consequences of the program. 34 7 Finally, the superindentent of the facility must have placed written
approval for the program in the patient's clinical record. 34 8 By implication, programs of behavior modification involving techniques
other than aversive conditioning are apparently regarded as permissible-if they meet the regulations' requirements-without regard to
the patients' wishes. The regulations do not deal with consent or
objections to treatment by means of medications of any sort.
The R.A.J settlement contained no specific stipulation either as to
the existence of a federal constitutional right to refuse treatment or
as to the content of any such right. It did, however, address several
treatment refusal issues in specific terms, apparently on the assumption that the federal constitutional right to appropriate treatment
necessarily encompassed some right to decline treatment. The defendants agreed to "maintain" an undescribed and apparently unpublished policy against psychosurgery in state facilities.34 9 In
addition, the agreement provided that no patient was to receive electroconvulsive therapy or any program of behavior therapy, except in
accordance with the applicable administrative rules.350 The defendants agreed that during the term of the settlement no rules of the
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.

Id. § 405.103.
See id §§ 405.141-.155.
See id. §§ 405.141-.155.
See id. §§ 405.141-.155.
See id §§ 405.141-.155 (Behavior Therapy Programs).
See R.A.J. v. Kavanagh, No. CA3-74-394-H, 1 (N.D. Tex. Settlement Agreement

filed Mar. 2, 1981).
350. See id at 11.
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commissioner referred to in the agreement would be modified unless
the Review Panel, the United States, and the plaintiffs had a prior
opportunity to review the proposed modification. 35' There was apparently no binding agreement concerning the substance of such
changes.
In regard to psychotropic medication, the agreement took a twopronged approach. First, it provided that patients were entitled to
protection against "improper, excessive or inappropriate" use of
such medication. 352 All medications were to be administered in
compliance with the commissioner's existing rules.353 Second, the
defendants also agreed to establish guidelines for appropriate ranges
of dosages and to submit a plan for monitoring the use of such
drugs.
The agreement also contained a confusing provision by which the
defendants agreed to prepare a proposed administrative rule regulating "the manner in which patient consent must be sought" prior
to the administration of drugs. The agreement stated that: "The
proposed regulation shall take into account, procedures and practices developed and mandated in the cases of Rennie v. Klein, 476
F.Supp. 1294 (D.N.J. 1979), and Rogers v. kin, [634 F.2d 650 (1st
Cir. 1980)]." 354 This provision was somewhat ambigious. The two
cited cases were in some ways inconsistent. Both recognized federal
constitutional limits on a state's ability to administer certain medications over objection or without consent. But they differed in important ways. Rogers permitted medication without consent only for
those patients who were incompetent; the district court opinion in
Rennie, on the other hand, imposed a more flexible standard.355
Procedurally, Rogers required that the determination of incompetency be a judicial one; Rennie, in contrast, required only that the
determination that objections could be overriden be made by an
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

See id at 15.
See id at 16.
See id.at 18.
See id at 18.
Compare Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 656 (1st Cir. 1980) ("forcible administra-

tion of drugs must further police power interest") with Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294,
1315 (D.N.J. 1979) (four factors to consider prior to forced medication decision), modfied,
653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded,458 U.S. 1119 (1982). The four factors

listed in Rennie are 1) physical threat posed by patient, 2) patient's capacity to decide on
particular treatment, 3) less restrictive alternative treatments, and 4) risk of permanent side
effects. See id. at 1315.
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outside psychiatric consultant rather than the treating staff.356 There
was obviously some uncertainty as to substance of the defendants'
obligation to "take into account" the requirements of these cases.
But the holdings of the incorporated cases made clear that both
could not be literally followed.
Several subsequent developments in the treatment refusal areas
significantly affected the situation posed when the legislature convened in January of 1983. The Supreme Court agreed on April 20,
198 1,35 to review the First Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in
Rogers, as it later acknowledged,358 to resolve whether the federal
Constitution contained a right to refuse treatment with antipsychotic drugs. But in June of 1982, without addressing the issue,
it vacated and remanded the case for consideration of whether intervening developments in state law affected the decision on which review was sought.3 59 The district court's decision in Rennie had been
modified on appeal to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals.36 ° In
July of 1982, however, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded
the judgment "for further consideration in light of Youngberg v.
Romeo. "361

Functionally, the situation confronting the legislature was as follows: The attorney general, on behalf of the State, had agreed that a
federal constitutional right to refuse treatment existed, but the
agreement did not address the substance of, and qualifications to,
that right in the important subarea of treatment by medication.
There was reason to believe that the federal judiciary was willing to
actively intervene to implement a broad definition of that right, at
least in the absence of definitive state action to define and protect
the underlying interests of the patients. The Supreme Court had
356. Compare Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 661 (1st Cir. 1980) ("absent emergency
judicial determination of incapacity necessary") with Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp. 1294,
1308 (D.N.J. 1979) (neutral, independent decision-maker may override informed refusal to
take medication), modified,653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), vacated,458 U.S. 1119 (1982), modified, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
357. See Okin v. Rogers, 451 U.S. 906 (1981).
358. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 293 (1982).
359. See id at 306. In an apparently unreported action, the court of appeals on remand
certified nine questions of state law to the Massachusetts Supreme Court. See Rogers v.
Commissioner of Dep't of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 322-23 (Mass. 1983).
360. Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981), modiying 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.N.J.
1979), vacated,458 U.S. 1119 (1982), modfied, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
361. Rennie v. Klein, 458 U.S. 1119 (1982), on remand, 720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983).
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pointedly declined to address either the existence or content of the
possible federal constitutional right. But, the state had agreed to
undertake-on an administrative level-to define both substantively
and procedurally that right in a manner "taking into account" conflicting judicial decisions no longer in effect. It is difficult to imagine
a more compelling need for leadership in defining and implementing a state policy.
2. The Revised Code and Treatment Refusal
No effort is made in the revised Code to deal comprehensively
with the issue of treatment refusal. On the other hand, provisions in
several areas do, or might, have some impact on patients' refusal
rights.
The revised Code indirectly recognizes a right on the part of voluntary patients to refuse treatment. No specific statement to this
effect appears. Article 5547-24, however, contains a prohibition
against an application for court-ordered treatment being filed concerning a voluntary patient. This is subject to exceptions, among
them those situations in which the patient "refuses or is unable to
consent to appropriate and necessary psychiatric treatment. 3 62 The
legislature's assumption was that voluntary patients have a right of
refusal and, if that right was exercised, no efforts to override it could
be taken unless the patient became an involuntary patient.
Unfortunately, the provision contains a number of ambiguities. It
is unclear, for example, whether "informed consent" of any sort is
required before treatment may be administered to voluntary patients. May proceedings be begun only if a voluntary patient affirmatively "refuses . . . appropriate and necessary psychiatric
treatment"? Or is it sufficient that the patient "refuses . . .to con-

sent" to such treatment? The answer to this question will have a
controlling impact upon whether treating personnel are required to
obtain formal, and perhaps written, consent before treating voluntary patients or, in the alternative, whether they are required only to
respect certain, or perhaps any, affirmative refusals by voluntary patients to submit to treatment techniques. If relatively formal consent
must be obtained from voluntary patients before they can be treated
with some, or any, procedures, treating personnel might find the
362. See TEX. REV. CIv.

STAT.

ANN. art. 5547-24(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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need to obtain such consent a significant impediment to effective
treatment of those patients.
Article 3174b-2 was not affected by the Code's revision, but, as
best construed, this statute does not address involuntary patients'
refusal rights. Article 5547-82 of the revised Code continues the authorization from the prior Code that the head of a facility "may give
the patient accepted psychiatric treatment and therapy. 3 63 Even if
the langauge in the prior Code would have been construed as creating no enforcable right to refuse treatment, the corresponding section of the revised Code might be read differently. The language
was reenacted against the background of extensive litigation and
legislation in other jurisdictions addressing treatment refusal. Perhaps when read against that background and in the absence of any
other provision in the revised Code addressing treatment refusal,
that language is best read as intended to address and resolve the
issue in favor of rejecting any such right. To construe it otherwise
would attribute to the legislature an intention to avoid addressing
what even a cursory examination of the area would disclose was a
major issue.
If read as addressing the issue, article 5547-82 could be construed
as drawing a reasonable distinction between those treatments which
patients should be able to reject and others they should not. The
article's language suggests that it might have been intended to deny
involuntary patients a right to decline only "accepted" treatment.
Medication, given its wide acceptance in mental health practice,
would most likely come within this category. "Experimental" treatments, such as pyschosurgery, on the other hand, would not be covered. By implication, article 5547-82 might direct that such
techniques cannot be used in the absence of informed voluntary
consent by the patient.
On the other hand, there are still persuasive arguments against
construing article 5547-82 as addressing and purporting to resolve
treatment refusal issues. If the legislature recognized the issue, it
must have also recognized its complexity. It is quite unlikely that
the legislature intended such a simplistic approach to a problem that
must have been recognized as a complex one. The argument above
that the use of the adjective "accepted" suggests a construction of
363. See id art. 5547-82."
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the statute that addresses these complexities may fall short. Electroconvulsive therapy, for example, is "accepted" in the sense that it
has been so widely used that it cannot be accurately characterized as
experimental. Yet, it is arguably so intrusive that it is unlikAiy that
the legislature intended it-as an "accepted" treatment techniqueto be available for use upon involuntary patients with no legislatively-proscribed safeguards. The reading suggested above would,
further, make treatment refusal an all-or-nothing matter-no mechanism would be provided for overriding patients' objections to treatments not "accepted." It is unlikely that any legislation that does not
provide for a conditional right to refuse at least some treatment
techniques-a right subject to being overridden pursuant to a proscribed procedure-was intended to definitively address the area.
Perhaps the indirect recognition of a right on the part of a voluntary patient to refuse treatment, discussed above, might be read as
confirming evidence of a legislative intent to withhold any similar
right from involuntary patients. Such a reading may be encouraged
by the apparent "remedy" provided for voluntary patients' refusals-the initiation of proceedings to make such persons involuntary
patients. Does this suggest a legislative assumption--or mandatethat involuntary patients have no right of refusal, so that conversion
of a refusing patient to involuntary status destroys the effectivness of
the patient's objections? Again, the evidence that the legislature
must have been aware of the complexity of the problem militates
strongly against reading into the revised Code such a simplistic effort to address and resolve the issues. The fairest reading of the
revised Code is that it simply did not address the right of an involuntary patient to refuse or avoid any treatment techniques.364
A final possibility needs to be mentioned. If competent involuntary patients-but only compentent ones-have a right to refuse certain treatment techniques, a determination of incompetency might
364. Article 5547-82 of the revised Code is further evidence of an effort to avoid addressing medication refusal. See id art. 5547-82. The Department's rules address restraint

in detail. See Tex. Dep't of Mental Health and Mental Retardation, 25 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§§ 405.121-405.130 (Shepard's May 1, 1982) ("subchapter F. Restraint and Seclusion").
These rules address "drug restraint" as well as "personal" and mechanical restraint. See id.
§ 405.124. The Code's restraint provision is carefully limited to "physical" restraint. See
TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-82 (Vernon Supp. 1984). This appears to reflect a
careful effort to avoid addressing even the limited issue of medication as a means of emergency restraint.
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be made at the time of the initial judicial proceeding. It is arguable
that under the revised Code the judicial decision that certain impaired persons may be compelled to submit to care or treatment also
involvCs a determination that their competency is so impaired that
they have no right during the subsequent period of involuntary
treatment to decline treatment.
Under the third aspect of the involuntary treatment criterion of
the revised Code,365 involuntary treatment may be ordered only after a finding that, among other things, the proposed patient is, as a
result of his mental illness, "unable to make a rational and informed
decision as to whether or not to submit to treatment." 366 Perhaps
patients found to be properly subjected to treatment under this criterion have, as part of the process, also been determined to be so impaired in regard to their decisionmaking capacities that any
objections they may raise to treatment are not entitled to respect.36 7
Thus, the criterion for involuntary treatment might be read, to some
extent at least, as addressing and resolving the treatment refusal
issue.
This is not an appropriate reading of the statute for several reasons. First, such a reading would impose more stringent limitations
upon treatment over objection of those persons institutionalized because of risks of harm to themselves or others. As so read, the Code
might contain no procedure for overriding the objections of those
persons institutionalized under either of the first two prongs of the
criterion. Yet, it is arguable that the social interest in restoring such
persons to a nondangerous condition is greater than the interest
brought into play by persons committed under the third prong. It is
unlikely that the legislature intended to provide for treatment over
objection only of those patients whose impairment does not render
them dangerous to themselves or others.
Second, such a reading of the statute would oversimplify the
problem. If patients committed under the third prong can properly
be regarded by reason of their commitment as lacking the ability to
365. See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-50(b)(2)(iii) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (three
alternative criteria which might subject impaired person to involuntary treatment).
366. See id arts. 5547-50(b)(2)(iii), -51(b)(2)(iii).
367. See A.E, & R.R. v. Mitchell, 5 Mental Disability L. Rep. 154, 154-55 (D. Utah
June 16, 1980) (since commitment requires proof of inability to engage in a rational deci-

sionmaking process regarding acceptance of mental treatment, committed patients' objections to medication need not be respected).
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make specific treatment decisions, this does not assign responsibility
for making those decisions. Traditionally, such substitute decisions
are made for an impaired person by a judicially-appointed guardian. Commitment of an impaired person under the third prong of
the revised criterion makes no provision whatsoever for a substitute
decisionmaker. Of course, the legislature might have intended a
blanket delegation of such authority to the treating physician or
staff. But in the absence of a more specific provision, it is inappropriate to attribute to the legislature an intention to so significantly
depart from traditional methods of providing for substitute decisionmaking for impaired persons.
Finally, such a construction of the statute would not assure that a
sufficiently focused determination of incompetency is made before a
patient's objection to specific forms of treatment is denied legal effect. It may be true that patients' objections to treatment should be
overriden if-and perhaps only if-the patients are determined "incompetent." But a reasonable construction of this approach demands that attention be addressed specifically to a patient's ability
to make an acceptable choice concerning the particular treatment
technique at issue. The decision that must be made under the involuntary treatment criterion does not require any such focus. Instead,
it directs attention only to the broader question of a proposed patient's ability to make an acceptable decision concerning whether or
not to submit to any treatment at all. This is not an adequate substitute for a focused inquiry on a patient's capacity or competency to
participate in the decision as to whether or not to utilize a specific
treatment regime involving electroconvulsive therapy or certain
powerful medications, whatever might be placed in issue by the
facts of particular cases.
On balance, the involuntary treatment criterion should not be
read as addressing the treatment refusal issue. A patient's commitment under the third prong of the statutory criterion should not affect the legal status of any objections the patient may raise to
particular treatment techniques.
The R.AJ settlement agreement left no doubt that the Texas prerevision legal framework and policy in the area of treatment refusal
was inadequate. Despite this, the revision failed to significantly address the area.
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The R.A.J Medication Refusal Order

The revision's failure to address treatment refusal and, in particular, medication refusal was, in light of the R.A.J litigation, an invitation for the void to be filled by federal court action. This has in
fact occurred. The R.A.J defendants submitted three proposals
dealing with medication refusal rights. All were found unacceptable
by the Review Panel. This created the first need in the R.A.J litigation for the court to resolve a major substantive matter on which the
parties were unable to agree. On June 22, 1984, the court issued an
opinion and order addressing medication refusal.3 6 8 After recognizing the post-agreement developments in Rennie and Mills, as well as
the potential significance of the Supreme Court's Romeo decision,
the court concluded that the matter "should be governed by the
principles enunciated in the Youngberg /v. Romeo] opinion. "369
Applying these principles, the court found no basis for even
"competent" patients to be given an absolute right to refuse medication.37 ° Moreover, it found no need for a judicial determination as
to whether patients' objections could be overridden.3 7 ' Romeo demands only that the decisions to intrude upon the patients' interests
be made "by the exercise of professional judgment.1 372 Applying
this approach, the court approved almost entirely the defendants'
proposed administrative rule as satisfying the requirements of the
settlement agreement and, apparently, federal constitutional demands as they existed as of the time of the court's decision.
The approved rule distinguishes two classes of patients for purposes of medication refusal. The first class consists of voluntary patients and those admitted involuntarily under the emergency or
protective custody provision.3 73 Extensive information concerning
the patient's illness, the medication, its effects, and "the patient's

368. R.A.J. v. Miller, No. CA3-74-394-H (N.D. Tex. Memorandum Opinion and Or-

der, June 22, 1984).
369. Id.at 5. The court read the Supreme Court's remand of Rennie for reconsideration in light of Romeo as evidencing an intention to have treatment refusal issues governed
by the Romeo approach. See id.at 4.

370. See id at 8.
371. See id.at 8.
372. See id at 4.

373. See id.app. at 4, No. 7 (proposed rule attached to Memorandum Opinion and
Order as Appendix).
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rights under this rule" must be given by the treating physician. 4
"Informed consent" by the patient (unless a guardian has been appointed) is a necessary prerequisite for administration of psychotropic medication to these patients. 5 It the patient consents, but
"refuses or is unable" to execute a written form, oral consent documented in the patient's record will suffice.376
The second class consists of "committed" patients. Consent is not
prerequisite to administration of medication to patients in this
class, 377 but these patients must be provided the same information as
patients in the first category. 78 During the first fourteen days of a
commitment, "the decision to administer psychotropic medication
• . .is within the discretion of the treating physician. ' 379 After the
fourteen day period, a patient's objection to the administration of
psychotropic medication puts into play a series of steps. First, "the
facility should consider discharging the patient. 38 ° If discharge is
not "appropriate," a "review process" may be initiated. The clinical
director of the facility, or a "physician designee" not working on the
patient's unit, must examine and interview the patient to make a
determination as to "the appropriateness of treatment with psychotropic medication."3 8 ' In deciding whether treatment with medication is medically appropriate, the following factors are to be
considered: "(A) the accuracy of the diagnosis; (B) indications for
the medication; (C) probable benefits and risks of the medication;
374. See id app. at 2-3, No. 4.
375. See id.
app. at 2-3, No. 4.
376. See id.
app. at 4, No. 6.
377. See id at 8. It is not clear that the district court saw any significance in the distinction between "consent" and "objection." See id at 9. In fact, some of its language suggests
that the district court regarded withholding of required consent as indistinguishable from
affirmatively raising objections. See id at 8-9.
378. See id app. at 2-3, No. 4.
379. Id.app. at 5, No. 8(a). Objections or resistance to medication during this period is
of no legal significance whatsoever and can be overridden, by force if necessary, with no
constitutionally required procedure. See id.app. at 5, No. 8(a).
380. Id.app. at 5-7, No. 8(b).
381. See id app. at 5, No. 8(b)(1). Medically appropriate treatment with medication is
defined as such treatment:
based on a professional judgment that without such medication the patient's condition
cannot realistically be expected to improve within a reasonable period of time; or that
without such medication deterioration of the patient's condition cannot be prevented; or
that without such medication there is a significant possibility that the patient's mental
condition will not be stabilized in time to prevent injury to himself or other persons.
Id. app. at 2, No. 3(e).
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and (D) the existence and value of alternative forms of treatment, if
any. 38 2
The clinical director is also to determine "whether the patient's
ability to understand the consequences of his decision to object to
the administration of such medication is impaired as a result of his
mental illness. ' 383 If it is determined that the patient retains the
ability to understand these consequences, the clinical director is not
required to consider this in deciding whether to override the patient's objection. Such a determination does, however, trigger another stage of review of the decision as to whether treatment by
medication is medically appropriate. A "consultant psychiatrist,"
not employed by the Department, must review the case and determine that this treatment is appropriate.384 If it is determined that
medication is appropriate despite the patient's objections, the
clinical director or his physician designee must "personally monitor" the patient's progress "on a monthly basis" to determine
whether medication continues to be medically appropriate.
Under the defendants' proposal, a patient's objection did not require that the administration of medication cease during the review
process.385 If, but only if, a determination was made that medication was not medically appropriate, administration of medication
was to be discontinued "within a reasonable period of time. ' 386 The
court, in its disapproval of the defendants' proposal, indicated that
"a patient who withholds his consent must not be treated over his
387
objections until the review process . . . has been complete.
In indirect language, the rule creates an "emergency" exception to
virtually all of its demands.3 88 "Emergency," in turn, is defined as
"a situation which, in the opinion of the treating physician, indicates
the possibility of immediate physical or mental deterioration of the
patient, or indicates the possibility of immediate physical injury or
389
death of the patient or other persons in the facility.
382. Id app. at 5, No. 8(b)(2).
383. See id app. at 6, No. 8(b)(3).
384. See id. app. at 6-7, No. 8(b)(6).
385. See id app. at 5-7, No. 8(b).
386. See id app. at 6, No. 8(b)(4).
387. See id at 9.
388. See id app. at 7, No. 10 ("Nothing herein is intended to preclude the administration of psychotropic medication to any patient in an emergency as defined herein.").
389. Id. app. at I, No. 3(a).
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Even as an embodiment of minimal federal constitutional requirements, the R.A.J medication refusal order is subject to significant criticism. Perhaps most important is the order's failure to
impose any limits upon treatment over objection during the first
fourteen days of court-ordered treatment. No precedent was cited,
or apparently exists, for exempting this significant period of involuntary detention from legal regulation. 390 The court's opinion did
not address or defend this aspect of the approved rule, and no defense appears available.
Second, the rule gives minimal and inadequate guidance as to the
criteria to be used in overriding a patient's objection. No requirement is imposed that the patient's expressed preference be taken
into consideration, regardless of the extent to which that preference
is the result of a competent decisionmaking process. The implication is that, if the required procedures are followed, the patient's
preferences can be entirely disregarded. Romeo, of course, emphasized the need to avoid interference with professional judgment. It
is far from clear, however, that this necessarily or desirably means
that, in the treatment refusal context, the personal preferences of the
patient can be denied any substantive significance whatsoever.
Third, no definition is provided for the "objection" that puts the
review process into play. It remains uncertain what sort of action or
words a patient must utilize and how rigorous those actions or
words must be. Moreover, no effort is made to define limits upon
the persuasion that the staff may use to discourage an objection or to
encourage the withdrawal of an objection already made.
Fourth, the prominence of the discharge option to an objection is
bothersome. Under the Code, it seems clear that a facility has a
duty to the patient and/or society to provide involuntary treatment
when appropriate, including taking the necessary steps to override a
patient's objections to treatment. If a resisting patient is discharged
despite continued indications that the patient meets the legal standards for involuntary treatment, the discharge is very likely in violation of the facility's obligations to the patient, society, or both. The
390. The decisions relied upon in the district court's opinion do not address this issue.
See id. at 5 (citing Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983); Rennie v. Klein,
720 F.2d 266 (3d Cir. 1983) (en banc)). The New Jersey regulations ultimately upheld in
Rennie and the New York regulations held sufficient in Prevost applied only after an initial
period of unregulated treatment over objection.
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discharge option arguably constitutes an invitation to ignore this
duty and to avoid the difficulties of treatment refusal situations by
simply discharging the patient in disregard of the facility's other
obligations.
Finally, the emergency exception to the requirements is too
broadly drafted. All of the otherwise applicable limits are rendered
inapplicable upon the anticipation of certain "deterioration" or "in'
jury." 391
Conceivably, then, the entire rule can be disregarded if the
treating physician anticipates some risk that the patient, without
medication, will experience immediate mental deterioration. It is of
no significance that the risk is extremely small, that the deterioration
will be slight, and that any such deterioration could quickly be reversed once the "review" process has been completed and nonemer392
gency treatment over objection is permissible.
More important than these considerations, however, is the nature
of the R.A.J requirements. The medication refusal requirements
represent the first necessity for the district court to actually address
the merits of a disputed issue. In doing so, the court obviously read
Romeo as directing that constitutional requirements be defined in a
manner reserving maximum respect for treating professionals' decisions reached pursuant to state law. There is, of course, no reason to
believe that the resulting requirements reflect the most appropriate
position from a state policy perspective. In formulating the requirements, the district court properly did not address the numerous issues that should be addressed in the development of sound state
policy.
For example, it may be that as a matter of sound state mental
391. See R.A.J. v. Miller, No. CA3-74-394-H, app. at 1,No. 3(a) (N.D. Tex. Memorandum Opinion and Order, June 22, 1984). The "deterioration" or "injury" must be immedi-

ate. See id.app. at 1, No. 3(a). There is no necessity, however, especially in the case of
deterioration, that it be irreversible. Cf id app. at I, No. 3(a). The rule indicates that only
"the possibility" of such "deterioration" or "injury" be anticipated. See id.app. at 1,No.
3(a).
392. There is reason to fear that this broad definition of emergency will render ineffective the right of patients admitted under Orders of Protective Custody or on emergency
grounds to avoid treatment without consent. In many cases, the grounds for so-called emer-

gency admission may well serve to establish an emergency justifying compelled medication.
The likelihood that the emergency admission standard will be uncritically applied to medication administration increases the risk of abuse of the emergency exception to R.AJ. 's consent requirement. Cf Jones, Emergency Restraint Under the Texas Mental Health Code, 33
TEX. B.J. 31, 32 (1970).
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health policy, the objections of a "competent" patient to medication
should be given some or perhaps controlling significance. It may be
that objecting patients should have a right to a judicial determination as to whether their objections may be overridden. The sorts of
emergencies that justify ignoring general requirements might appropriately be more limited than those specified in the proposed rule.
These and many other issues of state mental health policy remain
unaddressed despite the R.A.,J medication refusal order, yet the
existence of that order is likely to discourage effective consideration
of those issues as matters of state mental health policy. For many,
the distinction between federal constitutional demands and appropriate state policy may be too unfamiliar to be taken seriously. For
some, there may simply be an unwillingness to address the issue of
treatment refusal twice, even though the difference in forum should
mean that different approaches should be taken.
Whatever the end result, the necessity for the R.AJ court to address the treatment refusal issue virtually de novo was largely the
result of the legislature's failure to address this issue in the revision
of the Code. Given the tendency to be "satisfied" with one resolution of such an issue, the R.A.,J court's constitutional resolution may
become de facto state mental health policy. This would be extremely unfortunate.
F.

Conclusion

Development of a legislative framework for patients' care and
treatment is in some ways a more complex task than that of providing a framework for admitting impaired persons to such care and
treatment. Treatment matters present a greater potential for interfering with decisions best left to mental health professionals. In addition, funding considerations may be more significant in at least
some treatment areas-such as the right to treatment-than in admission procedures. These considerations and others, such as the
variability of the problems presented, suggest that, to some extent,
treatment matters might best be left to development as legislative
appropriation issues or in administrative rules and regulations.
Even if so, however, there is certainly some legislative responsibility
for setting basic policy, assuring the development of such rules, and
perhaps overseeing the implementation of those rules.
Treatment issues as matters of state law, like admission issues, are
complicated by the need to consider and accommodate the federal
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constitutional framework. The Texas situation was made even more
difficult by the attorney general's willingness in the R.A.J litigation
to submit the Texas public mental health system to the substantial
federal judicial oversight provided for in the settlement agreement.
It is unlikely that the state's concessions in the R.A.J agreement
bound the legislature to any substantive positions as matters of legislative policy. The legislative task was, however, increased in difficulty by the need to consider how best to respond to the federal
judicial scrutiny.
R.A.J should have alerted the legislature to the need for more
creative state action in the area of "patients' rights." Whether such
action could or would result in the federal court withdrawing in deference to state remedial action is uncertain. Perhaps the desirability
of retaining policymaking control in state officials and agencies and
of making oversight of policy administration a state matter argues
strongly in favor of responding to R.A.J by efforts to reassert state
primary responsibility for defining and protecting the interests of
state patients.
As so judged, the 1983 revision of those portions of the Mental
Health Code dealing with patients' rights was a failure. Some areas
were virtually ignored. The legislature's failure to address treatment
refusal virtually assures that the legal requirements in this area affecting the Texas mental health system will be federal constitutional
ones formulated by, or under the authority of, the federal district
court with virtually no input from the legislature.
Other areas were addressed, but in such a general way as to hold
little promise of substantive gain. While the area of patients' right
to treatment-so prominent in the R.A.J litigation-was recognized, no effort was made to define that right or to provide for implementation or enforcement of it. There was no acknowledgement
of the serious deficiencies which the state had acknowledged in the
R.A.J litigation. No effort was made to coordinate revision of the
Code, a legislative response to R.A.J, and the legislative funding
process. In short, there was virtually no effort made to provide a
basis for seeking to regain from the R.A.J court primary responsibility for assuring adequate respect for patients' interests in the
Texas public mental hospital system.393
393. A legislative oversight committee has been formed and charged with making recommendations concerning the needs of clients of the Department of Mental Health and
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OTHER CHANGES (OR NONCHANGES)

Legislative action, or nonaction, in several other areas addressed,
or that might be addressed, by the Mental Health Code is deserving
of some consideration.
A.

Immunity of Persons Particpatingin Securing Involuntary
Care

Under article 5547-18 of the 1957 Code, persons engaged in activity required or authorized by the Mental Health Code 394 were declared "free from all liability, civil or criminal, by reason of such
action" if they acted "in good faith, reasonably and without negligence. ' 39 But by negative implication, this seemed to mean that at
least civil liability for damages could exist by virtue of negligence in
performing tasks authorized by the Code. This was confirmed in
James v. Brown.396 The three physician-defendants in James had
examined the plaintiff (apparently pursuant to appointment by the
probate court) and had filed with the probate court certificates stating their opinions that the plaintiff was mentally ill and likely to
cause injury to herself or others if not immediately restrained. The
Texas Supreme Court held that under the Code, such examining
psychiatrists owe a patient a duty to exercise reasonable care. A
malpractice action will lie, therefore, for negligence in the examination, diagnosis, and reporting process.
No recommendation that this liability be modified was made by
the Task Force, but the revised Code nevertheless addressed the
matter. The revision continued what had previously been article
5547-18, 397 but added:

"Provided, however, that physicians per-

forming medical examinations and providing information to the
courts in any court proceeding held pursuant to the code shall be
considered an officer of the court and shall not be held liable for
Mental Retardation. The demands imposed upon the Department as a result of the R.A.J
settlement are clearly a matter of major concern for the committee. See Austin AmericanStatesman, June 23, 1984, at B2, col. 1-2.
394. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 18, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 508 (revised

1983). This was specifically defined as including "examination, certification, apprehension,
custody, transportation, detention, treatment or discharge of any person." Id.
395. Id
396. 637 S.W.2d 914, 918 (Tex. 1982) (duty imposed upon psychiatrist by art. 5547(1)).
397. See Mental Health Code, ch. 243, § 18, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 505, 508 (revised
1983).
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such examination or testimony when acting without malice. '398 In
regard to physicians, liability for negligence, or even gross negligence, in testifying or providing information in certificates no longer
exists.
Only upon proof of "malice" can physicians be held financially
responsible for errors made in performing their tasks under the
Code. Unfortunately, the intended meaning of malice is not clear.
In other contexts, its meaning varies but is often, if not always,
ambigious. 99 If a physician was certain at the time of his testimony
that his testimony was false, this would undoubtedly constitute malice. If the physician was merely aware of a risk that his testimony
was incorrect, it is uncertain when, if ever, this would amount to
malice. If the substance of the testimony was so incorrect that the
physician should have been aware of its actual or possible inaccuracy, then it is unlikely-but uncertain-whether the physician can
be said to have acted with malice. Given the effort in the remainder
of the revision to use meaningful language, it is quite unfortunate
that the legislature accepted such ambigious phraseology in this
context.
The provision refers only to "performing medical examinations
and providing information" in "any court proceeding" held under
the Code. It does not, therefore, affect physicians' liability for negligence in performing other tasks under the Code. Thus, physicians
are still liable for negligent administration of treatment or even for
negligently making their discretionary decision to discharge a patient. In addition, nonphysicians remain liable for negligence even
in providing input to the courts. Thus, a clinical psychologist testifying in support of an application for court-ordered treatment is apparently subject to liability if it can be established that he failed to
398. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-18 (Vernon Supp. 1984).

399. Where "actual" malice would render a slanderous statement beyond the protection of privilege, malice has been defined as knowledge that the statement was false or reckless disregard of whether it was false or not. See Ryder Truck Rentals v. Latham, 593
S.W.2d 334, 340-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ refd n.r.e.). Whether reckless disregard requires actual awareness of the risk that the statement was false is not entirely clear.
In a recent conversion case, malice was held properly defined as including "such gross indifference to the rights of another as will amount to a willful or wanton act done intentionally
and without just cause or excuse." Notion Refrigerated Express v. Ritter Bros. Co., 552
S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also Lone Star Steel
Co. v. Wahl, 636 S.W.2d 217, 222 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ)(in context of liabil-

ity for interference with future contracts, malice means "an unlawful act done intentionally
and without justification or excuse").
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use reasonable professional care in formulating the opinions to
which he testified.
Whether the immunity granted to physicians for their court-related activity is justified is open to question. Perhaps the need for
medical evaluations of proposed patients is so great that such immunity is justified as a means of encouraging physicians to provide
such evaluations. Or, given the type persons likely to be evaluated,
the risk of unjustified litigation against physicians may be so great
that only immunity can provide realistic protection. On the other
hand, it is quite anomalous to carve out this area as one in which
physicians can engage in malpractice free of financial responsibility
for resulting harm to others. In probably no other area of malpractice can the results of physician error be the deprivation of a citizen's liberty. This harm is rendered even more offensive given that
it can occur only if the negligent physician persuades the judiciary
to rely on the fruits of his malpractice. The need to avoid this extraordinarily important damage (and the involvement of the courts
in "causing" the damage) suggests that the physician exception created by the revision was quite unsound.
B.

Involuntary Treatment of Minors

Under the 1957 Code no special provisions were made for the
involuntary treatment of minors. It was widely assumed, therefore,
that unless a child was willing to accept treatment, treatment could
be provided only by using the standard "commitment" process."
Whether or to what extent this was based upon what were perceived
to be federal constitutional requirements was not clear.
In 1979, the United States Supreme Court held in Parham v.
JR.410 that at least certain children could be subjected to involuntary treatment by a summary procedure without violating federal
constitutional due process demands.10 2 No judicial procedure need
be utilized. It is necessary, however, that there be an inquiry by a
"neutral factfinder" with authority to refuse to admit the child and
400. See generally Comment, Voluntary Admission of Minors to Mental Hospitals in

Texas.- 4 Proposal,13 ST. MARY'S L.J. 621, 633-36 (1982). The author stressed problems
created under the prior Code when there was reason to believe a child was unable to provide
effective consent to hospitalization. See id at 633-36. The revised Code; of course, largely
eliminates problems of consent of minors to hospitalization.
401. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
402. See id at 607 (no formal or quasi-formal hearing necessary).
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that this inquiry include an interview with the child. The Court did
not specifically address what, if any, federal constitutional requirements existed concerning the criteria that the factfinder must apply.
The opinion strongly suggested, however, that there was no need for
the criteria to be the same as those used to determine whether adult
persons are to be subjected to involuntary treatment, and that it is
permissible for the factfinder to simply inquire whether institutionalization is medically appropriate or in the child's best interests.4 °3
Parhamdid not hold that states were required to adopt the procedures held in that case to meet minimal federal constitutional standards. Nor did the case purport to address desirable state policy in
this area. Nevertheless, the revised Code exercised the flexibility
that Parham made clear existed by authorizing certain involuntary
admissions of minors by summary methods. Incredibly, this was
done in the process of defining "voluntary" admissions, although
what is contemplated are admissions that do not in any way depend
upon the "voluntariness" of the child being treated.' If a person is
sixteen years of age or under,40 5 the Code now authorizes a request
for voluntary admission to an inpatient facility to be signed by the
parent, guardian, or managing conservator. °6 Presumably, this
makes the request one which authorizes the institution to admit, and
forcibly retain, the child as a patient. °7
No specific provision is made for the inquiry by the neutral
403. See id at 607. Procedural due process requires that a neutral factfinder have authority to refuse admission to any child "who does not satisfy the medical standards for
admission. " See id at 607 (emphasis added). The question is whether a child is mentally ill
and "can benefit from the treatment that is provided by the state." See id at 609.
404. See Ellis, Volunteering Children.: Parental Commitment ofMinors to Mental Institutions, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 840, 845 (1974) (children not volunteering, but being volunteered).
405. See TEX. REV. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-23(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984). The age
limit set by different jurisdictions is inconsistent and arbitrary at best. See, e.g., HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 334-60(2) (1976) (15 years old); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 7201 (Purdon Supp.
1984) (14 years old); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 72.23.070(3) (1982) (13 years old).
406. See TEX. REV. CrV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-23(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1984). A governmental agency or employee appointed as a guardian cannot, however, secure the child's
"voluntary" admission on this basis. See id. art. 5547-23(b) (minor's personal consent required for voluntary admissions sought by such guardians or managing conservators). In
this sense, the revised Code goes beyond federal constitutional requirements. In Parham v.
JR., the Supreme Court refused to construe due process as requiring greater procedural
safeguards for admission of a child when the state, rather than the natural parents, requests
admission. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 617-19 (1979) ("absence of adult who cares
. . . has little effect on the reliability of the initial admission decision").
407. Cf TEX. REV. ClV. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-22(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984) (admission
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factfinder, demanded by the remnants of due process, that apply to
such admissions. For all voluntary admissions, however, the Code
contemplates that the head of the facility or "his authorized, qualified designee" must make a "preliminary examination" and determine that the "the person has symptoms of mental illness and will
benefit from the services" to be provided. 40 8 This may suffice to
meet the due process requirements.
The basic rationale for this fundamental change in the Code's
philosophy concerning involuntary treatment of minors is not entirely clear. It appears to rest in large part upon the perception that
minors' expressed preferences are entitled to less weight than those
of adults for several reasons. Minors' immaturity suggests that their
preferences will less frequently be the product of informed and deliberate choice. 4°9 In addition, minors' preferences must, to some
extent, be subordinated to the preferences of their parents or guardians, who will generally be able to make more accurate choices on
matters such as treatment, and whose continued responsibility for
the minors suggests an interest in corresponding control over
them.4 10 Formal court proceedings might often be disruptive of
whatever meaningful family relationships exist and, in any case, discomforting to the minor and others involved. Moreover, such proceedings are less likely to be meaningful. If minors need not meet
regular criteria for involuntary treatment but may be compelled to
submit to treatment if this is in their "best interests," the issue is
more of a medical one than is the appropriateness of involuntary
treatment of adults. In light of this, a judicial proceeding was apparently perceived by the legislature as unlikely to effectively identify and prevent inappropriate compulsory treatment of minors.
authorized upon determination that, among other things, in the case of a child under 16, the

parent, guardian or conservator "voluntarily agrees to admission").
408. See id. art. 5547-22(a) (head of facility must inform parent, conservator, or guardian of the rights of voluntary patients).
409. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 638 (1979) (children should be legally protected

to insure full growth and development); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("law's
concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment").
410. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) ("natural bonds of affection lead

parents to act in the best interests of their children"). Children should be afforded "some
protection against their own immaturity." See Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New
Egalitarianism. Some ReservationsAbout Abandoning Youths to Their "'Rights," 1976 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 605, 650.
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Some problems are created by this change, largely because of the
decision to authorize involuntary inpatient care of children under
the obvious fiction that such treatment is "voluntary." Voluntary
patients are entitled to leave the facility within ninety-six hours of
giving notice of request for release, unless a court order is obtained
authorizing their detention. 41 ' No exception is recognized for children. It is quite unlikely that the legislature intended that children
under sixteen years of age could be admitted without regard to their
consent, but could themselves immediately put the facility to the
task of securing a court order by filing notice of a request for release.
Most likely the "notice of intent to leave" procedure can be invoked
only by notice given by the parents who "authorized" the original
admission.
Does this mean that a child institutionalized under this procedure
has no access to the courts to contest the propriety of his or her
detention? The provision for reexamination seems to exclude such
persons from coverage. 4 12 But voluntary patients-presumably including children-are specifically afforded "the right of habeas
corpus.141 3 This apparently constitutes the only mechanism by
which a child institutionalized as a "voluntary" patient is entitled to
a day in court.
If a child does secure a day in court, what standard is to be used
to determine the propriety of the child's continued institutionalization? There is no indication that the legislature intended that in this
context the ordinary involuntary treatment criteria are to be applied.
Is the only question before the court whether the parent or guardian
has a "voluntary" desire that the child be retained? Perhaps some
sort of judicial review is available of the decision that the neutral
factfinder must apparently make before admitting the child. Thus
411. SeeTEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-25(1) (Vernon Supp. 1984). The patient

can withdraw his own request to leave by a written withdrawal. See id.
art. 5547-25(1)(A).
In addition, a patient can be prevented from leaving by an application for court-ordered
mental health services, or by the filing for an emergency detention order. See id art. 554725(l)(B). Where a minor plaintiff was voluntarily admitted under the prior Code, a federal
district court, relying on the fact that plaintiff could secure release in 96 hours, questioned
whether plaintiff had established a sufficient case and controversy. His claim was based
upon a deprivation of constitutional rights for incarceration in a solitary confinement room
at the Terrell State Hospital. See Jenkins v. Cowley, 384 F. Supp. 441, 442 n.3 (N.D. Tex.
1974).
412. See TEX. REV.Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-56 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
413. Id art. 5547-25(2).
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the question posed in a habeas corpus proceeding brought by such a
"voluntary" minor patient might be whether in fact the child has
symptoms of mental illness and will benefit from the services provided in the institution. 14
In such a habeas corpus proceeding, should the habeas court address the issue de novo? This would mean that a child has the right
to a full judicial consideration of the propriety of hospitalization,
but it must be invoked by means of the habeas corpus procedure.
On the other hand, a habeas proceeding might present the habeas
court with a far more limited issue. Thus, the habeas court might be
limited to inquiring whether the "neutral factfinder" procedure was
followed and, if so, whether there is some, or perhaps a "reasonable," factual basis for the conclusion by that factfinder that the
child has symptoms of mental illness and will benefit from the
services.4" 5
In a different vein, the revised Code also provides that a minor
sixteen years of age or older may be admitted to voluntary inpatient
care without the consent of the parent, guardian, or conservator.41 6
This reflects a view that such persons should be able to seek and
obtain services free of arbitrary interference by parents. Parents, it
was feared, might place more importance upon avoiding the stigma
of illness than upon securing needed assistance for an ill child.
C.

State Appeal

The right of a person ordered to submit to treatment to appeal the
order is preserved in the revised Code.417 It remains unclear
414. See id art. 5547-22(a).
415. See Exparte Sentell, 153 Tex. 252, 259, 266 S.W.2d 365, 370 (1954). It is likely

that such proceedings would be governed by the general rule that the relator in a habeas
corpus proceeding has the burden of proof. This might argue in favor of deciding the issue
de novo. Placing the burden of proof on the child seeking release would mean that a meaningful difference would continue to exist between a standard judicial proceeding in which
the justification for institutional treatment had to be proven and a statutory scheme in which
habeas corpus was the child's only avenue of judicial recourse. It would also, however,
render the habeas corpus proceeding of less substantive value. If the issue is not the de novo
question, it may be whether the child can establish the lack of almost any evidence justifying
the conclusion of the neutral factfinder. Cf. Exparte Webb, 625 S.W.2d 372, 374-75 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1981, writ dism'd) (habeas relief denied to committed patient where
"more than a scintilla" of evidence existed on which judicial order of commitment could

have been based).
416. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-22(b) (Vernon Supp. 1984).

417. See id. art. 5547-57 (such cases given preference on the docket).
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whether the right to appeal is limited to the persons ordered to submit to treatment. In State v. Jones4 18 the state sought to appeal an
order entered under the prior Code providing for inpatient treatment of sixty days duration followed by thirty further days of outpatient care.419 The state urged that the trial judge was not authorized
to specify in the order the period of the ninety days of treatment that
are to involve inpatient treatment, nor did the evidence support the
underlying conclusion that only sixty days of inpatient treatment
were indicated. 420 The Austin court of civil appeals held that in the
absence of any authorization for such appeals in the Mental Health
Code, the state was not authorized to appeal. 2 ' Consequently the
appeal was dismissed.422
The revised Code does not address the matter. The appellate review provision does not specify what appeals are authorized, but
begins by addressing the court in which an appropriate appeal is to
be filed. 23 It is clear that the revised Code, like its predecessor, was
drafted with patient appeals in mind. Whether this should be regarded as evidencing a sufficient intent to exclude appeals by the
state is, at best, problematic.
In criminal litigation, Texas has a strong-but not unqualifiedpolicy of barring efforts by the state to obtain higher court relief
when a defendant "wins" below. 24 This appears to be based upon
the notion that requiring a defendant to repeatedly defend against
418. 570 S.W.2d 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1978, no writ).
419. See id.at 122.
420. See id at 122-23.
421. See id.at 123.
422. See id at 123 ("only person committed" has right to appeal).
423. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-57(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984) ("filed in the
court of appeals for the county in which the order was entered").
424. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 26; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 44.01 (Vernon
Supp. 1984) (state "shall have no right of appeal in criminal cases"). A parallel can be
drawn between juvenile delinquency cases and mental health commitment proceedings,
since both are civil actions and both involve a substantial impairment of the individual's
liberty. Compare O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975) (mental health institutionalization raises the question of the constitutional right to liberty) with In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 366 (1970) ("proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be
'delinquent' and subjected to loss of liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony
prosecution"). The right of the state to appeal juvenile delinquency verdicts has yet to be
conclusively decided in Texas because of conflicting courts of appeals decisions. Compare
State v. Marshall, 503 S.W.2d 875, 876-78 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lIst Dist.] 1973, no
writ) (state does not have right to appeal juvenile delinquency hearing verdict) with State v.
L__J_
B_ 561 S.W.2d 547, 550 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, no writ) (the "pro-
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state efforts to convict creates an unacceptable risk that the defensive efforts of even innocent defendants will be eventually worn
down. In addition, there seems to be a sense that a part from any
risk of such errors, fairness to the accused dictates that repeated efforts to convict be barred. Whether these considerations apply with
equal strength to the mental health context is open to dispute. Perhaps the nonpunitive nature of mental health proceedings means
that the dangers posed by providing the state with access to the appellate courts are significantly less. Unlike the criminal situation, in
mental health cases an impaired appellee, as well as the state, might
benefit from appellate correction of an error in the appellee's favor
below, if that error interfered with the provision of justified treatment. It is arguable that the numerous gaps and ambiguities in even
the revised Mental Health Code create an especially important need
for appellate litigation to resolve the resulting issues. To the extent
that this is the case, that would, of course, be furthered by extending
the right of appeal to the state.
The arguments against state appeal are strongest in regard to appeals from a proposed patient's win "on the merits," that is, from a
finding that, at the hearing, the state has failed in its efforts to prove
the allegations in the application. It is arguable that the appellate
review section of the revised Code, by implication, bars appeals
from such orders. The statute refers to "all appeals from orders requiring court-ordered mental health services. 425
At most, the revised Code might permit the state to appeal from
orders requiring court-ordered treatment, but, nevertheless, falling
short of what the state sought from the trial court. If state appeals
were so limited, perhaps the need for appellate case law justifies the
arguably limited imposition upon patients that might result if the
state, as well as the patient, were permitted to appeal.
X.

CONCLUSIONS

There is no doubt that revision of the Texas Mental Health Code
was long overdue. Nor is there doubt that the 1983 revision significantly improved the Code. The increased specificity in the criteria
for involuntary treatment was seriously needed. As revised, the
hibition of appeals by the state" has no application to juvenile delinquency cases because
they are civil cases).
425. See TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5547-57(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
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Code addresses more of the procedural questions that have been,
and will be, raised as mental health proceedings are taken more seriously as legal'proceedings by judges and attorneys. The efforts to
provide a better framework for utilization of alternatives to full-time
institutionalization are obviously well intentioned.
But in a number of ways the revision is unfortunate. There is no
indication that the Task Force or the legislature was willing to critically reconsider basic aspects of the structure for providing involuntary treatment. Thus, no serious consideration was given to the
accuracy of the assumption that prehearing detention should not, as
a matter of routine, be available for proposed patients. Perhaps the
most flagrant defect in the amended Code is the failure to realistically consider the nature and strength of demands for prehearing
detention, and then to devise a reasonable accommodation between
those demands and the proposed patients' interest in prehearing
liberty.
A number of the provisions of the amended Code reflect either or
both a failure to consider all aspects of an area or a failure to address those aspects with the care necessary for a largely procedural
statute. The criteria for involuntary care, for example, contain a
number of ambiguities that are likely to prove quite troublesome in
any conscientious effort to apply them seriously. A number of matters relating to hearing procedure are left unresolved. Perhaps most
importantly, the revision clearly short-changes the area of patients'
rights by failing to address many areas of inevitable concern and
addressing others in only a cursory fashion.
To some extent, of course, this may reflect an effort on the part of
the legislature to delegate responsibility for developing such matters
as remedies for violations of patients' rights to the judiciary. To the
extent that this is the case, however, it arguably reflects an unfortunate abdication by the legislature of its responsibility to develop
both general policy and implementation methods in areas such as
compelled treatment. There is at least some reason to believe that
the Texas judiciary is insufficiently sensitive to the interests of impaired persons and, therefore, cannot reasonably be relied upon to
perform such delegated tasks with adequate care.4 26
426. At a time when most American jurisdictions were debating whether the burden of
proof in hospitalization cases should be "beyond a reasonable doubt" or "clear and convincing evidence," the Texas Supreme Court embraced the "preponderance of the evidence"
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The major defects in the revised Code are probably related to the
manner in which the task of revision was undertaken. Involuntary
mental health treatment raises a large number of volatile and complex issues. Yet, the development of a comprehensive scheme
resolving these issues was relegated largely to an informal volunteer
body. The Mental Health Code Task Force was a citizen and "consumer" group composed of few persons with experience or sophistication in law reform. No serious staff support was provided. This
procedure was quite inadequate for full development of the
problems, alternative possible solutions, and reasoned decisions to
be made on the numerous complex issues. No serious sustained attention was given to the proposal in the legislative process, although
some minor changes in the Task Force's recommendations were
made before the revision was finally enacted. In general, there was
little sensitivity to the possibility that the task was an extremely
complex one requiring sustained effort and attention by persons familiar with both care delivery problems and legally-related concerns
and issues. Given the manner in which the revision was undertaken, perhaps it is surprising that the process produced a revision
as effective as that finally enacted.

standard. See State v. Addington, 557 S.W.2d 511 (Tex. 1977); State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d
563, 563-64 (Tex. 1977). Upon further review in Addington, the United States Supreme
Court characterized the Texas decisions as the only state judicial decisions concluding that
the preponderance of the evidence standard meets due process. See Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
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